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Summary
Cloud computing is becoming an important topic in both industry and academic
communities. While cloud computing provides many benefits, it also brings in new
challenges in research, especially in information security. One of the main challenges is
how to achieve a pair of apparently conflicting requirements simultaneously: efficiency
in communication, storage and computation on both client and server sides, and
security against outside and internal attackers. Security concerns consist of data
confidentiality and data integrity.
This dissertation is devoted to efficiently verify integrity in cloud storage and
outsourced database. The main strategy is to devise new homomorphic cryptographic
methods.
For cloud storage, we propose three efficient methods that allow users to remotely
check the integrity of their files stored in a potentially dishonest cloud storage server,
without downloading their files. These three methods rely on three underlying ho-
momorphic authentication methods, which we design with different techniques. All
of these three underlying homomorphic authentication methods support linear homo-
morphism: Given a public key and a sequence of message-tag pairs, any third party
can compute a valid authentication tag for a linear combination of these messages.
Furthermore, the second and third authentication methods support an additional ho-
momorphism: Given a public key and an authentication tag of a long message, any
third party can compute a valid authentication tag for a short message, as long as the
short message and the long message satisfy a predetermined predicate. We prove se-
curity properties of the proposed schemes under various cryptographic hard problem
assumptions.
viii
For outsourced database, we propose an efficient authentication method that al-
lows users to query their database which is maintained by a potentially dishonest
server, and verify the correctness and completeness of the query results returned by
the server. Supported database queries include aggregate count/min/max/median
query conditional on multidimensional rectangular range selection, and non-aggregate
multidimensional rectangular range selection query. The proposed method relies
on our newly constructed functional encryption scheme. This functional encryption
scheme allows a third party, with a delegation key that is generated on the fly, to
compute a designated function (the function is specified in the delegation key) value
of the plaintext from the corresponding ciphertext, yet without knowing the value of
the plaintext. We prove security properties of the proposed schemes under various
cryptographic hard problem assumptions.
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Software as a Service (SaaS), among other forms of cloud computing, is becoming a
trend in industry. By outsourcing IT services (e.g. database management, backup
services) to a professional service provider, users (e.g. companies, organizations or
individuals ) can reduce expensive operation cost to maintain IT services, and are
relieved to focus on their core business.
Outsourcing computation tasks and IT services to a potentially dishonest cloud
service provider, bring in many research challenges, especially in information security.
Indeed, any third party cloud service provider could be considered as potentially
dishonest to a prudent user. One of the main challenges is how to achieve a pair
of apparently conflicting requirements simultaneously: efficiency in communication,
storage and computation on both client and server sides, and security against outside
and internal attackers. Security concerns consist of two main aspects among others:
• Computation confidentiality and privacy: The server is able to compute a re-
sult upon a query provided by a client, yet both query and result are in some
encrypted form and hidden from both the server and outside attackers.
• Computation authentication and integrity: The computation results requested
by clients and generated by the server from clients’ data should be correct.
Clients should be able to efficiently verify the correctness of the returned com-
putation results. Such correctness verification should be more efficient than
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
direct computation of these results from scratch.
In general, privacy-preserving and/or verifiable delegated computation for any
polynomial time computable function can be implemented in polynomial time [GGP10,
CKV10], due to Gentry’s recent breakthrough in constructing fully homomorphic en-
cryption [Gen09]. A natural and meaningful question is that: Can we design more
efficient solutions than the generic solution for a smaller class of functions? As Whit-
field Diffie said, “The whole point of cloud computing is economy” [Dif09].
Indeed, before the generic polynomial time solution appears in 2010, the research
community has studied privacy preserving and/or verifiable delegation of computa-
tion for smaller class of functions for almost a decade. As one of the first few examples
of outsourced IT services, outsourced database and its security [HILM02,MNT06] be-
came a hot research topic in database and security communities, since 2002. Recently,
there is growing interests in remote verification of integrity of data stored in a cloud
storage server [JK07,ABC+07,CX08], which is another example of secure outsourced
IT services.
1.1 Our Results and Contributions
In this dissertation, we focus on only integrity aspect of delegation of two sorts of
computation tasks: cloud storage and outsourced database. The goal of this disserta-
tion is to construct efficient and reliable delegation schemes for proofs of storage and
verifiable outsourced database. Our main strategy is to devise efficient homomorphic
cryptography methods, which has been proved to be an effective and powerful tools for
such task. This dissertation is divided into two parts. Our results and contributions
can be summarized as below.
1.1.1 Part I: Proofs of Storage
Problem.
In Part I of this dissertation, we are interested in this problem: Alice, with a small
and reliable storage, stores her file F together with some authentication information
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at a potentially dishonest cloud storage server Bob, who has a large storage. Later,
Alice will periodically and remotely verify whether Bob indeed keeps the file F intact,
in an efficient manner.
Results.
In Part I, we propose three methods that allow Alice to verify the integrity of her file
stored in the untrusted cloud storage efficiently and reliably, without downloading
her file during a verification and without keeping a local copy of the file:
• In Chapter 4, we propose a homomorphic Message Authentication Code scheme
named S1 and apply S1 to construct a proofs of storage scheme named POS1.
The resulting proofs of storage scheme POS1 is very efficient in communication
and computation.
• In Chapter 5, we propose a homomorphic Message Authentication Code scheme
named S2 which supports two sorts of homomorphic properties, and apply S2
to construct a proofs of storage scheme named POS2. The constructed scheme
POS2 is very efficient in communication and storage, and is practical in com-
putation.
• In Chapter 6, we propose a proofs of storage scheme named POS3 that achieves
similar complexity as the second scheme, using different techniques. The con-
struction of of POS3 is conceptually simpler than POS2.
We prove the security properties of the above three proofs of storage methods condi-
tional on various cryptographic hard problem assumptions (i.e. Strong Diffie-Hellman
Assumption, Large Integer Factorization Assumption, assumption that secure pseudo-
random function exists), under Proofs of Retrievability (POR) security formulation
given by Juels and Kaliski [JK07] or Provable Data Possession (PDP) security for-
mulation given by Ateniese et al. [ABC+07]. A brief summary of complexities of these
three schemes is given in Table 1.1.
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Table 1.1: Complexities of the three proofs of storage schemes POS1, POS2, and
POS3, proposed in Part I of this dissertation. All of these three solutions require
only O(λ) communication, storage and computation cost on client’s (Alice’s) side,
independent on the file size. More detailed complexity analysis will be given later in
Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6, respectively.
Scheme Server Storage Computation Computation Public Key Security
Overhead (Preprocess) (Prove) Size Model
POS1 |F| |F|/λ O(λ) O(λ) POR
POS2 |F|/m |F|/λ O(λm) O(λm) POR
POS3 |F|/m |F|/λ O(λm) O(λ) PDP
Notation: λ is the security parameter, m is the size of a block in POS2 and POS3, and |F| represents
the file size (after error erasure encoding).
1.1.2 Part II: Verifiable Outsourced Database
Problem.
In Part II of this dissertation, we are interested in the integrity of the query results
from an outsourced database service provider. Alice has a set D of d-dimensional
integer points. Alice chooses her private key and generates authentication tag T for
data set D under her private key. Alice passes the data set D together with the
authentication tag T, to an untrusted service provider Bob, and removes local copies
of D and T. Later, Alice issues some query over D to Bob, and Bob should produce
the query result and a proof based on D and T. Alice wants to verify the integrity
of the query result against the proof, using only her private key. In Part II of this
dissertation, we consider aggregate query conditional on multidimensional rectangular
range selection. In its basic form, a query asks for the total number of data points
within a d-dimensional range.
Authenticating Aggregate Count Query.
We are concerned about the number of communication bits required and the size
of the tag T. We propose a scheme that requires O(d2 log2N) communication bits
per query and linear size authentication tag T w.r.t. the size of dataset D, to au-
thenticate an aggregate count query conditional on d-dimensional rectangular range
selection, where N is the number of points in the dataset. The security of our scheme
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relies on Generalized Knowledge of Exponent Assumption proposed by Wu and Stin-
son [WS07].
Authenticating Aggregate Min/Max/Median Queries and Non-aggregate
RangeSelect Query.
Besides counting, our scheme can be extended to support finding of the minimum,
maximum or median, and usual (non-aggregate) range selection with similar com-
plexity: O(d2 log2N) communication bits per query and linear size authentication
tag T w.r.t. the size of dataset D.
Functional Encryption.
The low communication bandwidth is achieved due to a new functional encryption
scheme, which we specially design by exploiting a property of BBG HIBE scheme [BBG05].
This functional encryption scheme allows a third party, with a delegation key that
is generated on the fly, to compute a designated function value of the plaintext from
the corresponding ciphertext, yet without knowing the value of the plaintext. This
designated function is a two-input one-way [Gol06] function, where one input is the
plaintext and the other input is secretly embedded in the delegation key. This new
functional encryption scheme may have independent interests.
1.2 Organization
Except Chapter 13 at the end which concludes the whole dissertation, the rest of this
dissertation consists of two parts. Part I includes Chapter 2 to Chapter 6, and is
devoted to proofs of storage problem. Part II includes Chapter 7 to Chapter 12, and
is devoted to the verifiable outsourced database problem.
1.2.1 Organization of Part I
In the first part, Chapter 2 introduces the background on proofs of storage problem
and Chapter 3 gives the formulation. In the subsequent three chapters, we will
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propose three proofs of storage schemes. In Chapter 4, we propose a homomorphic
MAC scheme S1 and apply it to construct a proofs of storage scheme POS1. We prove
the security property of POS1 under the POR model. In Chapter 5, we propose a
homomorphic MAC scheme S2 and apply it to construct a proofs of storage scheme
POS2. We prove the security property of POS2 under the POR model. In Chapter 6,
we propose the third proofs of storage scheme POS3 and prove its security under PDP
model.
1.2.2 Organization of Part II
The second part of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 7 gives an in-
troduction on the verifiable outsourced database problem and reviews related works.
Chapter 8 gives an overview of our main scheme. Chapter 9 presents the problem
formulation and security definition. The new functional encryption scheme is con-
structed in Chapter 10. Our main scheme for count query is described and analyzed
in Chapter 11 and its extensions for min/max/median and range selection queries are
given in Chapter 12. The full proof of security properties of the functional encryption
scheme and the authentication scheme is in Appendix A.
Part I
Proofs of Storage:




Storing data in a cloud storage, for example Amazon Cloud Drive, Microsoft Skydrive,
or Dropbox, is gaining popularity recently. We are considering scenarios where users
may have concerns of the integrity of their data stored in the cloud storage. Such
prudent users may not be simply satisfied with the cloud storage server’s promise on
maintaining the data integrity. Instead, they desire a technical way to verify that
whether the cloud storage server is keeping his promise and following the service
level agreement (SLA). That is, these users want to base their data integrity on the
incapability of cloud storage server to break SLA without being caught. Threat to
integrity of data stored in cloud is indeed realistic. It is reported that Dropbox keeps
all user accounts unlocked for almost 4 hours [wir] and allows adversaries to read and
modify users’ data files, due to a software bug. Very recently, a similar incident occurs
to Twitter [Twi]: A software bug in twitter’s official client allows adversaries to access
(read and modify) user accounts. Several events about massive data loss in cloud have
been reported, e.g. Microsoft Sidekick [Wik11], Amazon Cloud Service [Bus, Ama],
Gmail [Goo11] and Hotmail [Mic11]. There are also plenty of data loss cases that are
claimed by individuals but neither confirmed nor denied officially by the cloud server,
e.g. data loss cases in Dropbox [Dro11].
8
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 9
2.1 Problem Description
We are interested in this problem: Suppose a user Alice with a small and reliable
storage, stores her file with a potentially dishonest cloud storage server Bob who
has a large storage. How can Alice remotely, periodically and efficiently verifies the
integrity of her file that is stored in Bob’s storage?
2.1.1 Remote Integrity Verification
“Remote Integrity Verification” is a counterpart of local data integrity verification,
which is a historic and well-studied problem. Existing solutions to local data in-
tegrity verification include collision resistant hash [NIS02] and message authentica-
tion code [BCK96] for adversarial errors, and cyclic redundancy check [PB61] (CRC)
for random errors, among others. Unlike local data integrity verification, the verifier
in remote data integrity verification does not possess (even a small portion of) the
data file at the time of verification.
2.1.2 Periodical Integrity Verification
It is desired that such remote data integrity verification could be done by a practically
unlimited number of times. For conditional secure remote data integrity verification
methods, it is required that, with respect to any fixed polynomial poly(·), for any
security parameter λ, the verification method can reliably run for at least poly(λ)
times, where the polynomial poly(·) is fixed before the value of λ is chosen. The
implication of this requirement is that, the communication cost per each remote
verification should be as small as possible.
2.1.3 Efficient Integrity Verification
We concern about the efficiency of such verification methods in communication1,
storage, and computation, on both client side (i.e. Alice’s side) and server side (i.e.
Bob’s side). Furthermore, efficiency (computation and storage and communication)
1Alice’s communication cost is always equal to Bob’s communication cost.
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on client side takes priority. Ideally, all of computation cost, storage overhead and
communication cost on client side should be O(λ), independent on the file size, where
λ is the security parameter. Indeed, all of three proofs of storage schemes POS1,
POS2 and POS3 satisfy this efficiency requirement.
2.1.4 Simple but Undesirable Methods
The above requirements exclude the following straightforward approaches, which are
either efficient or robust, but not both.
Keeping a hash value.
Alice keeps a hash value of her file in local storage. In a verification, Alice asks Bob to
compute the hash value over her file stored in Bob’s storage. The hash value returned
by Bob will be compared to the one kept in Alice’s local storage. This method can
support verification for only one time, since dishonest Bob may cache the hash value
and delete Alice’s file. This method can be generalized in this way: Alice precomputes
a number of t keyed-hash values under t different random hash keys, and in each out
of t verifications, Alice consumes one random key out of t hash keys.
Downloading the file.
Alice keeps a hash value of her file in local storage. In each verification, Alice down-
loads her file from Bob and verifies file integrity locally. This method suffers from a
large communication cost per verification.
Keeping a local copy of the file.
Alice persistently keeps a copy of her file in local storage. In each verification, Alice
sends a random key to Bob and asks Bob to compute a key-ed hash value over her file.
Alice computes the key-ed hash value over her local copy of the file w.r.t. the same
key and compare the result with the hash value returned from Bob. This method
suffers from large storage cost on client side.
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2.2 Two Early Approaches
Now we brief two early approaches for proofs of storage: One based on RSA method,
and the other based on Message Authentication Code. These two approaches have
influence in many subsequent solutions to proofs of storage, including Ateniese et
al. [ABC+07], Chang and Xu [CX08], Shacham and Waters [SW08a], and all of three
solutions proposed in the Part I of this dissertation.
2.2.1 RSA based method
This scheme appears in [DQS03,FB06]: Alice chooses two primes p and q, and com-
pute a RSA modulus N = pq, where N is made public and p, q are kept secretly. Alice
also chooses a random integer g < N which is co-prime to N . Suppose Alice wants to
backup a file F to Bob’s storage. Alice treats F as a single large integer, and computes(
F mod (p− 1)(q− 1)) and pi = (gF mod (p−1)(q−1) mod N). At the end of the setup
between Alice and Bob, Alice has only (N, g, pi) in her storage and Bob has (N, F)









= gdF mod N .





2.2.2 MAC based method
This scheme appears in Naor and Rothblum [NR05,NR09]: Alice chooses a Message
Authentication Code scheme (for example, HMAC [BCK96]) and generates a random
private key k for the MAC scheme. To backup her file F to Bob, Alice encodes
file F using some error erasure code (e.g. Reed-Solomon code [RS60]) to obtain file
blocks Fi, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, such that only a fraction of blocks Fi’s can recover the
original file F using the decoding algorithm of the error erasure code. For each i, Alice
produces a MAC value σi for the combination of block Fi and index i, under private
key k. Then Alice interacts with Bob to carry out a setup. At the end of setup,
Alice has only the private key k and file size n (in term of number of blocks) in her
storage and Bob has all blocks and MAC values {(i, Fi, σi) : i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1}. In
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each verification, Alice sends a random subset C ⊂ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1} to Bob. Bob is
supposed to return {(i, Fi, σi) : i ∈ C}. After receiving the response, Alice will check
each tuple (i, Fi, σi) using the MAC scheme, with private key k.
2.2.3 Advantages and Disadvantages
The above two methods can reliably verify integrity of Alice’s data stored in Bob’s
storage for practically unlimited times. The RSA based scheme is very efficient in
communication and storage: O(λ) communication cost and O(λ) storage overhead
on both client (Alice) and server (Bob) side, where λ is the bit-length of the RSA
modulus N . The MAC based scheme requires O(λ) storage overhead on client side
and accesses only a portion of the file of interest per verification, where λ is the
bit-length of the private key k.
However, the RSA based scheme has to access every single bit of the file of interest
during each verification, and the MAC based scheme has large communication cost
and large storage overhead on server side. Subsequent solutions improve these two
approaches in efficiency from various aspects.
Particularly, the first part of this dissertation will propose three solutions to the
problem described above. In all of these three methods, communication cost, storage
overhead and computation cost on client side are in O(λ). In each verification, only
a small portion of files are accessed on the server side, independent on file size.
Furthermore, in the second and third methods, the storage overhead is just a fraction2
of the original file size.
2.3 Tools and Building blocks
Many constructions of proofs of storage consist of three components: (1) Chunking
and Indexing; (2) Error Erasure Coding and Random sampling; (3) Homomorphic
cryptography. Each of them is described as below.
2This fraction is a configurable system parameter.
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2.3.1 Chunking and Indexing
An efficient proofs of storage scheme only requires a prover to access a sublinear
fraction of data file for one verification request. Thus the data file has to be broken
into many small units and each unit gets a unique identifier, otherwise the verifier has
no way to tell the prover to access which part of the file and to ensure the prover’s
response is indeed computed from those selected data units.
We call such small unit as block. Typically, the identifier of a data block in a data
file F consists of two parts: (1) a sequence number to distinguish it from other blocks
in the same file; (2) a unique file identifier for F to distinguish it from other files. A
file F with file identifier id and consisting of n blocks is represented as (F0, . . . , Fn−1),
where for each i ∈ [0, n − 1], the i-th block Fi has the unique identifier id‖i across
all data blocks and all files. Here the binary operator ‖ denotes the unambiguous
string concatenation which allows unique unambiguous decomposition. Readers will
find that in all proofs of storage schemes proposed later in this dissertation, the
authentication tag for the i-th block Fi in file F, which has identifier id, involves
id‖i. Thus, the verifier can distinguish different files and different blocks during a
verification. Notice that for proofs of storage schemes [WWL+09, EKPT09] built
on authenticated data structure (e.g. Merkle Hash Tree [Mer80] or authenticated
skip list [EKPT09]), the index information may be implicitly embedded into the
authentication meta-data.
2.3.2 Random Sampling and Error Erasure Code
We just discussed that a file is broken into many blocks, and in a verification the prover
only accesses a small subset of blocks specified by the verifier. A natural question
is that: How should the verifier sample the subset of blocks? If no extra knowledge
about error distribution among blocks is present, uniformly random sampling could
be the best strategy for the verifier to maximize the error detection probability.
Error erasure encoding (e.g. Reed-Solomon code [RS60]) allows the verifier to
achieve high error detection rate when randomly sampling only a small number (pos-
sibly constant) of blocks during one verification, at the cost of file size expansion.
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Suppose an error erasure encoded file consists of n blocks F0, . . . , Fn−1, such that any
ρn number of blocks can recover the original file, where ρn ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , n}. If the
original file is unable to be recovered using the error erasure decoding algorithm, then
at most ρn−1 number of data blocks remain intact. The probability that a randomly
chosen block is intact is at most ρ− 1
n
, and the probability (False Acceptance Rate)




< ρ`. Thus a random sample of size ` will hit at least one corrupted block
with probability at least 1 − (ρ− 1
n
)`
> 1 − ρ`. This lower bound is a decreasing
function of ρ ∈ [ 1
n
, 1], indicating that the more redundancy introduced in the error
erasure encoding (i.e. the smaller ρ), the higher the hitting probability is. Notice that
if these ` blocks are chosen at random such that all ` blocks have distinct indices,
i.e. random sampling without replacement, the above lower bound on error detection
probability still holds.
Table 2.1 lists the “False Acceptance Rate” that ` random samples do not hit any
corrupted data blocks with ρ ∈ {0.98, 0.99} and ` ∈ {100, 300, 500, 700}. Note that
the the storage overhead due to erasure encoding is 1/0.99 − 1 ≈ 0.0101 of original
file size, if ρ = 0.99; 1/0.98− 1 ≈ 0.0204, if ρ = 0.98.
Table 2.1: The False Acceptance Rate Versus Challenge Size ` and Erasure Code Rate
ρ. The challenge size ` represents the number of data blocks accessed in a verification.
Challenge Size False Acceptance Rate ρ` False Acceptance Rate ρ`
with ρ = 0.99 with ρ = 0.98
` = 100 0.366032341 0.132619556
` = 300 0.049040894 0.002332506
` = 500 0.006570483 0.000041024
` = 700 0.000880311 0.000000722
Remark 1 We remark two points:
• In a verification of proofs of storage scheme, the verifier chooses a subset C
of ` indices, and asks the prover to check those data blocks with index within
the set C. To reduce communication cost, a natural thought [ABC+07] is to
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represent the set C compactly with a short seed s of some secure pseudoran-
dom function PRF: C = {PRFs(i) : i ∈ [0, ` − 1]}. However, Shacham and
Waters [SW08a] points out that this intuitive method actually requires rigorous
security proof, since the dishonest prover knows the values of seeds and the typi-
cal indistinguishability argument of pseudorandom function does not apply here.
This issue influences works [ABC+07,ABC+11b,CX08,SW08a] and all of three
schemes in Part I of this dissertation. The consequence is that, if we adopt this
compact representation of set C, our proposed schemes are only provable secure
in random oracle model, instead of standard model.
• Some proofs of storage schemes built on Merkle Hash Tree choose consecutive
blocks, in order to reduce proof size, at the cost of sacrificing error detection
probability. In comparison, in all of proofs of storage schemes proposed in this
dissertation, the proof size is independent on the choices of the subset of blocks
to be checked in a verification.
2.3.3 Homomorphic Cryptography
Previously, we analyzed the probability that a random sample of size ` will hit at
least one corrupted block, when the encoded file is so corrupted such that the original
file cannot be recovered. Once the hit event occurs, the cryptographic authentication
method should detect errors with overwhelming high probability—this is a require-
ment in security aspect. In the efficiency aspect, ` selected blocks and authentication
tags are too large as a proof. Ideally, a homomorphic authentication method may
allow the prover to aggregate those ` block-tag pairs into a single block-tag pair as
proof, and the verifier can detect any error among these ` blocks caused by a compu-
tationally bounded adversary with overwhelming high probability, by checking only
the single aggregated block-tag pair.
Linearly homomorphic cryptography allows the prover to produce an authenti-
cation tag for a linear combination of the ` selected data blocks with only a public
key. Among various homomorphic cryptography, linearly homomorphic cryptography
could be a good choice in constructing efficient proofs of storage scheme, since very
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efficient linearly homomorphic authentication scheme exists, and more importantly,
the original data blocks can be recovered efficiently from a number of authenticated
aggregated blocks by solving a linear equation system.
2.3.4 Framework
A typical framework of proofs of storage scheme is as below: A data file is error erasure
encoded and the encoded file consists of many small blocks. Each file is distinguished
from other files with a unique identifier and each data block is distinguished from
the other blocks within the same file with a unique sequence number. For each data
block, an authentication tag is generated w.r.t. the corresponding file identifier and
block sequence number, using some homomorphic authentication method. During a
verification, the verifier samples a random subset of ` data blocks, and the prover
produces an aggregated block-tag pair from these selected ` block-tag pairs by apply-
ing the homomorphic property. Only the aggregated block-tag pair is sent back as
proof to the verifier. Due to the security property of the homomorphic authentication
method, if verifier accepts the proof, then with overwhelming high probability, those
` selected data blocks are intact. The integrity of these ` blocks implies the integrity
of the original data file with high probability, due to the error erasure encoding.
All of Ateniese et al. [ABC+07,ABC+11b,AKK09], Chang and Xu [CX08], Shacham
and Waters [SW08a], and the three schemes POS1, POS2 and POS3 proposed in Part
I of this dissertation, fit in the above framework.
2.4 Related Work
2.4.1 Early Approaches
Our research is motivated by applications in remote-backup and peer-to-peer back-
up [ATS04, BBST02, LD06]. Peer-to-peer backup system requires a mechanism to
maintain the availability and integrity of data stored in peer nodes. Li and Dabek [LD06]
proposed to choose neighboring nodes based on the social relationships and relies on
the heuristic assumption that people are more likely cooperative with friends.
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2.4.2 Online Memory Checker and Sublinear Authenticator
Remote integrity verification has a close relationship with memory integrity verifica-
tion [BEG+91, SCG+03, NR05, DNRV09]. The notion of authenticator proposed by
Naor and Rothblum [NR05] is formulated for memory integrity checker. There is an
essential difference between memory checker and proofs of storage problem studied
in this dissertation: in the memory checker problem, an honest prover will follow
the specified protocol to verify its storage, where the storage is untrusted and could
be altered by outside attackers or random hardware failure; in the proofs of storage
problem, both the prover and its storage are untrusted, such that the prover could
do anything3 during a verification and the storage could be altered carefully by the
dishonest prover. Consequently, any solution to a proofs of storage problem is also
a solution to the memory checker problem. Thus, the lower bound on complexity
of memory checker discovered by Naor and Rothblum [NR05] also applies to proofs
of storage. Additionally, the idea of introducing redundancy to tradeoff resources is
useful in proofs of storage.
2.4.3 Proofs of Retrievability and Provable Data Possession
Recently, there is a growing interest in the cryptographic aspects of cloud storage
problem. Perhaps Filho and Barreto [FB06] first studied the scenario where the ver-
ifier does not have the original. They described two potential applications: uncheat-
able data transfer and demonstrating data possession, and proposed the RSA-based
scheme. Juels and Kaliski [JK07] proposed a formulation called Proofs of Retriev-
ability POR for the proofs of storage problem. Essentially, in a POR scheme, if the
cloud storage server can pass verification with a noticeable probability, then the veri-
fier can retrieve the original data from messages collected during polynomially many
verification interactions between the verifier and the cloud storage server. So POR
formulation allows a user to ensure whether his/her file is indeed in the cloud storage
in an intact form without actually downloading the file. However, the POR con-
struction in Juels and Kaliski [JK07] can support only a predefined constant number
3The only limitation is that the prover’s computation resource is polynomially bounded.
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of verifications. A refined security formulation is given in [BJO09b] .
Ateniese et al. [ABC+07] gave an alternative formulation called Provable Data
Possession for proofs of storage problem, and proposed an efficient construction.
Their method can be viewed as an extension of the RSA-based scheme. Similarly, the
scheme named RSAh given in our publication [CX08] exploits similar idea, and the
third scheme POS3 proposed in this dissertation is a refined version of RSAh, which
is more efficient than RSAh and Ateniese et al. [ABC+07].
Shacham and Waters [SW08a] proposed two efficient constructions of POR, where
one scheme supports private key verification and the other supports public key veri-
fication.
Ateniese and Kamara and Katz [AKK09] studied how to utilize homomorphic
linear identification scheme to construct proofs of storage scheme. Dodis and Vad-
han and Wichs [DVW09] studied how to construct proofs of retrievability scheme
through hardness application. All of schemes in [ABC+07,CX08,SW08a,AKK09] uti-
lize some underlying linear homomorphic authentication methods, which also has ap-
plications in network coding [AB09,BFKW09]. Several proofs of storage schemes with
pre-defined number of verifications have been proposed in works [JK07, ADPMT08,
DVW09]. A survey of proofs of storage is given by Yang and Jia [YJ11].
In this dissertation, we will compare our second method POS2 and third method
POS3 to Ateniese et al. [ABC+07,ABC+11b] and/or Shacham and Waters [SW08a].
2.4.4 Proofs of Storage with More Features
Very recently, several works [CKBA08,BJO09a,EKPT09,WWL+09,WWRL10] have
devoted to extend proofs of storage to support more features. In [CKBA08], verifier
checks whether the cloud storage server indeed keeps multiple intact copies of a user’s
file. Dynamic-PDP [EKPT09] allows insertion and deletion of data blocks on the fly
after setup. Proofs of storage schemes supporting public verifiability are proposed in
Shacham and Waters [SW08a] and Wang [WWL+09] and the privacy issue in public
verification is studied in Wang [WWRL10].
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2.4.5 More General Delegated Computation and Proofs of
Storage
Kate and Zaverucha and Goldberg [KZG10] proposed an efficient commitment scheme
for polynomial and Benabbas and Gennaro and Vahlis [BGV11] proposed a secure del-
egation scheme for polynomial evaluation. Both schemes can be extended to support
POR easily but with limitations: the POR scheme implied in Kate and Zaverucha
and Goldberg [KZG10] has large storage cost on client side and the POR scheme
implied in Benabbas and Gennaro and Vahlis [BGV11] has large storage and compu-
tation cost on the server side. We will elaborate more on Kate and Zaverucha and
Goldberg [KZG10]’s polynomial commitment scheme in Section 5.3.1 in Chapter 5.
The two solutions [GGP10,CKV10] to verifiable delegation of generic computation
task based on fully homomorphic encryption [Gen09], also imply a secure proofs of
storage scheme. However, the efficiency overheads in communication, storage and




In this chapter, we provide preliminary definitions, and give security formulation for
proofs of storage problem.
3.1 Preliminaries
3.1.1 Terminologies
Definition 1 (Negligible [Gol06]) A non-negative function (λ) is negligible in λ,
if for any positive integer c, for all sufficiently large integer λ, 0 ≤ (λ) ≤ λ−c.
Definition 2 (Overwhelming High Probability) Let µ(·) be a function which
measures the probability of some event. We say µ(λ) is overwhelming high prob-
ability, if 1− µ(λ) is negligible in λ.
Definition 3 (Noticeable [Gol06]) A function (λ) is noticeable in λ, if there ex-
ists a positive integer c, for all sufficiently large integer λ, (λ) ≥ λ−c.
Note that (1) any noticeable function is non-negligible; (2) any negligible function
is non-noticeable; (3) there exists function which is both non-noticeable and non-
negligible (See the below Example 1).
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( if λ is odd)
2−λ ( if λ is even)
3.1.2 Conventions
We use expression S = (KeyGen, Sign,Verify) to represent a scheme named S, which
consists of three algorithms KeyGen, Sign and Verify. If necessary, we will use notation
S.KeyGen to represent the algorithm KeyGen in the scheme S, to distinguish it from
key generating algorithms from other schemes.
In this dissertation, the word “random” refers to “uniform random”, if there is no
distribution specified.
We also clarify two distinct concepts valid proof and genuine proof.
Valid Proof : A proof is valid, if it is accepted by the verifier.
Genuine Proof : A proof is genuine, if it is the same as the one generated by an
honest (deterministic1) prover on the same query.
We give an example to distinguish valid proof and genuine proof.
Example 2 Take as example the straightforward approach where Alice keeps a hash
value and downloads her file from Bob to perform a local data integrity check during
each verification. If Bob somehow finds another file F′ 6= F, such that hash(F) =
hash(F′), and returns F′ back to Alice. Alice will accept F′ as a valid proof. In this
case, both F and F′ are valid proofs, but only F is the genuine proof.
3.1.3 Summary of Notations
We summarize the key notations used in Part I of this dissertation in Table 3.1.
1The provers in all of three schemes in Part I are deterministic.
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Table 3.1: Summary of Key Notations in Part I of this dissertation
Notation Semantics
x := a Assign the value a to the variable x.
x
def
=A The statement A defines the semantics of x.
x
$←− S Uniformly randomly choose x from a finite set S.
‖ Binary operator ‖ denotes the unambiguous string concatenation which
allows unique unambiguous decomposition.
[a, b] The set {a, a+ 1, . . . , b} where both a and b are integers and a ≤ b.
λ Security parameter. Group element size in bits.
n The number of data blocks in a data file.
m The number of sectors in a data block. Typically each sector is a group
element.
` The number of data blocks accessed during a verification.
~u A vector of form (u0, u1, u2, . . . , ud−1), where d is the dimension of vector
~u.
f~u(x) A polynomial u0 +u1x+u2x
2 + . . .+ud−1xd−1 of degree d−1 with vector
~u as coefficient, where d is the dimension of vector ~u.
PPT Probabilistic Polynomial Time.
negl Some negligible function [Gol06].
MAC Message Authentication Code [Gol06].
PRF Pseudorandom function [Gol06].
POR Proofs of Retrievability [JK07].
PDP Provable Data Possession [ABC+07].
S1 The name of the homomorphic MAC scheme proposed in Chapter 4.
S2 The name of the homomorphic MAC scheme proposed in Chapter 5.
POS1 The name of proofs of storage scheme proposed in Chapter 4.
POS2 The name of proofs of storage scheme proposed in Chapter 5.
POS3 The name of proofs of storage scheme proposed in Chapter 6.
S1.KeyGen The key generating algorithm KeyGen of scheme S1.
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3.2 Formulation: Proofs of Retrievability
Proofs of storage requires to periodically, remotely and reliably verify the integrity of
data stored in a cloud storage, without retrieving the data file. Proofs of Retrievability
(POR) model proposed by Juels and Kaliski [JK07] is among the first few attempts
to formulize the notion of “remotely and reliably verifying the data integrity”.
In this section, we review the POR model, which is proposed by Juels and
Kaliski [JK07] and revisited by Shacham and Waters [SW08a].
3.2.1 System Model
We restate the POR [JK07, SW08a] model as below, with slight modifications on
notations. We adopt the 1-round prove-verify version in Juels and Kaliski [JK07] for
simplicity.
Definition 4 (POR [JK07,SW08a]) A Proofs Of Retrievability (POR ) scheme
consists of four algorithms (KeyGen, DEncode, Prove, Verify):
• KeyGen(1λ) → (pk, sk): Given security parameter λ, the probabilistic key gen-
erating algorithm, run by the data owner Alice, outputs a public-private key pair
(pk, sk).
• DEncode(sk, F) → (idF, Fˆ, n): Given the private key sk and a data file F, the
encoding algorithm DEncode, run by Alice, produces a unique identifier idF and
the encoded file Fˆ with size n (in term of number of blocks), where (id, n) will be
kept by the data owner Alice and (id, Fˆ) will be kept by the cloud storage server
Bob.
• Prove(pk, idF, Fˆ,Chall) → ψ: Given the public key pk, an identifier idF, an en-
coded file Fˆ, and a challenge query Chall as input, the prover algorithm Prove,
run by cloud storage server Bob, produces a proof ψ.
• Verify(sk, idF,Chall, ψ)→ accept or reject: Given the private key sk, an iden-
tifier idF, a challenge query Chall, and a proof ψ as input, the deterministic
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verifier algorithm Verify, run by the data owner Alice, will output either accept
or reject.
A proofs of storage system between data owner Alice and cloud storage server
Bob can be implemented using a POR scheme (KeyGen, DEncode, Prove, Verify):
At the very beginning, Alice chooses a security parameter λ, and generates a pair of
public-private keys (pk, sk) := KeyGen(1λ) where pk is made public and sk is kept
private. Then Alice will interact with Bob in the following way.
Setup Phase: Alice and Bob will carry out the setup phase for one time per each
file.
• Alice preprocesses her file F to produce (id, Fˆ, n) := DEncode(sk, F). Alice
sends (id, Fˆ) to Bob and removes Fˆ from local storage.
At the end of setup phase, Alice only has (sk, id, n) in her local storage, and Bob
has (pk, id, Fˆ) in his storage.
Verification Phase: The verification phase consists of multiple verification sessions.
In each session, Alie and Bob interact as below.
• To check the file with identifier id, Alice chooses a random challenge Chall
and sends Chall together with the identifier id to Bob.
Note: Typically, the challenge Chall includes as a part a subset C ⊂ [0, n−
1], which indicates those blocks that Bob should access.
• Bob is supposed to run algorithm Prove upon the encoded file Fˆ correspond-
ing to the identifier id to generate a proof ψ := Prove(pk, id, Fˆ,Chall), and
send ψ to Alice.
• Alice runs the algorithm Verify with the private key sk to check the valid-
ity of the received proof ψ. Alice computes b := Verify(sk, id,Chall, ψ) ∈
{accept, reject} and outputs b.
Definition 5 (Completeness of POR) A POR scheme (KeyGen, DEncode, Prove,
Verify) is complete, if an honest prover (who ensures the integrity of his storage and
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executes the procedure Prove to compute a proof) will always be accepted by the verifier.
More precisely, for any key pair (pk, sk) generated by KeyGen, and any data file F,
any challenge query Chall, if ψ ← Prove(pk, idF, Fˆ,Chall), then Verify(sk, idF,Chall, ψ)
outputs accept with probability 1, where (idF, Fˆ, n)← DEncode(sk, F).
3.2.2 Security Model
3.2.2.1 Trust Model and Scope of Topic
In a proofs of storage system, only the data owner Alice is trusted and the cloud
storage server Bob is treated as untrusted and potentially malicious.
We clarify that, the following topics are out of the scope of this dissertation: (1)
Confidentiality of Alice’s data against Bob; (2) Support of dynamic operations like
insertion and deletion of data blocks; (3) Denial of Service Attack; (4) Frame attack
where dishonest Alice claims honest Bob was cheating.
3.2.2.2 POR Security Game
We rephrase the POR security game, which is proposed by Juels and Kaliski [JK07]
and revisited by Shacham and Waters [SW08a], in a standard way. The POR se-
curity game between a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A and a PPT
challenger C w.r.t. a POR scheme E = (KeyGen, DEncode, Prove, Verify) is as below.
Setup: The challenger C runs the key generating algorithm KeyGen to obtain public-
private key pair (pk, sk). The challenger C gives the public key pk to the adversary
A and keeps the private key sk securely.
Learning: The adversary A adaptively makes queries, where each query is one of
the following:
• Store query (F): Given a data file F chosen by A, the challenger C responses by
running data encoding algorithm (id, Fˆ, n) ← DEncode(sk, F) and sending the
encoded data file Fˆ together with its identifier id to A. The challenger C will
keep (id, n).
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• Verification query (id): Given a file identifier id chosen by A, if id is the (partial)
output of some previous store query that A has made, then the challenger C
initiates a POR verification with A w.r.t. the data file F associated to the
identifier id in this way:
– C chooses a random challenge Chall using the meta-data n;
– A produces a proof ψ w.r.t. the challenge Chall;
Note: adversary A may generate the proof in an arbitrary method rather
than applying the algorithm Prove.
– C verifies the proof ψ by running algorithm Verify(sk, id,Chall, ψ). Denote
the output as b ∈ {accept, reject}.
C sends the decision bit b to A as feedback. Otherwise, if id is not the (partial)
output of any previous store query that A has made, C does nothing.
Commit: AdversaryA chooses a file identifier id∗ among all file identifiers she obtains
from C by making store queries in Learning phase, and commits id∗ to C. Let F∗
denote the data file associated to identifier id∗.
Retrieve: The challenger C initiates ζ number of POR verifications with A w.r.t.
the data file F∗, where C plays the role of verifier and A plays the role of prover, as
in the Learning phase. From messages collected in these ζ interactions with A, C
extracts a data file F′ using some PPT extractor algorithm. The adversary A wins
this game, if and only if F′ 6= F∗.
The adversary A is -admissible [SW08a], if the probability that A convinces C to
accept in a verification in the Retrieve phase, is at least  ∈ (0, 1). We denote the
above game as GameEA(ζ).
Definition 6 ( [JK07,SW08a]) A POR scheme E is sound, if for any PPT -
admissible adversary A with  being a noticeable function in the security parameter
λ, there exists a polynomial function ζ in λ, such that the advantage AdvEA(ζ) defined
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[A wins GameEA(ζ)] . (3.1)
Notice that the above definition is slightly different from [JK07, SW08a], in which 
is non-negligible and the extractor algorithm runs in time Ω(−1). When  is non-
negligible and not noticeable, Ω(−1) is not upper-bounded by any fixed polynomial.
3.2.2.3 Clarification of Security Model
There should be no confusion between the security formulation and the real world
application of a POR scheme. We remark that the security games GameEA, especially
the Retrieve phase, are only for security formulation, and applications of a POR
scheme do not necessarily follow the description of the security game exactly. For
example, in real world applications, the data owner will be the one who chooses the
data file, instead of the cloud storage server, and the data owner can retrieve her file
by simply requesting the cloud storage server to send it back.
The Retrieve phase in the security games just ensures that, in theory, user’s file
can be recovered from multiple verifications with the cloud storage server efficiently
(using some PPT extractor algorithm), as long as the cloud storage server can pass a
noticeable fraction of challenge queries. Essentially, a secure POR scheme provides
a mechanism, in which the data owner will be guaranteed that her data file can be
efficiently recovered from the server’s storage at the moment that a verification is
accepted, without actually downloading the file from the server. Furthermore, this
guarantee is based on the assumption that the cloud storage server is not able to solve
some cryptographic hard problems2, without trusting in the cloud storage server.
3.2.3 Alternative Formulation: Provable Data Possession
An alternative formulation Provable Data Possession (PDP) proposed by Ateniese et
al. [ABC+07] will be reviewed later in Chapter 6, since the third proofs of storage
2For information-theoretical secure POR schemes (e.g. [DVW09]), such assumption is not nec-
essary.
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scheme proposed in Chapter 6 will be proved under the PDP model, while the first
two proofs of storage schemes proposed in Part I of this dissertation will be proved
under POR model. It is well-known that PDP is a weaker formulation than POR,
in the sense that any secure POR scheme is a secure PDP scheme, but not vice
versa. Our third proofs of storage scheme is such an example: It is provably secure
under PDP , and insecure under POR.
Chapter 4
Proofs of Retrievability from
Linearly Homomorphic Message
Authentication Code
A Linearly Homomorphic Message Authentication Code (MAC) scheme allows any
third party to compute a valid MAC value for a linear combination of messages Mi’s
from the MAC values of these messages Mi’s, using the public key. This chapter will
propose a linearly homomorphic MAC scheme, which we refer to as S1, and apply it
to construct a proofs of storage scheme, which we refer to as POS1 in this dissertation.
The proposed scheme POS1 is very efficient in communication and computation, and
will be proved under the Proofs of Retrievability formulation. The result in this
chapter is published in Chang and Xu [CX08] (under name “HTAG”). We remark that
Chang and Xu [CX08] declared the HTAG scheme as an independent work of Shacham
and Waters [SW08a].
4.1 Overview
Section 2.2.2 (on page 11) described a proofs of storage scheme constructed from a
non-homomorphic MAC scheme. In each verification of this MAC based method,
the verifier selects a random subset of ` indices, and the prover finds all data blocks
29
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corresponding to the selected indices and sends these data blocks together with their
MAC values to the verifier. Thus the communication cost is dominated by the `
message-MAC pairs. A wishful but natural thought is that: Can we somehow ag-
gregate all of these ` message-MAC pairs into a single message-MAC pair, such that
any errors in these ` message-MAC pairs introduced by a computationally bounded
adversary can be detected by checking only the single aggregated message-MAC pair?
Linearly homomorphic MAC is a good answer. Since such homomorphic MAC allows
the prover to compute a valid MAC value for a linear combination of these ` selected
data blocks from only these ` message-MAC pairs and a public key. Thus only one
message, which is the linear combination of previous ` data blocks, together with its
MAC value is sent back to the verifier, yet the verifier is able to detect any possible
errors within these ` data blocks with overwhelming high probability by checking the
received message-MAC pair.
4.1.1 A Brief Description of proofs of storage scheme POS1
Setup. Suppose Alice wants to backup her data file F to a cloud storage server
Bob. Alice first encodes file F using some error erasure code, and resulting enlarged
file consists of n data blocks F0, . . . , Fn−1. Alice chooses a prime p, a random secret
value τ , and a random secret seed, denoted as seed, of a pseudorandom function
PRF [Gol06]. For each data block Fi, Alice generates an authentication tag σi using
a linearly homomorphic MAC scheme:
σi := PRFseed(i) + τFi mod p. (4.1)
Alice sends all data blocks together with authentication tags, i.e. {(i, Fi, σi) : i ∈
[0, n− 1]}, to Bob.
Verification. Later, Alice may remotely verify the integrity of her data file stored
with Bob periodically. In each verification session, Alice randomly selects a subset
C ⊂ [0, n − 1] of indices and selects a random weights νi for each i ∈ C. Alice
sends {(i, νi) : i ∈ C} as challenge to Bob. Bob then finds all data blocks Fi’s and
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authentication tags σi’s with index i ∈ C, and apply the linear homomorphism to








νiσi mod p. (4.3)
Upon receiving (M, σ) as response from Bob, Alice checks the following equality










Figure 4.1: POR scheme POS1 constructed from linearly homomorphic MAC S1. A
square represents a data block and a circle represents an authentication tag. Detailed
explanation is in the paragraph with title “Illustration Picture”.
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Illustration Picture. Figure 4.1 illustrates the scheme POS1 that we just briefed.
In Figure 4.1, a square represents a data block and a circle represents an authenti-
cation tag (i.e. a MAC value). Each square together with the circle which lies just
below, represent a valid message-MAC pair. Those shaded squares represent data
blocks that are generated by the error erasure code. Figure 4.1 shows that during a
verification, a subset of 3 message-MAC pairs are selected and are aggregated into a
single message-MAC pair by applying the linear homomorphism property.
4.1.2 Organization
The rest of this chapter is organized as below. Section 4.2 gives the definition of
linearly homomorphic MAC scheme and Section 4.3 provides the construction of a
linearly homomorphic MAC scheme named S1. Next, we propose the proofs of storage
scheme POS1 based on S1 in Section 4.4 and analyze its performance in Section 4.5.
We analyze the security of S1 and POS1 in Section 4.6 and Section 4.7, respectively.
In the end, Section 4.8 summarizes this chapter.
4.2 Linearly Homomorphic MAC: Definition
A linearly homomorphic MAC scheme consists of four algorithms (KeyGen, Sign,
Combine,Verify), where each algorithm is described as below.
• KeyGen(1λ)→ (spk, ssk): The probabilistic key generating algorithm takes the
security parameter λ as input, and outputs a pair of public and private key
(spk, ssk).
• Sign(ssk, i, M) → σ: The signing algorithm takes the private key ssk, an index
i and a message M as input, and outputs a signature σ.
Note: The algorithm Sign is stateful.
• Combine(spk, {(i, Mi, σi, νi) : i ∈ C}, ) → (M, σ): The algorithm Combine im-
plements the homomorphic property. Taking as input the public key spk, the
sequence of tuples (i, Mi, σi, νi), i ∈ C, where σi is a MAC value of a message Mi
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w.r.t. an index i, and νi is a weight of Mi in a linear combination, algorithm
Combine outputs a message-MAC pair (M :=
∑
i∈C νiMi, σ).
• Verify(ssk, M, σ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}) → accept or reject: The deterministic ver-
ification algorithm takes the private key ssk, a message M, a MAC value σ,
a sequence of tuples {(i, νi) : i ∈ C} as input, and outputs either accept or
reject.
Definition 7 (Linearly Homomorphic MAC) A MAC scheme S = (KeyGen, Sign,
Combine,Verify) is Linearly Homomorphic, if for any public-private key pair
(spk, ssk) := KeyGen(1λ) generated by the key generating algorithm KeyGen and for
any sequence of message-MAC pairs {(i, Mi, σi), i ∈ C} generated by the signing al-
gorithm Sign under the private key ssk, the output (
∑
i∈C νiMi, σ) := Combine(spk,
{(i, Mi, σi, νi) : i ∈ C}) is accepted as a valid message-MAC pair by the verification al-
gorithm Verify under the private ssk w.r.t. {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, i.e. Verify(ssk,
∑
i∈C νiMi, σ,
{(i, νi) : i ∈ C}) = accept.
4.3 Linearly Homomorphic MAC: Construction
The construction of the MAC scheme S1 = (KeyGen, Sign,Combine,Verify) is as below.
4.3.1 Construction of S1
S1.KeyGen(1λ)→ (spk, ssk)
Choose at random a λ bits long prime number p. Choose at random a group
element τ from Z∗p: τ
$←− Z∗p. Choose at random a seed, denoted as seed, from
the key space of the pseudorandom function family {PRFseed : {0, 1}2λ → Zp}.
The public key is spk := (p) and the private key is ssk := (seed, τ, p). Output
(spk, ssk).
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S1.Sign(ssk, i, M)→ σi
The MAC value σi for a given message M ∈ Zp w.r.t. an index i ∈ {0, 1}2λ is
computed as below
σi := PRFseed(i) + τM mod p. (4.5)
S1.Combine(spk, {(i, Mi, σi, νi) : i ∈ C})→ (M, σ)
The MAC value for the linear combination M :=
∑





νiσi mod p. (4.6)
S1.Verify (ssk, M, σ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C})→ accept or reject
Check the following equality with the private key ssk = (seed, τ, p). Output
accept if the equality holds; otherwise output reject.
∑
i∈C
νi PRFseed(i) + τ · M ?= σ mod p (4.7)
4.3.2 Correctness
The following lemma is straightforward:
Lemma 4.1 (S1 is a linearly homomorphic MAC) The proposed MAC scheme
S1 is a linearly homomorphic MAC scheme under Definition 7.
4.3.3 S1 is Symmetric Key Signcryption
We realize that the proposed MAC scheme S1 actually functions as (private key)
signature scheme and encryption scheme simultaneously, i.e. S1 is a symmetric key
signcryption scheme [Zhe97]. The algorithm S1.Sign also takes the role of encryption.
The corresponding decryption algorithm is as below:
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S1.Decrypt(ssk, σ, i)→ M
The plaintext M is computed as below.
M := (σ − PRFseed(i)) τ−1 mod p. (4.8)
Consequently, S1 may have applications in constructing authenticated error correcting
code [BJO09b,LTT10].
4.4 POS1: A Proofs of Retrievability scheme con-
structed from Homomorphic MAC S1
4.4.1 Construction of POS1
Let S1 = (S1.KeyGen, S1.Sign, S1.Combine, S1.Verify) be a linearly homomorphic MAC
scheme. We construct a POR scheme named POS1 based on S1 as below.
POS1.KeyGen(1λ)→ (pk, sk)
Invoke the key generating algorithm S1.KeyGen of the MAC scheme S1 to gen-
erate the public-private key pair (pk, sk) := S1.KeyGen(1λ).
POS1.DEncode(sk, F)→ (id, Fˆ, n)
Let ρ ∈ (0, 1) be a system parameter. Apply rate-ρ error erasure code on data
file F to generate blocks (F0, . . . , Fn−1), such that each block Fi ∈ Zp and any ρn
number of blocks Fi’s can recover the original file F. Choose a unique identifier
id for file F from the space {0, 1}λ. For each i ∈ [0, n− 1], generate a tag σi for
block Fi as below:
σi := S1.Sign(sk, id‖i, Fi), (4.9)
where ‖ denotes a string concatenation that allows unique decomposition. The
encoded file is Fˆ := {(i, Fi, σi) : i ∈ [0, n− 1]}. Send (id, Fˆ) to the cloud storage
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server and keep only (id, n) in local storage.
POS1.Prove(pk, id, Fˆ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C})→ (M, σ)
Receive (id, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}) from the verifier as the challenge where C is a
subset of [0, n − 1]. Find the encoded file Fˆ = {(i, Fi, σi) : i ∈ [0, n − 1]}
associated with identifier id. Compute a message M and a MAC value σ using
the homomorphic property of the MAC scheme S1 as below
(M, σ) := S1.Combine(pk, {(id‖i, Fi, σi, νi) : i ∈ C}). (4.10)
The prover sends (M, σ) to the verifier as response.
POS1.Verify(sk, id, M, σ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C})→ accept or reject
Invoke the algorithm S1.Verify to obtain b ∈ {accept, reject} as below:
b := S1.Verify(sk, M, σ, {(id‖i, νi) : i ∈ C}). (4.11)
Output b.
Remark 2 To simplify the security proof, we assume that νi’s, i ∈ C, forms a simple
geometric sequence. More precisely, denote the elements of set C as {ij ∈ [0, n− 1] :
j ∈ [0, ` − 1]}, where ` is the size of set C and 0 ≤ i0 < i1 < i2 . . . < i`−1 < n.
There exists some element ν ∈ Z∗p, for each j ∈ [0, ` − 1], νij = νj mod p. Thus,
` distinct vectors of form (ν0, ν1, . . . , ν`−1) ∈ (Z∗p)` can constitute a vandermonde
matrix [MS58].
4.4.2 Completeness
Lemma 4.2 (POS1 is Complete) The above construction POS1 is complete under
Definition 5 (on page 5).
The completeness of POS1 is implied by the correctness of the underlying linearly
homomorphic MAC scheme S1 (Lemma 4.1). Recall that, a POR scheme is complete,
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if any genuine proof generated by following the POR scheme honestly upon an intact
copy of the file uploaded by Alice, will be accepted by the verifier Alice.
4.5 Performance Analysis
The scheme POS1 is very efficient in communication and computation. The proof
size is 2λ bits. In the setup, only one group multiplication, one group addition
and one pseudorandom function evaluation are required to compute a tag per each
data block. Let ` be the size of set C in a verification. In each verification, the
prover takes 2` group multiplications/additions to generate a proof; the verifier takes
` group multiplications/additions and ` number of pseudorandom function evaluations
to verify the proof.
The drawback is that an authentication tag is as large as a data block, and the
storage overhead due to the authentication tags is equal to the file size (after er-
ror erasure encoding). In applications where large data redundancy is required, this
drawback is mitigated due to the fact that the underlying MAC scheme S1 also func-
tions as a symmetric key encryption key (i.e. a symmetric key signcryption [Zhe97]):
All authentication tags together is another copy of the file in the encrypted domain.
4.6 Security Analysis of MAC scheme S1
4.6.1 Security Model for Linearly Homomorphic MAC
Let S = (KeyGen, Sign,Combine,Verify) be a linearly homomorphic MAC scheme as
described in Section 4.3. We define the security game GameCMAS,A between a challenger
C and an existential forgery adversary A w.r.t. a linearly homomorphic MAC scheme
S, under adaptive chosen message attack as below.
Setup.
The challenger C generates a pair of public-private key (spk, ssk) by running the
key generating algorithm KeyGen(1λ) with security parameter λ, and gives the public
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key spk to the adversary A and keeps the private key ssk securely. The challenger
C maintains a state variable state, which is used to assign a unique index to each
message to be signed.
Learning.
The adversary A can adaptively make queries, where each query is in one of the
following forms:
• SignQuery(M): Given a message M chosen by the adversary A, the challenger
C chooses a unique index i based on the current value of state and updates
state. The challenger C denotes the message as Mi and responses the query with
a signature σi := Sign(ssk, i, Mi).
• VerifyQuery(M, σ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}): Let I denote the set of all indices i’s chosen
by the challenger in answering all SignQuery. For each tuple (M, σ, {(i, νi) :
i ∈ C}) chosen by the adversary A, if C ⊂ I, then the challenger C responses
with b := Verify(ssk, M, σ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}) ∈ {accept, reject}. If C 6⊂ I, the
challenger does nothing.
Forge.
The adversary A outputs (M′, σ′, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}) with C ⊂ I. Let (M, σ) :=
S1.Combine(spk, {(i, Mi, σi, νi) : i ∈ C}) be the corresponding genuine output. The
adversary A wins the game if and only if
Verify(ssk, M′, σ′, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}) = accept and (M′, σ′) 6= (M, σ). (4.12)
4.6.2 The Linearly Homomorphic MAC Scheme S1 is Secure
Theorem 4.3 (S1 is secure) Suppose {PRFseed : {0, 1}2λ → Zp} is a secure pseu-
dorandom function family. Then the MAC scheme S1 is existentially unforgeable
under adaptive chosen message attack. For any PPT adversary A, the advantage of
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A against S1 defined as below is negligible in the security parameter.
AdvS1A
def
= Pr[A wins GameCMAS1,A]. (4.13)
We start by proving the unforgeability in a simplified setting, where all acceptance
or rejection decisions are kept secret from the adversary. That is, the challenger does
not answer any VerifyQuery in the security game. We refer to this simplified setting
as no-feedback setting, and refer to the original setting as feedback setting. Next, we
prove the security in feedback setting, based on the security in no-feedback setting.
It is worthy to point out that, we achieve security in feedback setting by “lift-
ing” the security in no-feedback setting, in contrast with verifiable cloud comput-
ing [GGP10, CKV10] that achieve security only in no-feedback setting (for a much
larger class of delegated functions). We emphasize that this is possible because our
scheme S1 has an essential difference with [GGP10, CKV10]: Informally, in S1, we
prove that if a candidate aggregated message-MAC pair (M, σ) w.r.t. {(i, νi) : i ∈ C} is
accepted by the verifier, then both of M and σ should be genuine (i.e. equal to the cor-
responding value computed by an honest user); while in the case of [GGP10,CKV10],
their security proof only ensures that the computation result (counterpart of M) is
genuine and cannot ensure whether the proof (counterpart of σ) is exactly the one
generated by an honest user. In [GGP10,CKV10], indeed anyone with the public key
of the fully homomorphic encryption scheme can output many different proofs (for
the correct computation result) such that the verifier will accept all of them.
4.6.2.1 S1 is secure in no-feedback setting
Lemma 4.4 If there exists a PPT adversary A which wins GameCMAS1,A in the no-
feedback setting with non-negligible probability, then there exists a PPT adversary B
which breaks the security of the pseudorandom function PRF. Precisely,
Pr[A wins GameCMAS1,A in no-feedback setting ] ≤
1
p− 1 +NPRF · Adv
PRF
B ,
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where NPRF is the number of distinct evaluations of pseudorandom function PRF re-
quired to answer all SignQuerys made by A (one PRF evaluation for one Sign-
Query), and AdvPRFB denotes the probability that B can distinguish the output of PRF
from true randomness.
Proof of Lemma 4.4:
Game 1. The first game is the same as GameCMAS1,A, except that the challenger will not
answer VerifyQuery made by the adversary A. Therefore, Pr[A wins Game 1 ] =
Pr[A wins GameCMAS1,A in no-feedback setting ].
Game 2. The second game is the same as Game 1, except that in the scheme
S1, the pseudorandom function PRFseed(·) is replaced by a simulator PRFSim which
outputs true randomness over the range of PRFseed. Precisely, the function PRF
Sim is
evaluated in the following way:
• The challenger keeps a table, which is empty at the very beginning, to store all
previous encountered input-output pairs (v,PRFSim(v)).
• Given an input v, the challenger lookups the table for v, if there exists an entry
(v, u), then return u as output. Otherwise, choose u at random from the range
of PRFseed, insert (v,PRF
Sim(v) := u) into the table and return u as output.
Claim 4.6.1 If there is a non-negligible difference in an PPT adversary A’s success
probability between Game 1 and Game 2, then there exists another PPT adversary
B which can break the security of the pseudorandom function PRF. More precisely,
∣∣Pr[A wins Game 1]− Pr[A wins Game 2]∣∣ ≤ NPRF · AdvPRFB ,
where NPRF is the number of distinct evaluations of pseudorandom function PRF re-
quired to answer all SignQuerys made by A (one PRF evaluation for one Sign-
Query), and AdvPRFB denotes the probability that B can distinguish the output of PRF
from true randomness.
The above Claim 4.6.1 can be proved using a standard hybrid argument [Gol06]. Here
we save the details.
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Claim 4.6.2 For any computationally unbounded adversary A, after interacting in
Game 2, the probability that A finds the value of τ is 1/(p− 1).
Proof of Claim 4.6.2: The secret value τ is only involved in the MAC values
σi’s. Since in Game 2, the pseudorandom function PRF is replaced by a simulator
PRFSim which outputs truly uniform randomness over Zp, the MAC values σi’s reveal
absolutely no information to adversary A about the secret τ at all, although A
is computationally unbounded. That is, the entropy of τ to the adversary A is
unchanged before and after A’s interaction with the challenger in the Game 2, and
the probability thatA can find τ is exactly 1/(p−1). Recall that τ is chosen uniformly
randomly from Z∗p. uunionsq
Claim 4.6.3
Pr[A wins Game 2] ≤ 1
p− 1 . (4.14)
Proof of Claim 4.6.3: Recall that (M′, σ′, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}) denotes the forgery
output by the adversary A in the Forge phase of Game 2, and (M, σ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C})
denotes the corresponding genuine output1 which shares the same value {(i, νi) : i ∈
C} with the forgery output. We assume the forgery is valid, that is, the forgery
output (M′, σ′, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}) is accepted by the verifier algorithm S1.Verify, and
(M′, σ′) 6= (M, σ).
Since both the forgery output (M′, σ′, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}) and the genuine output
(M, σ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}) are accepted by S1.Verify, we substitute them into the Equa-




′ = σ′ mod p; (4.15)∑
i∈C
νiPRFseed(i) + τM = σ mod p. (4.16)
1The adversary can compute the genuine output by keeping an intact copy of users’ file from the
very beginning.
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Subtract Equation (4.16) from Equation (4.15), we have
τ(M′ − M) = σ′ − σ mod p. (4.17)
If M′ = M, then σ′ − σ = τ(M′ − M) = 0 mod p, which is a contradiction with our
hypothesis that (M′, σ′) 6= (M, σ). Thus M′ 6= M and the secret value τ can be found
τ =
σ′ − σ
M′ − M mod p. (4.18)
By the Claim 4.6.2, we conclude
Pr[A wins Game 2] ≤ Pr[A finds τ in Game 2] ≤ 1
p− 1 . (4.19)
Thus, Claim 4.6.3 is proved. uunionsq
Therefore, Lemma 4.4 is inferred by combining Claim 4.6.1 and Claim 4.6.3. uunionsq
4.6.2.2 S1 is secure in feedback setting
Lemma 4.5 S1 is unforgeable in feedback setting.
Proof of Lemma 4.5:
Game 1. The first game is just GameCMAS1,A in the no-feedback setting, where all
acceptance or rejection decisions are kept secret from the adversary. It is identical to
the Game 1 in the proof of Lemma 4.4 (on page 39).
For each integer k ≥ 0, we define the following game:
Game 2.k. This game is the same as Game 1, except that, A adaptively makes k
verification queries in the Learning phase and all acceptance or rejection decisions
are provided to A at the end of each query.
We describe two different verification strategies as below, where the first one is
adopted by the challenger of the security game Game 2.k and the second one serves
as the reference:
• SimulatedVerifier: The challenger keeps a local copy of messages and MACs,
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where messages are chosen by the adversary in a SignQuery and MAC values
are generated by the challenger in response to that SignQuery. The challenger
also plays the role of an honest user of the MAC scheme S1. For each tuple
(M′, σ′, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}) received from the adversary A in a VerifyQuery, the
challenger computes the corresponding genuine tuple (M, σ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C})
from the challenger’s local copy of messages and MACs. If adversary’s output
are the same as the genuine output, i.e. (M′, σ′) = (M, σ), then outputs accept;
otherwise outputs reject.
• ImaginaryVerifier: An imaginary verification oracleOS1.Verify(ssk;·) which some-
how has access to the private key ssk.
Note that (1) the simulated verifier accepts only genuine output while the imaginary
verifier oracle accepts all valid outputs which include genuine outputs; (2) the sim-
ulated verifier provides absolutely no new information to the adversary A, since A
itself can simulate such verifier by keeping another intact copy of the messages and
MAC values from the very beginning.
Let us code accept with the bit ‘1’ and code reject with the bit ‘0’, and de-
note with ai ∈ {0, 1} be the decision bit output by the imaginary verification oracle
OS1.Verify(ssk;·) for the i-th VerifyQuery made by the adversary A in Game 2.k;
bi ∈ {0, 1} be the corresponding decision bit output by the simulated verifier. Fur-
thermore, let Ak := a1a2 . . . ak ∈ {0, 1}k and Bk := b1b2 . . . bk ∈ {0, 1}k. We notice
that
• ak+1 6= bk+1 indicates the event that the adversary wins Game 2.k.
– (ak+1 = 1, bk+1 = 0) indicates the event that the adversary wins Game 2.k,
since the adversary’s output is valid (accepted by ImaginaryVerifier),
but different from the genuine output (rejected by SimulatedVerifier).
– (ak+1 = 0, bk+1 = 1) is impossible, since the MAC scheme S1 is correct
such that all genuine MAC values are valid.
• ak+1 = bk+1 indicates the event that the adversary loses Game 2.k.
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Claim 4.6.4 Let ξ be a negligible function implied in Lemma 4.4, such that for any
PPT adversary A, Pr[A wins Game 1] ≤ ξ. Then Pr[A wins Game 2.0] ≤ ξ.
Claim 4.6.5 If Pr[Ak = Bk] ≥ X, then Pr[Ak+1 = Bk+1] ≥ X(1− ξ).
Proof of Claim 4.6.5:
Pr[Ak+1 = Bk+1] = Pr[Ak = Bk ∧ ak+1 = bk+1] (4.20)
= Pr[Ak = Bk]× Pr[ak+1 = bk+1 | Ak = Bk] (4.21)
≥ Pr[Ak = Bk]× Pr[A loses Game 1] (4.22)
≥ X(1− ξ). (4.23)
uunionsq
Claim 4.6.6 Pr[Ak = Bk] ≥ (1− ξ)k.
Proof of Claim 4.6.6: We prove the above claim using mathematical induction.
Base Case: k = 1. Pr[A1 = B1] = Pr[a1 = b1] = Pr[A loses Game 2.0] ≥ (1− ξ).
Induction Step: from k to k + 1. This is just Claim 4.6.5. uunionsq
Claim 4.6.7 Pr[A wins Game 2.k] ≤ ξ + (1− (1− ξ)k) = (k + 1)ξ + o(ξ).
Notice that here o(·) denote the little-O notation.
Proof of Claim 4.6.7:
Pr[A wins Game 2.k]
= Pr[A wins Game 2.k ∧ Ak = Bk] + Pr[A wins Game 2.k ∧ Ak 6= Bk]
≤ Pr[A wins Game 2.k | Ak = Bk]× Pr[Ak = Bk] + Pr[Ak 6= Bk]
≤ Pr[A wins Game 2.k | Ak = Bk] + Pr[Ak 6= Bk]
≤ Pr[A wins Game 1] + Pr[Ak 6= Bk]
≤ ξ + (1− (1− ξ)k) = (k + 1)ξ + o(ξ).
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Notice that Pr[A wins Game 2.k | Ak = Bk] ≤ Pr[A wins Game 1], since in Game
2.k, Ak = Bk indicates that the adversary gains absolutely no information from the
k VerifyQuery in the Learning phase. uunionsq
Therefore, Lemma 4.5 is concluded from Claim 4.6.7. uunionsq
Now it is time to prove the Theorem 4.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.3: By Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.5, for any PPT adversary
A which makes NPRF number of SignQuery and Nverify number of VerifyQuery
in the security game GameCMAS1,A, the probability that A wins the security game is
Pr[A wins GameCMAS1,A] ≤ (Nverify + 1)
(
1





which is negligible in the security parameter λ = log p. uunionsq
4.7 Security Analysis of POR scheme POS1
Theorem 4.6 If {PRFseed : {0, 1}2λ → Zp} is a secure pseudorandom function fam-
ily, then the proposed POR scheme POS1 is sound under Definition 6 (on page 26).
We first prove two lemmas about random sampling and then apply these two
lemmas, together with the security property of S1, to prove the above theorem.
4.7.1 Two Lemmas on Random Sampling
Lemma 4.7 Let X and Y be two finite sets. Let UX denote a uniform random variable
over the domain X and UY denote a (independent) uniform random variable over the
domain Y. Consider any function f : X × Y → {0, 1}. Let  = Pr[f(UX, UY) = 1].
For any constant a ∈ (0, 1
2
), define a set Sa = {x ∈ X : Pr[f(x, UY) = 1] ≥ a}. We
have
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Proof of Lemma 4.7: Let N = |Sa| be the size of set Sa. We have






Pr[f(x, UY) = 1] +
∑
x∈X\Sa
Pr[f(x, UY) = 1]
 (4.25)
≤ 1|X| (N + a(|X| −N)) (4.26)

















, ] = O(). (4.28)
uunionsq
Lemma 4.8 Let κ be an integer. Let δ,  ∈ (0, 1] be two real values and δ ≥ . Let
t = dκ

e. Independently sample t number of values r1, . . . , rt from {0, 1} under the
Bernoulli distribution with probability δ. Let d be a positive integer and d ≤ κc for
some real valued constant c ∈ (0, 1). Then with overwhelming high probability (w.r.t.
κ), there exists d distinct indices i1, i2, . . . , id ∈ [1, t] such that ∀j ∈ [1, d], rij = 1.
We remark that the original form of Chernoff bound [Che52, Gol06] does not serve
our purpose.
Proof of Lemma 4.8: Let us consider the set S = {i ∈ [1, t] : ri = 1}. We will
show that the size of set S is at least d with overwhelming high probability.
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For each index i ∈ [1, t], we have Pr[ri = 1] = δ ≥ .
Pr[|S| < d] =
d−1∑
j=0





























where e is the base of natural logarithm.
Now we explain the above inference. Equation (4.30) can be derived from Equa-
tion (4.29), since for each j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , d − 1}, function f(δ) = δj(1 − δ)t−j, δ ∈
(0, 1), has a negative first order derivative since κ > κc ≥ d, and is thus a monotone
decreasing function of δ ∈ (0, 1).
Equation (4.31) can be derived from Equation (4.30), since the probability mass
function of a binomial distribution is a bell shape (like normal distribution) and






()j (1− )t−j is a monotone increasing function of j.
Equation (4.32) can be derived from Equation (4.31), due to the following two
Equations (4.34) and (4.35).












d−1 ≤ td−1d−1 = (t)d−1 ≤ (κ+ 1)d−1 (4.35)
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c−1) ln(κ+1)−κ+O(κc) = e−O(κ). (4.36)
So de−O(κ) ≤ κc · e−O(κ) is negligible in κ. Recall that d < κc for constant c ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, Pr[|S| < d] is negligible in κ and the set S has size at least d with
overwhelming high probability (1− Pr[|S| < d]) in κ. uunionsq
4.7.2 Scheme POS1 is Sound
Proof of Theorem 4.6: Suppose in the Retrieve phase of the POR security
game between an adversary A and a challenger, the challenger initiates ζ = O(t2)
verifications, and the adversary A correctly answers  fraction of verification queries,
where t = dnλ

e. Here n is the number of blocks in the error erasure encoded file.
Recall that a challenge query (C, ~ν) consists of two parts: a subset C ⊂ [1, n] with
size `, and a weight vector ~ν = (ν, ν2, . . . , νd+1) ∈ (Zp)`. Let us denote the domain
of C as C and the domain of weight as W.
We remark that (1) a negligible function w.r.t. nλ is also a negligible function
w.r.t. λ; (2) both sizes of domain C and W are exponentially large in λ, since
` = O(λ).
Extractor Strategy The challenger chooses challenge queries in this way: For each
i ∈ [1, t], independently choose a random subset Ci ∈ C, and independently choose
t number of random weights ~νi,j ∈ W, j ∈ [1, t]. For each (i, j) ∈ [1, t] × [1, t], send
(Ci, ~νi,j) to the adversary A, receive response (Mi,j, σi,j) from the adversary. Define a
function f : C×W→ {0, 1}, such that if (Mi,j, σi,j) is accepted, then f(Ci, ~νi,j) = 1,
otherwise f(Ci, ~νi,j) = 0.
The challenger finds all indices i ∈ [1, t], such that for at least ` distinct in-
dices jι, ι ∈ [1, `], the adversary A’s responses (Mi,jι , σi,jι) w.r.t. query (Ci, ~νi,jι) are
accepted. From such responses Mi,jι , the challenger can solve the following linear
equation system to obtain the data blocks Fu’s with index u in the set Ci. Let
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~M = (Mi,j1 , . . . , Mi,j`)
> be a column vector and µ be a `× ` matrix, such that ι-th row
of µ is just the row vector ~νi,jι , ι ∈ [1, `]. The linear equation system with unknown
~x is as below
µ~x = ~M (4.37)
Note that µ is a vandermonde matrix [MS58] and has rank ` as long as all ~νi,jι ’s,
ι ∈ [1, `], are distinct.
From ρn number of blocks Fu’s, the original file can be recovered using the error
erasure decoding algorithm. Recall that ρ is the rate of the error erasure code.
Analysis of the Extractor Strategy Let a = 1
3
. For a subset C ∈ C, we say
C is good, if the Pr[f(C, ~ν) = 1] ≥ a, where the probability is over uniformly ran-
domly chosen weight vector ~ν ∈ W. Let Sa be the set of all good subset C. By
applying Lemma 4.7, a uniformly random chosen subset C is good with probabil-
ity at least O(): Pr[C ∈ Sa] ≥ O(). By Lemma 4.8 with κ = nλ and constant
d = ρn < κ, among these t number of independent samples Ci’s, i ∈ [1, t], with
overwhelming high probability, there exists at least d = ρn number of good Ci’s.
For each good Ci, applying the Lemma 4.8 on the random variable ~ν with κ = nλ
and d = ` < κ, with overwhelming high probability, there exists at least d samples
~νi,jι , ι ∈ [1, d], jι ∈ [1, t], such that f(Ci, ~νi,jι) = 1 (We call such ~νi,jι as good weight).
Therefore, with overwhelming high probability, the challenger can find sufficient num-
ber of good subsets and weight vectors to form ρn number of linear equation systems
as in Equation (4.37).
Since the underlying MAC scheme S1 is unforgeable (Theorem 4.3), a valid proof
(M, σ) is genuine with overwhelming high probability. Additionally, since the domain
of subset Ci (respectively, weights ~νi,jι) is exponentially large w.r.t. λ, all good Ci’s
(respectively, good weights ~νi,jι) are distinct with overwhelming high probability.
Thus the challenger’s above extractor algorithm succeeds with overwhelming high
probability. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.6. uunionsq
We remark that the above proof assumes that the adversary’s response w.r.t.
a given particular query is deterministic for simplicity. In the more generic case
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where the adversary’s response to a given query is probabilistic, we can write out the
adversary’s random coin explicitly and apply the Lemma 4.8 on this random coin for
one more time. After that the above argument still holds. The cost is that in this
more generic case, the extractor runs O(t3) number of verification interactions.
4.8 Summary
This chapter presented a linearly homomorphic MAC scheme S1, which allows any
third party to compute a MAC value for a linear combination of messages Mi’s, from
the MAC values of these messages Mi’s and a public key. S1 is also a symmetric key
signcryption scheme, that is, it functions as a symmetric key signature (i.e. MAC)
scheme and a symmetric encryption scheme simultaneously. Based on S1, a Proofs of
Retrievability scheme POS1 is constructed. The POR scheme POS1 is very efficient
in communication and computation: (1) only linear (w.r.t. the security parame-
ter) communication bits per verification are required; and (2) only group multiplica-
tion/addition and pseudorandom function evaluations are required in data preprocess
and proof generation. The drawback is that the authentication tags are as large as
the data file size. Full security proof of S1 and POS1 under assumption of existence
of secure pseudorandom function are provided. The security property of S1 is proved
in two steps: (1) in the first step, security of S1 is proved in a simplified setting,
where all acceptance/rejection decisions of each verification are kept secret from the
adversary; (2) in the second step, security of S1 is proved in the original setting, using
the result in the first step.
Chapter 5
Proofs of Retrievability from
Linearly Predicate-Homomorphic
Message Authentication Code
A linearly predicate-homomorphic MAC scheme satisfies two homomorphic properties:
• It is a linearly homomorphic MAC scheme as described in previous Chapter 4.
That is, any third party can compute a MAC value for a linear combination of
messages Mi’s from the MAC values of these messages Mi’s, using the public key.
• It is a predicate-homomorphic MAC scheme, such that given a MAC value of a
message M, any third party can compute a MAC value for another message M′
with the public key, as long as the two messages (M, M′) satisfies the designated
predicate.
This chapter will propose a linearly predicate-homomorphic MAC scheme, which
we refer to as S2, and apply it to construct a proofs of storage scheme, which we
refer to as POS2 in this dissertation. The proposed scheme POS2 is very efficient
in communication and storage, and is practical in computation. The result in this
chapter is published in Xu and Chang [XC12].
51
CHAPTER 5. POR FROM PREDICATE-HOMOMORPHIC MAC 52
5.1 Overview
5.1.1 A Brief Description of proofs of storage scheme POS2
The POR scheme POS1 constructed in the previous Chapter 4 is very efficient in
communication—only a single message-MAC pair is returned as the response in a
verification. However, in POS1, the size of authentication tags are equally large as
the size of data file (after erasure encoding). Can we reduce the size of authentication
data?
Asymmetric Linear Homomorphic MAC—A MAC value is shorter than a
message Suppose a data block is large and consists of m sectors. We wish to build
an authentication tag with size equal to one sector. This can be done in this way:
Choose a secret random vector ~s ∈ (Zp)m. Treat a data block ~Fi ∈ (Zp)m as a vector.




of the two vectors ~Fi and ~s, and then apply the
MAC scheme S1 on the inner product to generate a MAC value σi as below,





where (seed, τ) is the private key of the MAC scheme S1. The generated MAC values
σi’s are also linearly homomorphic w.r.t. the data blocks ~Fi’s, in the sense that, for














i νi~Fi and its MAC value
∑
i νiσi have to be returned to
the verifier for validity check. However, the size of block
∑
i νi~Fi (mod p) is mλ bits
and the proof size increases from 2λ bits to (m+ 1)λ bits. In summary, the size of all
authentication tags is reduced by a multiplicative factor m, at the cost of increase in
proof size by a multiplicative factor m+1
2
. We remark that the above is the essential
idea of Shacham and Waters [SW08a].
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Predicate Homomorphism Can we recursively apply some Proofs of Retrievabil-
ity scheme on the data
∑
i νi~Fi with authentication tag
∑
i νiσi, although both the
data and the authentication tag are generated dynamically?
A wishful thought is that: Suppose somehow our MAC scheme supports an ad-
ditional homomorphism, such that given a message-MAC pair (M, σ), anyone can
produce a valid MAC value σ′ for another shorter message M′, as long as (M′, M) satisfy
some designated predicate. Thus the shorter message-MAC pair (M′, σ′) can be sent
back as response for verification, instead of the original (M, σ). Furthermore, there are
many different shorter messages M′is such that (M
′
i, M) satisfy the designated predicate,
and from these shorter messages M′is, the original long message M can be recovered (or
retrieved) efficiently. In other words, M′is are codewords of M.
Illustration Picture Figure 5.1 illustrates the above idea. In Figure 5.1, each
rectangle consists of three squares. Each rectangle represents a data block and each
square within a rectangle represents a sector in that data block. Thus in the case of
Figure 5.1 the block size is m = 3. Those shaded rectangles represent data blocks
that are generated due to the error erasure code. A rectangle represents a data block
and the circle that lies just below represents the corresponding authentication tag
generated by some underlying MAC scheme. An authentication tag is about the same
size of one data sector, and thus is one third of a data block. During a verification, a
subset of three data blocks and their authentication tags are selected, from which a
single pair of data block and an authentication tag is generated by applying the linear
homomorphism of the underlying MAC scheme. Instead of sending the large data
block back directly, some predicate homomorphism is applied to generate a shorter
message-MAC pair, which is sent back to the verifier as response.
5.1.2 Organization
The rest of this chapter is organized as below: The next Section 5.2 presents the def-
inition of a linearly predicate-homomorphic MAC scheme, followed by a construction
(named S2) of such a homomorphic MAC scheme in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, a
proofs of storage scheme (named POS2) is constructed using the newly constructed







Figure 5.1: POR scheme POS2 constructed from linearly predicate-homomorphic
MAC scheme S2. Detailed explanation is in the paragraph with title “Illustration
Picture”.
homomorphic MAC scheme. The performance of POS2 is analyzed in Section 5.5.
Next, we present the security formulation of linearly predicate-homomorphic MAC
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and provide the full security proof for our construction S2 in Section 5.6. The security
proof for scheme POS2 under POR security formulation is in Section 5.7. At the last,
Section 5.8 summarizes this chapter.
5.2 Linearly Predicate-Homomorphic MAC: Defi-
nition
In this section, we describe the definition of a linearly predicate-homomorphic Message
Authentication Code scheme. We defer the security formulation later to Section 5.6,
where we will analyze the security property of the proposed construction of such
homomorphic MAC scheme.
Ahn et al. [ABC+11a] proposed the new concept of “Predicate-Signature”, which
can be viewed as a counterpart of predicate encryption [BW07, KSW08, SW08b]. In
this dissertation, we are interested in a small class of predicates—function.
Let F : M×R→M′ be a two inputs function. We are interesting in the following




1 (F (M, r) = M′)
0 (o.w.)
(5.3)
A linearly predicate-homomorphic MAC scheme w.r.t. a predicate family {PF,r : r ∈
R} consists of six algorithms (KeyGen, Sign,Combine,P-Sign,Verify,P-Verify), where
each algorithm is described as below.
• KeyGen(1λ)→ (spk, ssk): The probabilistic key generating algorithm takes the
security parameter λ as input, and outputs a pair of public and private keys
(spk, ssk).
• Sign(ssk, i, M) → σ: The signing algorithm takes the private key ssk, an index
i, and a message M ∈M as input, and outputs a signature σ.
• Combine(spk, {(i, Mi, σi, νi) : i ∈ C}) → (M, σ): The algorithm Combine imple-
ments the linearly homomorphic property. Taking as input the public key spk,
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a sequence of tuples (i, Mi, σi, νi), i ∈ C, where σi is the MAC value of a mes-
sage Mi w.r.t. an index i, and νi is a weight of Mi in a linear combination, the
algorithm Combine outputs a message-MAC pair (M :=
∑
i∈C νiMi, σ).
• P-Sign(spk, M, σ, r) → (F (M, r), σˆ): This algorithm implements the predicate-
homomorphic property. Algorithm P-Sign takes the public key spk, a message-
MAC pair (M, σ) and a value r as input, and outputs a message-MAC pair
(F (M, r), σˆ).
Note: In order to construct an efficient Proofs of Retrievability scheme using
such predicate homomorphism, we wish that (1) σˆ is a valid MAC value for
F (M, r); (2) the bit-length of (F (M, r), σˆ) is sublinear in the bit-length of (M, σ);
(3) F (M, r) is a codeword of M for any value r from a proper domain R, such
that the message M can be decoded (or retrieved) efficiently from a subset of
{F (M, r) : r ∈ R}.
• Verify(ssk, M, σ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}) → accept or reject: The deterministic veri-
fication algorithm Verify takes the private key ssk, a message-MAC pair (M, σ)
and a sequence of pairs of index i and weight νi, i ∈ C as input, and outputs
either accept or reject.
• P-Verify(ssk, M, σ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r) → accept or reject: The deterministic
predicate-verification algorithm P-Verify takes the private key ssk, a message-
MAC pair (M, σ), a sequence of pairs of index i and weight νi, i ∈ C, and a
value r as input, and outputs either accept or reject.
Intuitively, a MAC scheme is linearly homomorphic, if the MAC value of a linear
combination of messages Mi can be generated without the private key from the MAC
values of these messages Mi’s; a MAC scheme is predicate-homomorphic, if the MAC
value of a message M′ can be generated without the private key from the MAC value of
another message M as long as the two messages (M′, M) satisfy the designated predicate.
Definition 8 (Linearly Predicate-Homomorphic Message Authentication Code)
Let S = (KeyGen, Sign,P-Sign,Verify,P-Verify) be a MAC scheme. We say S is a lin-
early predicate-homomorphic MAC scheme, if the following conditions hold:
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• Linear Homomorphism: If for any public-private key pair (spk, ssk) := KeyGen(1λ)
generated by the key generating algorithm KeyGen and for any sequence of
message-MAC pairs {(i, Mi, σi), i ∈ C} generated by the signing algorithm Sign
under the private key ssk, the output (
∑
i∈C νiMi, σ) := Combine(spk, {(i, Mi, σi, νi) :
i ∈ C}) is accepted as a valid message-MAC pair by the verification algorithm
Verify under the private key ssk w.r.t. {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}.
• Predicate Homomorphism: If for any public-private key pair (spk, ssk) :=
KeyGen(1λ) generated by the key generating algorithm KeyGen, and for any
message-MAC pair (M, σ) := Combine(spk, {(i, Mi, Sign(ssk, i, Mi), νi) : i ∈ C})
generated by the algorithm Combine under the public key spk w.r.t. {(i, νi) :
i ∈ C}, and for any value r ∈ R, the output (F (M, r), σˆ) := P-Sign(spk, M, σ, r)
is accepted as a valid message-MAC pair by the verification algorithm P-Verify
under the private key ssk w.r.t. {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}.
5.3 Linearly Predicate-Homomorphic MAC: Con-
struction
We first briefly review the polynomial commitment scheme proposed by Kate and
Zaverucha and Goldberg [KZG10]. Next, we present our construction of linearly
predicate-homomorphic MAC, which integrates the linearly homomorphic MAC scheme
S1 presented in Chapter 4 and the idea of polynomial commitment scheme [KZG10].
5.3.1 Background on Short Polynomial Commitment Scheme
Kate and Zaverucha and Goldberg [KZG10] proposed a constant size commitment
scheme [Blu81,BCC88] for polynomial functions, which has a special feature in sup-
porting efficient verification of polynomial evaluation. Their scheme exploits a simple
and elegant algebraic property of polynomials: For any polynomial f(x) ∈ Zp[x] in
variable x with coefficients in group Zp, and for any scalar input r ∈ Zp, the polyno-
mial x− r divides the polynomial f(x)− f(r).
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Let us denote with f~u(x) ∈ Zp[x] the polynomial with coefficient vector ~u =
(u0, . . . , um−1) ∈ (Zp)m, that is, f~u(x) ≡
∑m−1
j=0 ujx
j. Let G and GT be two multi-
plicative group of prime order p and e : G×G→ GT be a bilinear map.
We brief how the commitment scheme in [KZG10] supports verification of poly-
nomial evaluation as below. In the setup, a trust party chooses a public key pk :=
(g, gα, . . . , gα
m−1
) ∈ Gm, where g is a generator of group G and α ∈ Zp is chosen at




coefficient vector ~u = (u0, . . . , um−1) ∈ (Zp)m, a committer can compute a commit-
ment C using the public key pk, that is, C := ∏m−1j=0 (gαj)uj = gf~u(α) ∈ G, and then
publish C. Later, for any scalar r ∈ Zp, the committer can compute y := f~u(r) ∈ Zp
and generate a short proof ψ ( [KZG10] calls it witness) to convince a verifier that
y is indeed the correct evaluation of f~u(r), without revealing the polynomial f~u(x).
The proof (or witness) ψ is generated as below:
• Divide the polynomial f~u(x)−f~u(r) with (x−r) using polynomial long division,
and denote the coefficient vector of the resulting quotient polynomial as ~w =
(w0, w1, . . . , wm−2), that is, f~w(x) ≡ f~u(x)−f~u(r)x−r .
• Then compute ψ := gf~w(α) using the public key pk in the same way as computing







= gf~w(α) ∈ G.
After receiving (r, y, ψ) from the committer, a verifier can verify whether y
?
= f~u(r)
with the proof ψ and public key pk = (g, gα, . . . , gα
m−1
) and the public commitment
C of the unknown polynomial f~u(x), using a bilinear map e : G×G→ GT :
e(g, C)/e(g, g)y ?= e(ψ, gα/gr). (5.4)
Note that the left hand side of above Equation (5.4) is e(g, C)/e(g, g)y = e(g, g)f~u(α)−y,
and the right hand side is e(ψ, gα/gr) = e(gf~w(α), gα−r) = e(g, g)(α−r)f~w(α).
In summary, the commitment scheme proposed by Kate and Zaverucha and Gold-
berg [KZG10] allows the owner of a polynomial f(x) to generate a constant size proof
for the correctness of the polynomial evaluation f(r) at any particular point x = r,
without revealing the polynomial f(x).
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5.3.2 Construction of S2 : Integrating KZG Polynomial Com-
mitment and the Linearly Homomorphic MAC S1
In this subsection, we construct a linearly predicate-homomorphic MAC scheme
named S2. The new MAC scheme S2 integrates the main idea of polynomial commit-
ment scheme [KZG10] and the linearly homomorphic MAC scheme S1 we proposed
in previous Chapter 4. Recall that:
• The notation f~u(x) denotes the polynomial with coefficient vector ~u = (u0, . . . ,




• The construction described below exploits an algebraic property of polynomials:
for any polynomial f(x) in variable x and for any scalar input r, the polynomial
x− r divides the polynomial f(x)− f(r).
The construction of S2 = (KeyGen, Sign,Combine,P-Sign,Verify,P-Verify) as below.
We emphasize that the construction of S2 can be instantiated over elliptic curve
group 1, although in the following description, S2 is constructed over a modulo group.
S2.KeyGen(1λ)→ (spk, ssk)
Choose at random a λ bits safe prime q such that p := (q−1)/2 is also prime. Let
QRq be the subgroup of quadratic residues modulo q in Z∗q. Choose at random
a generator g of group QRq. Choose at random two elements τ, α from Z∗p:
τ, α
$←− Z∗p. Choose at random a PRF key, denoted as seed, from the key space
of a pseudorandom function family {PRFseed : {0, 1}2λ → Zp}. The public key
is spk := (p, q, {gαj mod q}m−1j=0 ) and the private key is ssk := (p, q, seed, α, τ).
Note: (1) Both the size of group QRq and the multiplicative order of g modulo
q are equal to p; (2) Zero is not in Z∗q or QRq.
1Bilinear map is not required, since S2 does not support public verification.
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S2.Sign(ssk, i,~M)→ σ
The input is the private key ssk, an index i ∈ {0, 1}2λ, and a vector ~M =
(M0, . . . , Mm−1) ∈ (Zp)m. Compute the MAC value σ for ~M as below:




j mod p. (5.5)
S2.Combine(spk, {(i,~Mi, σi, νi) : i ∈ C})→ (~µ, σ)
The input consists of a public key spk, a sequence of tuples (i,~Mi, σi, νi), i ∈ C,
where i is an index, ~Mi ∈ (Zp)m is a message in vector form, σi is the MAC value
of ~Mi, and νi ∈ Z∗p is a weight for linear combination. Compute a message-MAC




νi~Mi mod p ∈ (Zp)m ; σ :=
∑
i∈C
νiσi mod p ∈ Zp. (5.6)
Output (~µ, σ).
S2.P-Sign(spk, ~µ, σ, r)→ (f~µ(r), σˆ)
The input consists of a public key spk, a message ~µ = (µ0, . . . , µm−1) ∈ (Zp)m
in vector form, a MAC value σ for ~µ, and a value r ∈ Zp. Evaluate poly-
nomial f~µ(x) at point x = r to obtain y := f~µ(r) mod p. Divide the poly-
nomial f~µ(x) − f~µ(r) in variable x with (x − r) using polynomial long divi-
sion, and denote the coefficient vector of the resulting quotient polynomial as
~w = (w0, . . . , wm−2) ∈ (Zp)m−1, that is,
f~w(x) ≡ f~µ(x)− f~µ(r)
x− r .
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= gf~w(α) mod q. (5.7)
The MAC value for y is σˆ := (ψ, σ). Output (y, σˆ).
S2.Verify(ssk, ~µ, σ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C})→ accept or reject
The input consists of a private key ssk, a message ~µ ∈ (Zp)m in vector form,
and a sequence of tuples (i, νi), i ∈ C, where i is an index and νi is a weight
for linear combination. Check the following equality with the private key ssk =





+ τ · f~µ(α) ?= σ mod p. (5.8)
S2.P-Verify(ssk, y, (ψ, σ), {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r)→ accept or reject
The input consists of a private key ssk, a message y ∈ Zp, a MAC value (ψ, σ)
for y, a sequence of tuples (i, νi), i ∈ C, where i is an index and νi is a weight
for linear combination, and value r ∈ Zp. Check the following equality with the
private key ssk = (p, q, seed, α, τ). If Equality (5.9) holds and ψ ∈ QRq is a




i∈C νiPRFseed(i)) − y mod q (5.9)
Remark 3
• In case that α−r is even, if (y, ψ, σ) satisfies Equation (5.9), so does (y,−ψ, σ).
• We check whether ψ is a quadratic residue modulo q in algorithm S2.P-Verify,
in order to avoid accepting (y,−ψ, σ). The reasons are as below:
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– From motivation point of view, we hope to authenticate both the message
y and the MAC value (ψ, σ), so that we can achieve stronger security.
– The correct value ψ generated by the Equation (5.7) is
ψ = gf~w(r) mod q is within group QRq,
since g ∈ QRq.
– Recall that q = 2p+1 is a safe prime with p being prime, thus q = 3 mod 4.
For such kind of prime q, the negation of a quadratic residue modulo q is
not a quadratic residue [Gol06].
• S2 can be alternatively instantiated over an elliptic curve group, and bilinear
map operation is not required. This is different from [KZG10], since S2 only
supports private key verification.
5.3.3 Correctness
Recall that f~u(x) denotes the polynomial in variable x with vector ~u = (u0, . . . , um−1)
as coefficients: f~u(x) =
∑m−1
i=1 uix
i. We define a predicate family {Pr : Zp× (Zp)m →
{0, 1}} w.r.t. the polynomial function2 f~u as below
Pr(y, ~u) =
{
1 ( if f~u(r) = y mod p)
0 (o.w.)
(5.10)
Lemma 5.1 (S2 is a Linearly Predicate-Homomorphic MAC) The proposed
MAC scheme S2 is both linearly homomorphic and predicate-homomorphic w.r.t.
predicate family {Pr : r ∈ Zp} as defined in Equation (5.10), under Definition 8
(on page 56).
2Here the corresponding two input function F (·, ·) is F (~u, r) = f~u(r).
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Proof of Lemma 5.1: One can verify that the following Equality (5.11) holds
through some straightforward algebra manipulation over polynomials.
∑
i∈C




The following proof will utilize the above equality.
Linear-Homomorphism Let ~µ =
∑
i∈C νi~Mi and σ =
∑
i∈C νiσi be as computed




























νiPRFseed(i) + τf~µ(α) (5.15)
= LHS. (5.16)
Predicate-Homomorphism Suppose ψ = gf~w(α) mod p, σ =
∑
i∈C νiσi mod p,
y = f~µ(r) mod p. Then ψ ∈ QRq is a quadratic residue, and the LHS (left hand





= gf~w(α)×(α−r) = g
f~µ(α)−f~µ(r)
α−r ×(α−r) = gf~µ(α)−f~µ(r) mod q.(5.17)
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= gf~µ(α) − f~µ(r) = LSH mod q. (5.23)
Note that we obtain Equation (5.21) from Equation (5.20), i.e. the equality between∑
i∈C νif~Mi(α) and f~u(α) with vector ~u =
∑
i∈C νi~Mi, due to Equality (5.11). uunionsq
5.4 POS2: A Proofs of Retrievability scheme
constructed from Homomorphic MAC S2
In this section, we construct an efficient POR scheme with private verifiability, by
applying the newly constructed linearly predicate-homomorphic MAC scheme S2. We
refer to this scheme as POS2 in this dissertation.
5.4.1 Construction of POS2
POS2.KeyGen(1λ)→ (pk, sk)
Invoke the key generating algorithm S2.KeyGen to generate the public-private
key pair: (pk, sk) := S2.KeyGen(1λ). Output (pk, sk).
POS2.DEncode(sk, F)→ (id, Fˆ, n)
The input consists of a private key sk and a file F. Let ρ ∈ (0, 1) be a system
parameter. Apply a rate-ρ error erasure code on the file F to generate file blocks
(~F0, . . . ,~Fn−1), such that each block ~Fi = (Fi,0, . . . , Fi,m−1) ∈ (Zp)m is a vector
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of sectors Fi,j ∈ Zp, and any ρn number of blocks ~Fi’s can recover the original
file F. Choose a unique identifier id from domain {0, 1}λ. For each block ~Fi,
i ∈ [0, n−1], generate a MAC value σi using the MAC scheme S2 under private
key sk as below:
σi := S2.Sign(sk, id‖i, ~Fi). (5.24)
The encoded file Fˆ is {(i,~Fi, σi) : i ∈ [0, n−1]}. Send (id, Fˆ) to the cloud storage
server and keep (id, n) in local storage. Output (id, Fˆ, n).
Note: Figure 5.2 illustrates the data organization. In this figure, a rectangle
represents a data block ~Fi and a square within a rectangle represents a data
sector Fi,j in the data block ~Fi. A circle below represents the corresponding
authentication tag σi. Those shaded rectangles represent data blocks that are
generated by the error erasure code.
POS2.Prove(pk, id, Fˆ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r)→ (y, ψ, σ)
The input consists of a public key pk, a file identifier id, an encoded file Fˆ =
{(i,~Fi, σi) : i ∈ [0, n − 1]} which is associated with the identifier id, and a
challenge ({(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r), where i ∈ C ⊆ [0, n − 1] is index, νi ∈ Z∗p is a
weight for linear combination, and r ∈ Zp. Apply the linear homomorphism of
S2 to compute a message-MAC pair (~µ, σ~µ) as below
(~µ, σ~µ) := S2.Combine(pk, {(id‖i,~Fi, σi, νi) : i ∈ C}). (5.25)
Next, apply the predicate-homomorphism of S2 to generate a message-MAC
pair (y, σˆ) as below
(y, σˆ) := S2.P-Sign(pk, ~µ, σ~µ, r). (5.26)
Parse σˆ as (ψ, σ) and send (y, ψ, σ) back to verifier (i.e. data owner). Output
(y, ψ, σ).






























σ0 σ1 σn−3 σn−2 σn−1
Figure 5.2: Data Organization of POS2
POS2.Verify(sk, id, (y, ψ, σ), {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r)→ accept or reject
The input consists of a private key sk, a file identifier id, the response (y, ψ, σ)
from the prover (i.e. the cloud storage server), and the challenge ({(i, νi) : i ∈
C}, r), where i ∈ C ⊆ [0, n − 1] is an index, νi ∈ Z∗p is a weight for linear
combination, and r ∈ Zp. Invoke the verification algorithm S2.P-Verify of MAC
scheme S2 to obtain b ∈ {accept, reject} with private key sk as below, and
output b.
b := S2.P-Verify(sk, y, (ψ, σ), {(id‖i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r) ∈ {accept, reject}.
(5.27)
Remark 4
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• The challenge {(id‖i, νi) : i ∈ C, νi ∈ Z∗p} can be represented compactly with two
short random seeds of a pseudorandom function under random oracle model [SW08a,
DVW09]. Alternatively, Dodis, Vadhan and Wichs [DVW09]’s PoR Code can
be applied.
• To simplify the proof, we assume that νi’s, i ∈ C, forms a simple geometric
sequence. More precisely, denote the elements of set C as {ij ∈ [0, n− 1] : j ∈
[0, ` − 1]}, where ` is the size of set C and 0 ≤ i0 < i1 < i2 . . . < i`−1 < n.
There exists some element ν ∈ Z∗p, for each j ∈ [0, ` − 1], νij = νj mod p.
In other words, the sequence (. . . , νi, . . .)i∈C, ordered by increasing i, forms a
simple geometric sequence (ν0, ν1, . . . , ν`−1). Thus, ` distinct vectors of form
(ν0, ν1, . . . , ν`−1) ∈ (Z∗p)` can constitute a vandermonde matrix [MS58].
• Compared to Shacham and Waters [SW08a] scheme, the algorithm Prove in
POS2 is able to aggregate m number of weighted sums µ0, µ1, . . . , µm−1 into two
short numbers y and ψ using the idea in the polynomial commitment scheme [KZG10],
where y = f~µ(r) =
∑m−1
j=0 µjr
j ∈ Zp (r is a random nonce chosen by the data
owner) and ψ = g
f~µ(α)−f~µ(r)
α−r ∈ Z∗q. In this way, POS2 requires only O(λ)
communication bits per verification. In comparison, the Shacham and Wa-
ters [SW08a] scheme requires O(mλ) communication bits per verification, since
(µ0, µ1, . . . , µm−1) are sent back directly as the response.
5.4.2 Completeness
Lemma 5.2 (POS2 is Complete) The above construction POS2 is complete under
Definition 5 (on page 24).
The completeness of POS2 is implied by the correctness of the underlying homomor-
phic MAC scheme S2 (Lemma 5.1). Recall that, a POR scheme is complete, if any
genuine proof generated by following the POR scheme honestly will be accepted by
the verifier.
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5.5 Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze the performance of our proposed scheme POS2 in commu-
nication, storage, and computation. We also compare POS2 with existing works by
Shacham and Waters [SW08a] and Ateniese et al. [ABC+07, ABC+11b]. We remark
that, the scheme POS2 can be instantiated over a modulo group of size 21024, or over
an elliptic curve with much smaller group size 2160 (Bilinear map is not required).
5.5.1 Communication
During a verification, the communication cost is the size of a challenge plus the size
of its corresponding response (or proof). In our scheme POS2, the challenge consists
of a set {(i, νi) : i ∈ C} and a group element r. As mentioned previously, the set
{(i, νi) : i ∈ C} can be represented compactly with two 80 bits PRF seeds. The group
element r is used to retrieve a polynomial function value f(r) for some polynomial
f(x) determined by a linear combination of the data blocks specified in the set C. In
the security analysis, the goal of r is to retrieve multiple function values f(ri)’s for
different inputs ri, and then recover the polynomial f(x) by solving a linear equation
system. For this reason, we can simply choose r from a smaller range [1, 280] without
any sacrificing in the security. As a result, the challenge size is 80× 3 = 240 bits.
In our scheme POS2, a response, i.e. the proof, consists of three group elements
y, σ, ψ, which are derived from the challenge, the data blocks and authentication tags.
So the size of a response is 3λ bits. Therefore, the communication cost per verification
is 3λ+ 240 bits.
5.5.2 Storage
During verification, the data owner only keeps the private key, and identifier and size
(in term of number of blocks) of each file in her local storage. Similar to Shacham and
Waters [SW08a], in the scheme POS2, the data owner can sign the meta-data of each
file and store the meta-data together with data owner’s digital signature in the cloud
storage. Before conducting a verification, the data owner retrieves the meta-data for
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the file of interest from the cloud storage, and check its digital signature. Thus, the
storage cost on data owner side is just the size of private key, which is 3λ+ 80 bits.
The storage overhead (due to authentication tags) on the cloud storage server side
is 1/m of the data file size, where the system parameter m is the block size and is
equal to the ratio of the size of a data block to the size of an authentication tag. The
public key is also kept in the cloud storage and its size is (m+ 1)λ bits. Note that in
our scheme, there is only one public key per user, without regarding to the number
of files the user stores in the cloud storage server.
5.5.3 Computation
Our scheme is very efficient in setup. Key generation requires m number of group
exponentiations. Suppose a nmλ bits data file consists of n data blocks, each block has
m group elements and each group element has λ bits. The data preprocess (i.e. the
DEncode algorithm) requires only nm number of group multiplications and additions,
together with n PRF evaluations. Note that the PRF can be simulated [BH05] with
an AES cipher [DR02] in counter mode.
During a verification, the computation complexity on the cloud storage server side
is dominated by the computation of ψ in Equation (5.7) in the algorithm P-Sign (on
page 61), which is invoked by algorithm Prove. This dominant step takes (m − 1)
number of group exponentiations, and is the bottleneck of efficiency of our scheme
when the block size m becomes large. We will measure the actual running time in
Section 5.5.6.
5.5.4 Recommended System Parameters
We recommend the following system parameter for our proposed scheme POS2: The
error erasure rate is 0.98, block size m is around 160, the challenge size is around 500.
In this setting, the false accept rate is 4.1024× 10−5 (False accept rate is analyzed in
Section 2.3.2 and example values are listed in Table 2.1 on page 14), the number of
communication bits required in a verification is 720 for elliptic curve group or 3312
for modulo group, the storage overhead is about 2% due to erasure encoding and
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Table 5.1: Comparison with an example among the PDP scheme by Ateniese et
al. [ABC+07], the POR scheme by Shacham and Waters [SW08a], and the POR
scheme POS2 proposed in this chapter. After erasure encoding, the file size is 1GB,
block size is m = 100, and storage overhead due to authentication tags is about 10MB
for all schemes. For all schemes listed below, we assume that, during a verification,
the challenge {(i, νi) : i ∈ C} are represented by two 80 bits PRF seeds. System
parameter ` represents the size of set C. All computation times are represented by
the corresponding dominant factor. exp and mul denote the group exponentiation and
group multiplication respectively in the corresponding group. Note that one 1024 bits
modular exponentiation or one 160 bits elliptic curve exponentiation takes roughly 5
millisecond in a standard PC.
Scheme Group Element Communication Computation Computation
Size (bits) bits (Data Preprocess) (Prove)
Ateniese λ = 1024 2λ+ 160 + 256 = 2464 223 exp. over Z∗N (100 + `) exp. over Z∗N
[ABC+07]
SW [SW08a] λ = 80 (m+ 1)λ+ 160 = 8240 227 mul. over Zp 100` mul. over Zp
POS2 (E.C.) λ = 160 3λ+ 240 = 720 226 mul. over Zp 100 exp. over Elliptic Curve
POS2 (Z∗q) λ = 1024 3λ+ 240 = 3312 223 mul. over Zp 100 exp. over Z∗q
1/160 = 0.625% due to authentication tags. Our experiment will confirm that the
query latency is within 1 second.
5.5.5 Comparison
We give a comparison on the performances of our scheme with Shacham and Wa-
ters [SW08a] and Ateniese et al. [ABC+07] in Table 5.1 with an example. A more
detailed and generic comparison is given in Table 5.2 (on page 71). Note that in our
proposed scheme POS2, the practical choice of value m is bounded by the computa-
tion on the server side, which is similar to the case of Ateniese [ABC+07]. In contrast,
in SW [SW08a], the largest practical value of m (SW [SW08a] uses “s” to denote this




































Table 5.2: Performance Comparison. All schemes support private verification only. In each scheme, a challenge set
{(i, νi) : i ∈ C} contains ` index-coefficient pairs and is represented compactly by two 80 bits PRF seeds. In the
table, exp, mul and add represent exponentiation, multiplication and addition in the corresponding groups/fields;
notation |F| denotes the file size in bits. Note: In Ateniese’s PDP scheme, exponentiation with a large integer of
mλ bits is required. We represent such exponentiation as a number of m normal group exponentiation exp, where















λ = 1024 2λ Zero |F|/λ exp. 1 exp. 1 exp.
PolyCommit
[KZG10]
λ = 160 3λ Zero |F|/λ exp. + 2|F|/λ (mul.
+ add.)




λ = 160 2λ+ 240 |F| |F|/λ (exp. + mul. +
add.)





λ = 1024 2λ+ 320 |F|/m (`+m) exp. + 2` mult. +
` add + 1 hash + 2` PRF
` (exp. + mult.)
+ 1 hash




λ = 80 (m+ 1)λ+
160
|F|/m m` (add + mult) + 2` PRF (` + m) (add +
mult) + 3` PRF




λ = 160 3λ+ 240 |F|/m (m−1) exp. + (m`+m+`)
(add + mul) + 2` PRF
2 exp. + ` (add
+ mult) + 3`
PRF
|F|/λ (mul. + add.) +
|F|/(λm) PRF
POS2 (Z∗q) λ = 1024 3λ+ 240 |F|/m (m−1) exp. + (m`+m+`)
(add + mul) + 2` PRF
2 exp. + ` (add
+ mult) + 3`
PRF
|F|/λ (mul. + add.) +
|F|/(λm) PRF
Notations: λ is the size of group/field and also functions as the security parameter, n is the number of
blocks in a file, m is the number of group elements in a block, and ` is the number of blocks accessed during a
verification.
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We also compare the proposed scheme POS2 with SW scheme [SW08a] in com-
munication and storage overhead. For a 1GB data file, we plot the number of com-
munication bits (i.e. the size of a challenge and a proof) against the storage overhead




































Figure 5.3: Comparison on communication (in bits) and storage overhead (in megabytes)
w.r.t. a 1GB data file. SW denotes the POR scheme with private verification by Shacham
and Waters [SW08a]; POS2 (E.C.) denotes our proposed scheme instantiated over elliptic
curve group; POS2 (Z∗q) denotes our proposed scheme instantiated over group Z∗q .
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Table 5.3: The choices of values of various system parameters in our experiment
System Semantics Choices
Parameter of Values
λ Group element size in bits 1024
m The number of group elements in a data block 40, 80, 160, 320, 640, or 960
` The number of data blocks accessed in a verification 100, 300, 500 or 700.
5.5.6 Experiment: Measuring the computation time
The goal of this experiment is to measure the actual running time of the four algo-
rithms KeyGen,DEncode,Prove,Verify in the proposed scheme POS2(Z∗q), with disk IO
time included and networking communication time excluded. Note that the reported
query latency includes of running time of Prove and Verify and disk IO time.
5.5.6.1 Experiment Environment and Setting
We have implemented a prototype of our POS2 scheme in C programming language.
The large integer arithmetic is computed using GNU MP [GMP] library with version
5.0.1. The pseudorandom function PRF are simulated with AES symmetric cipher
provided in OpenSSL [Ope] library with version 1.0.0d. The disk IO is handled by
C library function mmap. We observe a low memory consumption for all experiments
conducted. Our implementation is not optimized and further performance improve-
ments of our scheme can be expected.
Our test machine is a laptop computer, which is equipped with a 2.5GHz Intel
Core 2 Duo CPU (model T9300), a 3GB PC2700-800MHZ RAM and a 7200RPM
hard disk. The test machine runs 32 bits version of Gentoo Linux OS with kernel
2.6.36. The file system is EXT4 with 4KB page size.
Our test data files are of size 16MB, 32MB, 64MB, 128MB, 256MB and 512MB,
respectively (We assume these are the file sizes after error erasure encoding). The
choices of values of various system parameters, i.e. group element size λ, block size
m and challenge size `, are listed in Table 5.3.
Our experiments are conducted in this way:
• Key generation: For each choice of block size m, we generate a key pair with
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size m using the key generating program KeyGen. The generated public key
consists of m group elements.
• Data preprocess: For each test file, for each choice of value of block size m,
we run the data encoding program DEncode to generate a set of authentication
tags.
• Verification: For each test file, for each choice of value of block size m, for each
choice of value of challenge size `, we run the Prove and Verify programs to
simulate the interaction between the data owner and cloud storage server.
Every single experiment case is repeated for 10 times and the reported timing data
are the averages. We remark that experiment trials are run in sequence without
parallelism.
5.5.6.2 Experiment Results
The experiment results are showed in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5. All experiment
results are averaged over 10 trials. Since all experiment results vary little across
different trials, we do not report the variances or confidence intervals.
Our experiment result in Figure 5.4(a) indicates that the key generating time is
proportional to the key size, i.e. the number of group elements in a key. The exper-
iment result in Figure 5.4(b) indicates that the data preprocess time (particularly,
DEncode) is proportional to the data file size and almost independent on the block
size s. The experiment (Figure 5.5(a) and Figure 5.5(b)) also shows that the query
latency is proportional to the block size m, almost independent on the file size, and
grows very slowly with the challenge size `, suggesting that the computation of ex-
ponentiations becomes the bottleneck when m is so large. All of these results agree
with our analysis.
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(a) Time to generate a key VS the key size
(b) Data preprocess time VS the block size. Each line is labeled with the size (in megabytes) of
corresponding data file.
Figure 5.4: Computation Time of algorithms KeyGen and DEncode.
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(a) Query latency VS the challenge size for a 128MB data file. Each line is labeled with the
corresponding block size.
(b) Query latency VS the challenge size for a 512MB data file. Each line is labeled with the
corresponding block size.
Figure 5.5: Computation Time of algorithm Prove and Verify.
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5.6 Security Analysis of MAC scheme S2
In this section, we give the security model for linearly predicate-homomorphic MAC
scheme, introduce the Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption, and then prove the security
of our construction S2 under this assumption.
5.6.1 Security Model for Linearly Predicate-Homomorphic
MAC
Let S = (KeyGen, Sign,Combine,P-Sign,Verify,P-Verify) be a linearly predicate ho-
momorphic MAC scheme as described in Section 5.2 (on page 55). We define the
existential forgery security game GameCMAS,A (1
λ) between a challenger C and an adver-
sary A w.r.t. the MAC scheme S under adaptive chosen message attack model as
below.
Setup.
The challenger C generates a pair of public-private key (spk, ssk) by running the key
generating algorithm KeyGen(1λ) with security parameter λ, and gives the public key
spk to the adversary A and keeps the private key ssk securely. The challenger C
maintains a state variable state, which will be used to assign unique index to each
message to be signed.
Learning.
The adversary A can adaptively make queries, where each query is in one of the
following forms:
• SignQuery(M): Given a message M chosen by the adversary A, the challenger C
chooses a unique index i based on the current value of state and updates state.
The challenger C denotes the message M as Mi and responses the query with a
signature σi := Sign(ssk, i, Mi).
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• P-VerifyQuery(M, σ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r): Let the state variable I denote the set
of all indices i’s chosen by the challenger in answering all previous SignQuery.
For each tuple (M, σ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r) chosen by the adversary A, if C ⊂ I,
then the challenger C responses with b := P-Verify(ssk, M, σ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r) ∈
{accept, reject}. If C 6⊂ I, then the challenger does nothing.
Forge.
The adversaryA outputs (M′, σ′, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r) with C ⊂ I. Let the corresponding
genuine output be
(M, σ) := P-Sign(spk, Combine(spk, {(i, Mi, σi, νi) : i ∈ C}), r)
The adversary A wins the game if and only if
P-Verify(ssk, M′, σ′, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r) = accept and (M′, σ′) 6= (M, σ).
5.6.2 Assumption
Let p and q = 2p + 1 be prime. Denote the subgroup of quadratic residues in Z∗q as
QRq. The order of group QRq is p. The Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption [BB04,
BB08] over the group QRq is described as below.
Assumption 1 (m-SDH Assumption [BB04,BB08]) Let p and q = 2p + 1 be
prime, and QRq be the subgroup of quadratic residues in Z∗q. Let g be a random
generator of QRq. Let α $←− Zp be a random element from Zp. Let T = (g, gα, gα2 , . . . ,
gα
m−1






w = g1/(α+c) where (c, w) := A(p, q, T )]
is negligible in λ = log p.
We remark that when the MAC scheme S2 is alternatively instantiated using
elliptic curve, the SDH Assumption over elliptic curve group is required.
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5.6.3 The Linearly Predicate-Homomorphic MAC scheme S2
is Secure
Theorem 5.3 (S2 is Secure) Suppose the SDH Assumption 1 holds and {PRF} is
a secure pseudorandom function family. Then the proposed MAC scheme S2 is exis-
tentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attack. More precisely, for any
PPT adversary A, the advantage AdvCMAS2,A of A against S2 is negligible in the security





[A wins GameCMAS2,A(1λ)] . (5.28)
5.6.3.1 Outline of Proof of Theorem 5.3
We show that the MAC scheme S2 is secure in two steps:
• Security in no-feedback setting: We prove the unforgeability in a simplified
setting, where all decision bits (acceptance or rejection) are kept secret from
the adversary.
• Security in feedback setting: We prove the security in the feedback setting,
which is as stated in Theorem 5.3, based on the security in the simplified no-
feedback setting.
5.6.3.2 S2 is unforgeable in no-feedback setting.
Lemma 5.4 (Unforgeability in no-feedback setting) In the no-feedback setting,
where all decision bits (acceptance or rejection) are kept secret from the adversary in
GameCMAS2,A w.r.t. scheme S2, for any PPT adversary A, there exist PPT adversaries
B1 and B2, such that
Pr
[A wins GameCMAS2,A in no-feedback setting ]
≤ AdvSDHB1 +
1
p− 1 +NPRF · Adv
PRF
B2 , (5.29)
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where NPRF is the number of distinct evaluations of the pseudorandom function PRF
in GameCMAS2,A (NPRF is equal to the number of SignQuerys made by A in GameCMAS2,A),
AdvSDHB1 is the probability that B1 breaks the SDH Assumption 1 and AdvPRFB2 is the
probability that B2 can distinguish the output of pseudorandom function PRF from
true randomness.
Proof of Lemma 5.4:
Game 1. The first game is the same as GameCMAS2,A, except that all decision bits
(acceptance or rejection) are kept secret from the adversary A, i.e. the challenger in
Game 1 does not answer any P-VerifyQuery made by the adversary A.
Let (y′, φ′, σ′, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r) be the output of A in the Forge phase of the
Game 1, and (y, φ, σ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r) be the corresponding genuine output that
shares the same values {(i, νi) : i ∈ C} and r. Let (spk, ssk) be the public-private
key pair chosen by the challenger. By the definition of security game GameCMAS2,A and
Game 1, the following claim can be derived straightforwardly.
Claim 5.6.1
Pr
[A wins GameCMAS2,A in no-feedback setting]
= Pr [A wins Game 1 ]
= Pr [S2.P-Verify(ssk, y′, φ′, σ′, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r) = accept ∧ (y′, φ′, σ′) 6= (y, φ, σ)]
Game 2. The second game is the same as Game 1, except that the pseudorandom
function PRFseed(·) in the scheme S2 is replaced by a simulator PRFSim, which outputs
true randomness over the range of PRFseed. Precisely, the function PRF
Sim is evaluated
in the following way:
• The challenger keeps a table, which is empty at the very beginning, to store all
previous encountered input-output pairs (v,PRFSim(v)).
• Given an input v, the challenger lookups the table for v, if there exists an entry
(v, u), then return u as output. Otherwise, choose u uniformly randomly from
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the range of PRFseed, insert (v,PRF
Sim(v) := u) into the table and return u as
output.
Game 3. The third game is the same as Game 2, except that adversary A wins if
and only if S2.P-Verify(ssk, y′, φ′, σ′, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r) = accept and (y′, ψ′, σ′) 6=
(y, ψ, σ) and σ′ = σ.
Game 4. The fourth game is the same as Game 2, except that adversary A wins
if and only if S2.P-Verify(ssk, y′, φ′, σ′, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r) = accept and (y′, ψ′, σ′) 6=
(y, ψ, σ) and σ′ 6= σ.
From the definitions of Game 2, Game 3 and Game 4, the following claim is
straightforward.
Claim 5.6.2
Pr[A wins Game 2] = Pr[A wins Game 3] + Pr[A wins Game 4].
Claim 5.6.3 If there is a non-negligible difference in a PPT adversary A’s success
probability between Game 1 and Game 2, then there exists another PPT adversary
B, which can break the security of the pseudorandom function PRF. More precisely,
∣∣Pr[A wins Game 1]− Pr[A wins Game 2]∣∣ ≤ NPRF · AdvPRFB ,
where NPRF is the number of distinct evaluations of pseudorandom function PRF re-
quired to answer all SignQuerys made by A (one PRF evaluation for one Sign-
Query), and AdvPRFB denotes the probability that B can distinguish the output of PRF
from true randomness.
The above Claim 5.6.3 can be proved using a standard hybrid argument [Gol06]. Here
we save the details.
Claim 5.6.4 If a PPT adversary A wins Game 3 with non-negligible probability,




= Pr [B solves SDH problem] ≥ Pr [A wins Game 3 ] . (5.30)
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Proof of Claim 5.6.4: We construct a PPT algorithm B, based on the adversary
A, to solve the SDH problem.
Given an input (p, q, {gαj}m−1j=0 ) of the m-SDH problem, the algorithm B can sim-
ulate the Game 3, where B plays the role of challenger and A plays the role of
adversary. The simulated game Sim is as below:
Sim.Setup The challenger B simulates the algorithm S2.KeyGen:
• Choose τ, seed in the same way as in the algorithm S2.KeyGen.
• Let public key spk := (p, q, {gαj}m−1j=0 ) and conceptually set private key
ssk := (p, q, seed, α, τ), where α is unknown to the challenger B.
The challenger B gives the public key spk to the adversary A.
Sim.Learning
Sim.SignQuery(~M): Given a message ~M ∈ (Zp)m chosen by the adversary A, the
challenger B chooses a unique index i for message ~M based on a state variable
and updates the state variable. The challenger B denotes the message ~M as ~Mi
and generates the authentication MAC σi by randomly choosing an element
from group Zp: σi
$←− Zp. B provides σi to A as response.
Note: (1) There exists some unknown si ∈ Zp, such that σi = si + τf~Mi(α)
mod p. (2) si is uniformly randomly distributed over Zp since σi is uniformly
randomly distributed over Zp. (3) (Conceptually) Set the value of PRFSim(i) as
the unknown value si.
Sim.P-VerifyQuery: The challenger B does nothing. In the no-feedback setting,
the challenger will not answer this query, and will keep all verification results
(i.e. acceptance or rejection) secret from the adversary A.
Sim.Forge The conditions that the adversary A wins the simulated Game Sim are
the same as the conditions that A wins Game 3. That is, the adversary A
wins if and only if
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• A outputs a valid forgery (y′, ψ′, σ′, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r) as in the Forge
phase of the game GameCMAS,A .
• σ′ = σ, where σ is from the corresponding genuine output (y, ψ, σ, {(i, νi) :
i ∈ C}, r) which shares the same values {(i, νi) : i ∈ C} and r with the
forgery output.
Note that B can compute the genuine output (y, ψ, σ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r) by itself.
After interacting with the adversary A in Game Sim, the adversary B computes
(c, w) as a solution to the SDH problem as below:
• If y = y′: find any c 6= −r ∈ Zp and set w := g1/(r+c) mod q;






Until now, the construction of the adversary B is complete.
Next, we want to show the following Claim 5.6.5 and Claim 5.6.6, which together
imply the Claim 5.6.4:
Claim 5.6.5 Pr[A wins Game 3] = Pr[A wins Game Sim].
Proof (Sketch proof of Claim 5.6.5): The above security game Game Sim
between the challenger B and the adversary A is identical to the Game 3 to the
view of the adversary A (even if A is computationally unbounded), since all infor-
mation that A obtains from the challenger in game Sim is identically distributed as
information that A can obtain from the challenger in Game 3: All MAC values σi’s
received as the response of SignQuery are uniformly randomly distributed over Zp.
Furthermore, the conditions that A wins in Game Sim and in Game 3 are identical.
Thus,
Pr[A wins Game 3] = Pr[A wins Game Sim].
uunionsq
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Claim 5.6.6 If A wins the Game Sim, i.e. S2.P-Verify(ssk, y′, ψ′, σ′, {(i, νi) : i ∈
C}, r) = accept and (y′, ψ′, σ′) 6= (y, ψ, σ) and σ′ = σ, then the output (c, w) of the
adversary B is a correct solution to the SDH problem, i.e. g 1α+c = w. That is,
Pr[A wins Game Sim] ≤ Pr[B solves SDH problem].
Proof of Claim 5.6.6: Since both the forgery output (y′, ψ′, σ′, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r)
and the corresponding genuine output (y, ψ, σ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r) are accepted by the








i∈C νiPRFseed(i)) − y′ mod q (5.32)





−1(σ−σ′) + y′−y = g y
′−y mod q ( Since σ′ = σ) (5.33)
Recall that if A wins Game Sim (or Game 3), then σ′ = σ.
Now we do a case analysis on whether y′ is equal to y.
Case 1: y′ = y mod p. The equality that y′ = y, implies ψ′ 6= ψ, since (y′, ψ′, σ′) 6=
(y, ψ, σ) and σ′ = σ. Note that the verifier algorithm S2.P-Verify accepts the forgery
output (genuine output respectively) only if ψ′ (ψ respectively) is a quadratic residue
modulo q. In the subgroup QRq of quadratic residue modulo q, all elements, except
unity element 1, have multiplicative order p modulo q. We know that ψ′/ψ 6= 1, so
the element ψ′/ψ ∈ QRq has multiplicative order p. Thus, Equation (5.33) and y′ = y
mod p together imply α = r mod p. Thus adversary B’s output (c, w = g1/(r+c) =
g1/(α+c)) is a valid solution to the m-SDH problem.
Case 2: y′ 6= y mod p. Equation (5.33) and y′ 6= y mod p together imply that
α 6= r mod p. Recall that in case y′ 6= y, the output of B to the SDH problem is
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Equation (5.33), we have
w(y
′−y)(α−r) = gy
′−y mod q (5.34)
Since y′ − y 6= 0 mod p and α − r 6= 0 mod p, their inverses 1/(y′ − y) mod p










α−r mod q (5.35)
The above Equation (5.35) shows that the adversary B’s output (c = −r, w) is a
valid solution to the SDH problem.
We remark that Case 2 in the above proof for Claim 5.6.6 borrows ideas from the
proof in Kate, Zaverucha and Goldberg [KZG10]. uunionsq
By combining the results in Claim 5.6.5 and Claim 5.6.6, Claim 5.6.4 is proved:
Pr[A wins Game 3] = Pr[A wins Game Sim] ≤ Pr[B solves SDH problem].
uunionsq
Claim 5.6.7 For any computationally unbounded adversary A, after interacting in
Game 4, the probability that A finds the value of τ is 1/(p− 1).
Proof of Claim 5.6.7: In Game 4, the adversary A is given the public key
spk = (p, q, {gαj mod q}m−1j=0 ) and authentication MAC values σi’s for any message
~Mi (vectors) chosen by the adversary A:
σi = PRF
Sim(i) + τf~Mi(α) mod p.
The secret value τ is only involved in the MAC values σi’s. Since in Game 4,
the pseudorandom function PRF is replaced by a simulator PRFSim, which outputs
uniform randomness over Zp, the MAC values σi’s reveal absolutely no information
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to adversary A about the secret τ at all, although A is computationally unbounded.
That is, the entropy of τ to the adversary A is unchanged before and after A’s
interaction with the challenger in the Game 4, and the probability that A can find
τ is exactly 1/(p− 1). Recall that τ is chosen at random from Z∗p.
uunionsq
Claim 5.6.8 For any computationally unbounded adversary A,
Pr [A wins Game 4] ≤ 1
p− 1 .
Proof of Claim 5.6.8: Let (y, ψ, σ, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r) and (y′, ψ′, σ′, {(i, νi) : i ∈
C}, r) be as specified in Game 1. Suppose a computationally unbounded adversary
A wins Game 4, i.e. S2.P-Verify(ssk, y′, φ′, σ′, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, r) = accept and
(y′, ψ′, σ′) 6= (y, ψ, σ) and σ′ 6= σ.





−1(σ−σ′) + y′−y mod q (5.36)
The computationally unbounded adversary A can find α from the public key spk
by solving discrete log problem, and eventually find τ from the above Equation (5.36).
However, by Claim 5.6.7, the probability that A finds τ has to be 1/p. Consequently,
the adversary A wins Game 4 with probability
Pr [A wins Game 4] ≤ Pr [A finds τ ] = 1
p− 1 .
Thus, the Claim 5.6.8 is proved. uunionsq
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In summary, we have showed that
Pr
[A wins GameCMAS2,A in no-feedback setting]
= Pr[A wins Game 1] ≤ Pr[A wins Game 2] +NPRF · AdvPRFB2
=
(





p− 1 +NPRF · Adv
PRF
B2 . (5.37)
Therefore, Lemma 5.4 is proved. uunionsq
5.6.3.3 S2 is unforgeable.
Lemma 5.5 (Unforgeable in feedback setting) Let ξ be the probability that a
PPT adversary A can win the security game GameCMAS2,A in the no-feedback setting.
Then the probability AdvCMAS2,A that the adversary A can win the security game GameCMAS2,A
in the feedback setting is as below




≤ ξ +Nver · ξ + o(ξ), (5.38)
where Nver is the number of verification query P-VerifyQuerys made by the adver-
sary A during the security game, and o(·) is the little-O notation.
The proof of Lemma 5.5 is essentially identical to the proof of Lemma 4.5 (on
page 42). We save the details.
Proof of Theorem 5.3: By Lemma 5.4 and Lemma 5.5, for any PPT adversary
A which makes NPRF number of SignQuery and Nver number of P-VerifyQuery
in the security game GameCMAS2,A, the advantage of A against the MAC scheme S2 is
AdvCMAS2,A = Pr
[A wins GameCMAS2,A] ≤ (Nver + 1)(AdvSDHB1 + 1p− 1 +NPRF · AdvPRFB2
)
,
which is negligible in λ ≈ log p. uunionsq
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5.7 Security Analysis of POR scheme POS2
Theorem 5.6 Suppose the SDH Assumption 1 holds and {PRF} is a secure pseu-
dorandom function family. Then the proposed scheme POS2 is a sound Proof of
Retrievability under Definition 6 (on page 26).
Proof of Theorem 5.6: At first, we review Lemma 4.7 and Lemma 4.8 from
Section 4.7.1 (on page 45) in the previous Chapter 4.
Lemma 4.7 (on page 45) Let X and Y be two finite sets. Let UX denote the uniform
random variable over the domain X and UY denote the (independent) uniform ran-
dom variable over the domain Y. Consider any function f : X × Y → {0, 1}. Let
 = Pr[f(UX, UY) = 1]. For any constant a ∈ (0, 12), define a set Sa = {x ∈ X :
Pr[f(x, UY) = 1] ≥ a}. We have








Lemma 4.8 (on page 46) Let κ be an integer. Let δ,  ∈ (0, 1] be two real values
and δ ≥ . Let t = dκ

e. Independently sample t number of values r1, . . . , rt from
{0, 1} under the Bernoulli distribution with probability δ. Let d be a positive integer
and d ≤ κc for some real valued constant c ∈ (0, 1). Then with overwhelming high
probability (w.r.t. κ), there exists d distinct indices i1, i2, . . . , id ∈ [1, t] such that
∀j ∈ [1, d], rij = 1.
Extractor Strategy In the Retrieve phase of the POR security game between an
adversary A and a challenger, the challenger runs ζ = O(t3) number of verifiability
interactions with the adversary A, where A can answer each query correctly with
probability  and t = d nλ
a2
e for some real constant a ∈ (0, 1
2
) (say a = 1
3
). We
emphasize that the encoded file in the security game consists of n file blocks ~Fu ∈
(Zp)m, u ∈ [0, n − 1]. Here, we assume m ≤ n (In the alternative case that m > n,
we will set t = dmλ
a2
e).
A challenge query consists of three parts: a subset C ⊂ [1, n] of size `, a weights
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vector ~ν ∈ (Zp)`, and a value r ∈ Zp. Let C, W and R denote the domain of C, ~ν
and ~r = (r0, r1, . . . , rm−1) ∈ Zmp , respectively. Recall that in a verification, given
a challenge query (C, ~ν, ~r) ∈ C ×W × R, where C = {i1, i2, . . . , i`} ⊂ [0, n − 1],





~r = (r0, r1, . . . , rm−1) ∈ (Z∗p)m, an honest prover will return a value y together with






∈ Zp, ~Fi ∈ (Zp)m is the i-th file block.
The challenger issues queries as in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Collect responses from adversary through O(t3) number of verification
interactions.
1: Initiate a three-dimensional array f : C×W× R→ {0, 1}.
2: for each i ∈ [1, t] do
3: Choose a subset Ci ∈ C at random
4: for each j ∈ [1, t] do
5: Choose a weight vector ~νi,j ∈W at random
6: for each k ∈ [1, t] do
7: Choose ~ri,j,k ∈ R at random
8: Send (Ci, ~νi,j, ~ri,j,k) as challenge query to the adversary A and get response
(yi,j,k, ψi,j,k, σi,j,k)
9: if the response (yi,j,k, ψi,j,k, σi,j,k) is accepted by the verifier then
10: Set f(Ci, ~νi,j, ~ri,j,k) = 1
11: else
12: Set f(Ci, ~νi,j, ~ri,j,k) = 0
Next, the challenger finds the set I of all i ∈ [1, t], which satisfy this property: there
exits a set Ji ⊂ [1, t] and sets Ki,j ⊂ [1, t], j ∈ Ji, such that (1) ∀j ∈ Ji,∀k ∈ Ki,j,
f(Ci, ~νi,j, ~ri,j,k) = 1; (2) |Ji| ≥ ` and ∀j ∈ Ji, |Ki,j| ≥ m.
For each i ∈ I, for each j ∈ Ji, for each k ∈ Ki,j, adversary’s response (yi,j,k, ψi,j,k, σi,j,k)
for query (Ci, ~νi,j, ~ri,j,k) is accepted. Since the underlying MAC scheme S2 is unforge-
able (Theorem 5.3), with overwhelming high probability, we have ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ Ji,∀k ∈





= yi,j,k ∈ Zp,where vector (. . . νi,j,u . . .)u∈Ci = ~νi,j.
Thus the linear combination
∑
u∈Ci νi,j,u~Fu is a solution of the below linear equation














ordered by increasing k
(5.39)
In turn, the file blocks ~Fu, u ∈ Ci, can be recovered from (at least) ` number of linear
combinations
∑






















ordered by increasing j
(5.40)
Therefore, for each i ∈ I, the challenger can recover file blocks Fu’s with u ∈ Ci. If
the challenger recovers ρn number of file blocks, then he/she can recover the original
file F using the error erasure decoding algorithm.
We emphasize that the coefficient matrix in each of above linear equation systems
in Equation (5.39) and (5.40) is a vandermonde matrix [MS58], since in POS2, verifiers
choose vectors ~r and ~ν in the form (z0, z1, z2, . . .). Consequently, the solution to each
of the above linear equation system is unique.
Analysis of Extractor Strategy Recall that the adversary can answer correctly
a random chosen query from domain C×W×R with probability at least . That is
Pr[f(C, W, R) = 1] ≥ , where (C, W, R) is chosen at random from C ×W × R. Recall
that constant a = 1
3
. We say a set C ∈ C is good, if Pr[f(C, W, R) = 1] ≥ a, where
(W, R) is chosen at random from W×R. By the Lemma 4.7, a random chosen C ∈ C
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is good with probability at least O() (more precisely at least 1
2
). For a good C, we
say W ∈ W is good w.r.t. C, if Pr[f(C,W, R) = 1] ≥ a2, where C and W are fixed
and R is chosen at random from R. By Lemma 4.7, a randomly chosen W is good
w.r.t. a good C with probability at least O(a) (more precisely at least 1
6
).
By Lemma 4.8 with κ = nλ and d = ρn ≤ n < κc for some constant3 c ∈
( lnn
ln(nλ)
, 1), with overwhelming high probability, there are at least d = ρn good Ci’s
among {Ci : i ∈ [1, t]}. For each good Ci, by Lemma 4.8 with κ = nλ and d = ` ≤
n < κc, with overwhelming high probability, there are at least ` good Wj’s w.r.t. Ci
among {~νi,j : j ∈ [1, t]}. For each good ~νi,j w.r.t. Ci, by Lemma 4.8 with κ = nλ
and d = m ≤ n < κc, with overwhelming high probability, there are at least m
number of ~ri,j,k among {~ri,j,k : k ∈ [1, t]}, such that f(Ci, ~νi,j, ~ri,j,k) = 1. Thus
in the above extractor algorithm, the challenger can find sufficient number of correct
responses from the adversary to form linear equation systems, with overwhelming high
probability. Since the domain sizes of C, W and R are all exponentially large, with
overwhelming high probability, all good Ci’s (respectively, ~νi,j or ~ri,j,k) are distinct.
uunionsq
5.8 Summary
This chapter presented a predicate-homomorphic MAC scheme S2, which allows any
third party to compute MAC values for many short messages Mi’s from a long message
M and its MAC value σ using the public key, as long as two messages (Mi, M) satisfy
some pre-determined predicates. Furthermore, each short message Mi is a codeword
of the long message M, such that M can be recovered from a certain number of distinct
messages Mi’s. Based on homomorphic MAC scheme S2, a Proofs of Retrievability
scheme POS2 is constructed, which is very efficient in communication and storage.
Empirical study confirmed that POS2 is practical in computation. POS2 is also
compared with the existing works in various aspects. Full security proof for S2 and
POS2 are provided, under Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption and the assumption of
3Note that the file size n is upper bounded by a polynomial in λ. Thus there exists a positive
integer z such that n ≤ λz. We can set constant c = zz+1 ≥ lnnln(nλ) .
CHAPTER 5. POR FROM PREDICATE-HOMOMORPHIC MAC 92
existence of secure pseudorandom function. The security property of S2 is proved
in two steps: (1) in the first step, security of S2 is proved in a simplified setting,
where every acceptance/rejection decision of each verification is kept secret from the
adversary; (2) in the second step, security of S2 is proved in the original setting, using
the result in the first step.
Chapter 6
Provable Data Possession
Provable Data Possession (PDP) is an alternative formulation of proofs of storage
proposed by Ateniese et al. [ABC+07]. This chapter will propose a proofs of storage
scheme, which we refer to as POS3. The proposed scheme POS3 improves Ateniese et
al. [ABC+07,ABC+11b] in computation aspect, and will be proved under PDP for-
mulation.
6.1 Overview
Ateniese et al. [ABC+07] proposed the first Provable Data Possession (PDP for short)
scheme. Their scheme is very efficient in communication and storage: the size of a
proof is a small multiple of the security parameter, and the storage overhead due
to authentication tags is a fraction1 of the size of the original data. However, their
scheme requires a large number of modular exponentiation in both setup phase and
verification phase, and is thus relative expensive in computation.
In this chapter, we will propose a new PDP construction named POS3, which
requires no modular exponentiation in the setup phase and a smaller number of
modular exponentiations in verification phase, without sacrificing in communication
or storage aspects.
1This fraction is a configurable system parameter.
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6.1.1 A Brief Description of proofs of storage scheme POS3
Setup.
Suppose Alice wants to backup her file F into a cloud storage server provided by Bob.
Alice encodes file F with some error erasure code to obtain data blocks (F0, . . . , Fn−1).
Alice chooses a RSA modulus N = pq, a secret seed, denoted as seed, of a pseudo-
random function PRF, and a secret number τ . Let φ(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1). With
the private key sk = (φ(N), seed, τ), Alice produces an authentication tag σi for each
block Fi:
σi := τFi + PRFseed(i) mod φ(N). (6.1)
It is worthy to point out that the generated authentication tag σi is much shorter than
a data block Fi. At the end of setup, Alice sends data blocks and tags {(i, Fi, σi) : i ∈
[0, n− 1]} together with a public key pk = (N) to Bob.
Verification.
Later, Alice may remotely verify the integrity of her data file stored with Bob peri-
odically. In each verification session, Alice randomly selects a subset C ⊂ [0, n − 1]
of indices and selects a random weights νi for each i ∈ C. Alice sends {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}
as challenge to Bob. Bob then finds all data blocks Fi’s and authentication tags σi’s
with index i ∈ C, and applies the linear homomorphism to compute an aggregated









We emphasize that the above two equations are computed over integer domain, and
thus the bit-length of the linear combination M (the aggregated authentication tag
σ, respectively ) is slightly larger than a data block Fi (an authentication tag σi,
respectively).
Instead of sending the large message block M together with authentication tag σ
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directly to the verifier Alice, Bob is able to produce a shorter message-tag pair with
the help of Alice. Alice generates a pair of fresh public token pt and secret token
st per each verification, where the public token pt is sent to the prover Bob and the
secret token st is kept private. With pt and (M, σ), Bob is able to generate a shorter
message-tag pair, which can be verified by the verifier Alice with the private key and
the secret token st.
Illustration Picture
Figure 6.1 illustrates the scheme POS3 briefed above. In Figure 6.1, a rectangle repre-
sents a data block, and a circle represents a short authentication tag corresponding to
the data block represented by the rectangle that lies above. Those shaded rectangles
represent data blocks that are generated by the error erasure code. In our scheme
POS3, a data block is treated as a single large integer (much larger than the RSA
modulus N). Figure 6.1 shows an example where a data block is about three times
larger than a tag, by dividing each rectangle with dashed lines.
In a verification, a subset of three pairs of blocks and tags are selected, which are
aggregated into a single pair of block and tag through linear homomorphism. Since
the linear combination is computed over integer domain, the aggregated block (tag,
respectively) is slightly larger than an original data block (tag, respectively). With
the help of the public token pt provided by the verifier, a shorter message-tag pair
can be generated from the long aggregated message-tag pair. The verifier can verify
the short message-tag pair using a secret token st.
6.1.2 Organization
The rest of this chapter is organized as below. The next Section 6.2 describes the
definition of PDP . Section 6.3 presents the construction of our PDP scheme POS3.
Then we analyze the performance of proposed scheme in Section 6.4 and security in
Section 6.5. At the end, Section 6.6 summarizes this chapter.


















Figure 6.1: An Efficient PDP scheme POS3. Detailed explanation is in the paragraph
with title “Illustration Picture”.
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6.2 Provable Data Possession: Definition and For-
mulation
A PDP [ABC+07] scheme consists of five polynomial algorithms (KeyGen,DEncode,
Challenge, Prove,Verify), which are described as below.
• KeyGen(1λ)→ (pk, sk): Given security parameter λ, the probabilistic key gen-
erating algorithm outputs a public-private key pair (pk, sk).
• DEncode(sk, F) → (idF, Fˆ, n): Given the private key sk and a data file F as
input, the data encoding algorithm DEncode produces a unique identifier idF,
an encoded file Fˆ, and file size n (in term of number of blocks).
• Challenge(sk, id, n)→ (pt, st,Chall): The probabilistic algorithm Challenge takes
as input the private key sk, a file identifier id and the file size n (in term of
number of blocks), and outputs a public token pt, a private token st and a query
Chall.
Note: (1) The public/secret token pair (pt, st) is generated independently per
each execution of algorithm Challenge. (2) In both Ateniese et al. [ABC+07] and
the scheme POS3 that will be presented later in this chapter, Chall = {(i, νi) :
i ∈ C ⊂ [0, n− 1]} is just a set of pairs of index i (in the range [0, n− 1]) and
weight νi (from some group) with i ∈ C, and has no secret information involved.
• Prove(pk, idF, Fˆ, pt,Chall) → ψ: Given as input the public key pk, an identifier
idF, an encoded file Fˆ, a public token pt and a challenge query Chall, the prover
algorithm Prove produces a proof ψ.
• Verify(sk, idF, st,Chall, ψ) → accept or reject: Given the private key sk, an
identifier idF, a secret token st, a challenge query Chall, and a proof ψ as input,
the deterministic verifier algorithm Verify will output either accept or reject.
Remark 5 Compared to POR, in the above description for PDP, the prover algo-
rithm Prove takes a public token pt as an additional input and the verifier algorithm
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Verify takes a corresponding secret token st as an additional input, where the pub-
lic/secret token pair (pt, st) is generated online by the verifier for each verification
session.
6.3 POS3: An Efficient PDP Scheme
In this section, we will construct the scheme POS3 which is briefed previously in
Section 6.1.
6.3.1 Construction of POS3
The description of scheme POS3 = (KeyGen,DEncode,Challenge,Prove,Verify) is as
below.
POS3.KeyGen(1λ)→ (pk, sk)
Choose at random a λ bits RSA modulus N = pq, such that all of p, q, p′ =
(p−1)/2 and q′ = (q−1)/2 are primes and the bit-lengths of p and q are the same.
Let φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1) = 4p′q′. Let QRN denote the subgroup of quadratic
residues modulo N . Choose at random a generator g of the subgroup QRN .
Choose at random τ
$←− Zφ(n). Choose at random a seed, denoted as seed, from
the key space of the pseudorandom function family {PRFseed : {0, 1}2λ → Zφ(N)}.
The public key is pk = (N, g) and the private key is sk := (g, p, q, τ, seed).
Note: Size of subgroup QRN [Gol06] is equal to 14φ(N) = p′q′.
POS3.DEncode(sk, F)→ (id, Fˆ, n)
Let ρ ∈ (0, 1) be a system parameter. Apply rate-ρ error erasure code on data
file F to generate blocks (F0, . . . , Fn−1), such that each block Fi ∈ {0, 1}mλ and
any ρn number of blocks Fi’s can recover the original file F. Choose a unique
identifier id ∈ {0, 1}λ for the file F. For each data block Fi, i ∈ [0, n−1], compute
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an authentication tag σi:
σi := τFi + PRFseed(id‖i) mod φ(N). (6.4)
The encoded file is Fˆ = {(i, Fi, σi) : i ∈ [0, n − 1]}. Send (id, Fˆ) to the cloud
storage server, and keep (id, n) in the local storage. Output (id, Fˆ, n).
POS3.Challenge(sk, id, n)→ (pt, st, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C})
Choose at random a secret value d
$←− Z∗φ(N), and computes gd := gd mod N .
The public token is pt := gd and the secret token is st := d. Chooses a subset
C ⊂ [0, n − 1] with size |C| = ` at random and choose weight νi $←− Z∗φ(N) at
random for each i ∈ C. Output (pt, st, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}).
POS3.Prove(pk, id, Fˆ, pt, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C})→ (ψ1, ψ2)
Receive (id, pt, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}) from the verifier as the challenge. Find the
encoded file Fˆ corresponding to the identifier id. Find all selected blocks Fi’s










Compute (ψ1, ψ2) from (pi1, pi2) using the public key pk = (N, g) and the public
token pt = gd as below
ψ1 := g
pi1
d mod N ; (6.7)
ψ2 := g
pi2 mod N. (6.8)
Send (ψ1, ψ2) to the verifier. Output (ψ1, ψ2).
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POS3.Verify(sk, id, st, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, ψ1, ψ2)→ accept or reject
With the private key sk = (g, p, q, τ, seed) and the secret token st = d, check











If both verifications succeed, then output accept; otherwise output reject.
Remark 6
• We remark that in the above scheme, we can change the proof from (ψ1, ψ2)
to (ψ1, SHA256(ψ2)) to reduce the size of response/proof from 2λ bits to (λ +
256) bits using a secure hash function SHA256 [NIS02], similar to Ateniese et
al. [ABC+07].
• Like the first PDP scheme proposed by Ateniese [ABC+07] and different from
previous POS1 and POS2, in our construction POS3, the prover requires a public
token to generate a short proof and the verifier requires a corresponding secret
token to verify the short proof, where this pair of public-secret tokens are gen-
erated by the verifier online per each verification. Therefore, the underlying
homomorphic cryptography component of the POS3 is not a MAC scheme, and
we do not separate it out as a standalone primitive.
6.3.2 Completeness
In the above scheme POS3, if the response (ψ1, ψ2) is generated by an honest prover
from intact data blocks and authentication tags, then the verifier always accepts
(ψ1, ψ2), since
• ψ1 = gpi1d = gdpi1 mod N ∈ QRN (recall that g ∈ QRN);
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τ = LHS (mod N).
6.4 Performance Analysis
The proposed scheme POS3 is efficient in storage, communication and computation.
The storage overhead due to authentication tags is 1/m of the file size (after error
erasure encoding). The proof size in a verification is 2λ bits. In the setup, the data en-
coding algorithm DEncode requires n number of pseudorandom function evaluations,
and modular additions/multiplications. In a verification session, the computation of
the prover algorithm Prove is dominated by the exponentiation with large integer
exponent in Equation (6.7), which is equivalent to (m+ 2) number of group exponen-
tiation in Z∗N with exponent in ZN . The verifier algorithm Verify requires one modular
division, three modular exponentiation in Z∗N , ` number of additions/multiplications
in Zφ(N), and ` number of pseudorandom function evaluations, where ` = |C| is the
number of indices selected during a verification.
6.4.1 Comparison
We compare the proposed scheme POS3 and Ateniese et al. [ABC+07, ABC+11b] in
Table 6.1 in the setting specified in the below example.
Example 3 After erasure encoding, the file size is 1GB, block size is m = 100, and
storage overhead due to authentication tags is about 10MB for both schemes. For both
schemes, we assume that, during a verification, the challenge query {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}
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Table 6.1: Comparison among Ateniese et al. [ABC+07, ABC+11b] and POS3 and
POS2 w.r.t. a 1GB file. The setting is described in Example 3.
Scheme Group Ele-
ment Size






λ = 1024 2λ+ 160 + 256 = 2464 223 exp. over Z∗N (100 + `) exp. over Z∗N
POS3 λ = 1024 2λ+ 160 + 256 = 2464 223 mul. over Zφ(N) 102 exp. over Z∗N
POS2 λ = 1024 3λ+ 240 = 3312 223 mul. over Zp 100 exp. over Z∗q
is represented by two 80 bits PRF seeds. System parameter ` represents the size of set
C. All computation times are represented by the corresponding dominant factor. exp
and mul denote the group exponentiation and group multiplication respectively in the
corresponding group. Note that one 1024 bits modular exponentiation takes roughly 5
millisecond in a standard PC. See Table 6.1.
It is worthy to point out that, the most efficient variant scheme E-PDP in Ate-
niese et al. [ABC+07] is suffering from the attack by Shacham and Waters [SW08a].





i for all tags Ti selected by the challenge Chal. The authors
proposed an efficient variant scheme, named E-PDP, by setting all coefficients ai in
the challenge Chal as 1, so that in the computation of the aggregated tag, only
multiplication is involved and expensive exponentiation is avoided. Shacham and
Waters [SW08a] presented an attack on E-PDP, such that the adversary can answer
correctly a non-negligible fraction of queries, but there exists no extractor that can
recover any data block.
We remark that even compared to the insecure variant E-PDP, our scheme POS3
is still much more efficient in setup and equally efficient in verification.
6.5 Security Analysis of PDP Scheme POS3
6.5.1 Security Model of PDP
The security game for a PDP [ABC+07] scheme is the same as the game for a POR
scheme in Section 3.2.2.2 (on page 25), except the following differences:
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• To process a verification query, the challenger C chooses the challenge query in a
different way from the POR game: C runs the algorithm Challenge to generate
a pair of public-secret tokens (pt, st) and the a challenge query Chall, and sends
(pt,Chall) to the adversary A and keeps st private. The secret token st will be
used in the verifier algorithm Verify.
• The Retrieve phase is different from the POR game: The challenger C ini-
tiates polynomially many PDP verifications w.r.t. the data file F∗ chosen by
A. Suppose the challenger C asks A to check all data blocks Fi of F∗ with index
i ∈ I. The challenger C extracts file blocks {(i, F′i) : i ∈ I} from A’s storage
by applying a PPT knowledge extractor. The adversary A wins this PDP se-
curity game, if the challenger C accepts A’s response in the verification during
the Retrieve phase. The challenger C wins this game if the extracted blocks
{(i, F′i) : i ∈ I} are identical to the original {(i, Fi) : i ∈ I}.
Definition 9 ( [ABC+07]) A PDP scheme is sound if for any PPT adversary A,
the probability that A wins the above PDP security game is negligibly close to the
probability that C wins the same security game. That is
Pr[A wins PDP game ] ≤ Pr[C wins PDP game ] + negl. (6.10)
6.5.2 Assumptions
The Knowledge of Exponent Assumption (KEA) is introduced by Damg˚ard [Dam92]
and subsequently appears in many works [HT98, BP04a, BP04b, Kra05, Den06]. The
below is a variant version of KEA in the RSA ring given by Ateniese et al. [ABC+07].
Assumption 2 (Knowledge of Exponent Assumption [Dam92,BP04a])
Let N = pq be a RSA modulus, g ∈ Z∗N and s be an positive integer. For any PPT
algorithm A that takes (N, g, gs) as input and r as random coin and returns (C, Y )
such that Y = Cs mod N , there exists a PPT extractor algorithm A¯ which, given
(N, g, gs, r) as input, outputs x such that gx = C mod N .
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Remark 7
• Note that the extractor A¯ has access to A’s input (N, g, gs) and A’s random
coin r, thus A¯ can replay step by step the process how A computes (C, Y ) from
(N, g, gs).
• This assumption has been shown to hold in generic group by Abe and Fehr [AF07].
Assumption 3 (Factorization Assumption [RSA78]) We say an integer N is




are prime numbers and bit-lengths
of p and q are equal. Then for any PPT adversary A, the probability that A can
factorize a randomly chosen λ bits RSA modulus, is negligible in λ.
6.5.3 Security Proof
Theorem 6.1 (POS3 is Sound) If Knowledge of Exponent Assumption 2 and Fac-
torization Assumption 3 hold and the pseudorandom function family {PRF} is secure,
then the proposed scheme POS3 is sound.
The proof below is similar to the proof of Ateniese et al. [ABC+07] in the high level:
If an adversary A wins the security game, then some knowledge extractor (as in the
assumption KEA) can find a linear combination of data blocks (See Equation (6.5)).
Next, each individual block can be obtained by solving a linear equation system.
However, the details of the below proof is significantly different from Ateniese et
al. [ABC+07,ABC+11b].
Like in previous chapters, at first in Lemma 6.2, we prove that the response
in a verification of POS3 is unforgeable in a simplified setting, where all decisions
(acceptance or rejection) are kept secret from the adversary in the PDP security
game. Recall that we call this simplified setting as “no-feedback” setting.
Lemma 6.2 Suppose Factorization Assumption 3 holds and the pseudorandom func-
tion family {PRF} is secure. Then the proof (ψ1, ψ2) in the proposed scheme POS3 is
unforgeable in the no-feedback setting, where all acceptance or rejection decisions are
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kept secure from the adversary in the PDP security game. More precisely, let (ψˆ1, ψˆ2)
denote the adversary A’s response in the Retrieve phase of the PDP security game
w.r.t. POS3, and (ψ1, ψ2) denote the corresponding genuine response. The probability
Pr[Verifier accepts (ψˆ1, ψˆ2) ∧ (ψˆ1, ψˆ2) 6= (ψ1, ψ2)] ≤ negl(λ) (6.11)
is negligible.
Proof of Lemma 6.2:
Game 1. The first game is the same as the PDP security game, except that
• All acceptance or rejection decisions are kept secure from the adversary A. Es-
sentially, the challenger in the PDP security game does not answer verification
queries made by the adversary.
• Adversary A wins in Game 1, if A’s forgery proof (ψˆ1, ψˆ2) is accepted and it
is different from the genuine proof. Formally, let id, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C} and (pt, st)
denote the file identifier, challenge query, and public-secret tokens respectively
in a verification in the Retrieve phase of the PDP security game, let (ψ1, ψ2)
denote the corresponding genuine proof and (pk, sk) be the public-private key
pair. Adversary A wins in Game 1, if
Verify(sk, id, st, {(i, νi) : i ∈ C}, ψˆ1, ψˆ2) = accept and (ψˆ1, ψˆ2) 6= (ψ1, ψ2).
(6.12)
Game 2 The second game is the same as Game 1, except that the pseudorandom
function PRF is replaced by a simulator PRFSim, which outputs true randomness over
the range of PRF. Precisely, the function PRFSim is evaluated in the following way:
• The challenger keeps a table, which is empty at the very beginning, to store all
previous encountered input-output pairs (v,PRFSim(v)).
• Given an input v, the challenger lookups the table for v, if there exists an entry
(v, u), then return u as output. Otherwise, choose u uniformly randomly from
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the range of PRF, insert (v,PRFSim(v) := u) into the table and return u as
output.
Game 3 The third game is the same as Game 2, except that:
• The range of the function PRF is changed from Zφ(N) to ZN , thus in this game,
PRFSim outputs true randomness over ZN ;
• The range of the authentication tag is also changed from Zφ(N) to ZN . More
precisely, the Equation (6.4) (on page 99) is replaced by the following equations
σi := τFi + PRFseed(id‖i) mod N. (6.13)
We remark that in Game 3, the challenger is not able to verify adversary’s response
with algorithm Verify. The challenger does not need to do verification either, since in
the no-feedback setting, the challenger will not answer verification queries made by
the adversary.
Claim 6.5.1 If there is a non-negligible difference in a PPT adversary A’s success
probability between Game 1 and Game 2, then there exists another PPT adversary
B that can break the security of the pseudorandom function PRF. More precisely,
|Pr[A wins Game 1]− Pr[A wins Game 2]| ≤ NPRF · AdvPRFB ,
where NPRF is the number of distinct evaluations of pseudorandom function PRF re-
quired and AdvPRFB denotes the probability that B can distinguish the output of PRF
from true randomness.
The above Claim 6.5.1 can be proved using a standard hybrid argument [Gol06]. Here
we save the details.
Claim 6.5.2 For any computationally unbounded adversary A, the probability that
A can find the secret value τ after interacting in Game 2, is 1
φ(N)
.
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Proof (Proof Sketch of Claim 6.5.2): In Game 2, the pseudorandom function
PRF is replaced by a simulator PRFSim which outputs true random numbers in Zφ(N),
thus the secret value τ is hidden perfectly. Therefore, the probability that an (com-
putationally unbounded) adversary A can find τ is 1
φ(N)
. Recall that τ is chosen at
random from group Zφ(N). uunionsq
Claim 6.5.3 For any PPT adversary A, the probability that A can factorize N after
interacting in Game 3 is negligible.
Proof (Proof Sketch of Claim 6.5.3): Recall that in Game 3, the authentication
tag σi for each block is a group element chosen at random from ZN . Suppose a PPT
adversary A can factorize the RSA modulus N after interacting in Game 3.
Based on A, we construct a PPT adversary B to factorize N . Given only the
RSA modulus N , the adversary B can play the role of challenger to setup2 the PDP
security game w.r.t. scheme POS3, and answer store queries made by the adversary
A by sampling uniform random number from ZN as the authentication tag σi. Thus,
Pr[A factorizes N in Game 3] ≤ Pr[B factorizes N ] = AdvFactB . (6.14)
uunionsq
Claim 6.5.4 For any PPT adversary A, the probability that A can factorize N after
interacting in Game 2 is negligible.
Proof of Claim 6.5.4: We will show that any PPT adversary cannot distinguish
between Game 2 and Game 3. As a result, Claim 6.5.3 can imply Claim 6.5.4.
Now we study the statistical difference [SV03] between uniform random variables
over Zφ(N) and over ZN .
2From the input N , B can generate the public key and simulate the algorithm DEncode. In the
no-feedback setting, B does not need to do verification, so secret key is not necessary.
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Let X be a uniform random variable over Zφ(N) and Y be a uniform random
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Let N0 be a positive integer. Let Xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N0, be independently and iden-
tically distributed uniform random variables over Zφ(N), and Yi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N0, be
independently and identically distributed uniform random variables over ZN . Ac-
cording to Fact 2.1 and Fact 2.3 of Sahai and Vadhan [SV03], we have




The right hand side of the above Equation (6.15) is
∑
i∈[1,N0]











Suppose the adversary A obtains exactly NPRF authentication tags σi (σ′i respec-
tively) for NPRF different indices i’s in Game 2 (Game 3 respectively). Since σi’s
are independently and identically distributed uniform random variables over Zφ(N)
and σ′is are independently and identically distributed uniform random variables over
ZN , the difference of the adversary’s views3 in Game 2 and Game 3 is bounded as
3Adversary’s view is a transcript of all messages received.
CHAPTER 6. PROVABLE DATA POSSESSION 109
below
SD(ViewGame 2A , View
Game 3











The adversaryA is polynomially bounded, which impliesNPRF is polynomially bounded.
Therefore, the statistical difference SD(ViewGame 2A , View
Game 3
A ) is negligible in
λ ≈ logN ≈ 2 log p ≈ 2 log q, and there is no adversary can distinguish between
Game 2 and Game 3.
Combining with Claim 6.5.3, we conclude that the probability










is negligible in λ ≈ logN . The proof for Claim 6.5.4 is complete. uunionsq
Claim 6.5.5 Without loss of generality, assume p′ < q′. Then
Pr[A wins Game 2] ≤ 1
p′
.
Proof of Claim 6.5.5: Let (ψˆ1, ψˆ2) denote the adversary A’s forgery output in
the Game 2 and (ψ1, ψ2) be the corresponding genuine output which shares the
same values {(i, νi) : i ∈ C} with the forgery output. Suppose the adversary A wins
Game 2, then A’s forged proof (ψˆ1, ψˆ2) is accepted and is different from the genuine
output (ψ1, ψ2): (ψˆ1, ψˆ2) 6= (ψ1, ψ2). Since both the forged proof and genuine proof
are accepted by the verifier w.r.t. {(i, νi) : i ∈ C} and satisfy the Equation (6.9) (on
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Recall that the verifier algorithm Verify accepts only if ψ1, ψˆ1 ∈ QRN . Thus ψˆ1ψ1 ∈
QRN is also a quadratic residue. For any element x ∈ QRN , x 14φ(N) = 1, and the
multiplicative order of x modulo N will be a factor of 1
4
φ(N) = p′q′. Let ϕ denote the
multiplicative order of ψˆ1
ψ1
modulo N . Since ψˆ1
ψ1
6= 1, ϕ is at least min{p′, q′} = p′. Thus
a computationally unbounded adversary B can invoke the adversary A to obtain the
above Equation (6.20) and find the value (τ mod ϕ) from Equation (6.20) by solving
a discrete log problem with ψˆ1
ψ1
as base. The probability that (τ mod ϕ) = τ is
Pr[(τ mod ϕ) = τ ] = Pr[τ ∈ Zϕ] = ϕ
φ(N)
. (6.21)
By Claim 6.5.2, we have the probability
Pr[A wins Game 2] ≤ Pr[B finds τ in Game 2]











is negligible in λ ≈ logN ≈ 2 + 2 log p′. The proof of Claim 6.5.5 is complete. uunionsq
Thus, Lemma 6.2 is proved. uunionsq
Lemma 6.3 Suppose Factorization Assumption 3 holds and the pseudorandom func-
tion family {PRF} is secure. Then the proof (ψ1, ψ2) in the proposed scheme POS3
is unforgeable in the feedback setting, where all acceptance or rejection decisions are
provided to the adversary in the PDP security game.
With Lemma 6.2 present, the proof of the above Lemma 6.3 is essentially identical
to the proof of Lemma 4.5 (on page 42). Here we save the details.
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Now it is time to prove the main Theorem 6.1 of this chapter.
Proof of Theorem 6.1: Lemma 6.3 states that the response/proof (ψ1, ψ2) in
the scheme POS3 is unforgeable. Since for random value d ∈ Z∗φ(N), A can win
PDP security game with non-negligible probability. Then for many different values
di’s, A can compute (ψi,1 = gpi1di , ψi,2 = gpi2) correctly. Let us just consider d1 and










the adversary A can output (gd1pi1 , gd2pi1 = (gd1pi1)c). By Knowledge of Exponent
Assumption (KEA [Dam92]), there exists a PPT extractor that can find M , such
that gd1pi1 = gd1M mod N .
Case 1: M 6= pi1 If the two integers M and pi1 are distinct (Notice that, here we
treat M , pi1 as large integer instead of group elements from Zφ(N)), then the difference
M−pi1 has to be a multiple of 14φ(N), from which the factorization of N can be found
using Miller’s result [Mil75]. As a result, this case occurs with negligible probability
under large integer factorization assumption.
Case 2: M = pi1 In this case, the extractor finds pi1, as desired. Recall that the
large integer pi1 =
∑
i∈C νiFi (Indeed, integer, not group element) is linear equation
of file blocks Fi’s. Similar to the proof in Ateniese’s PDP [ABC
+07, ABC+11b], by
choosing independent weights νi’s in |C| number of executions of the protocol, we
obtain |C| independent linear equations in the unknowns Fi, i ∈ C. Thus these file
blocks Fi, i ∈ C, can be found by solving the linear equation system over integer
domain.
Thus, Theorem 6.1 is proved.
uunionsq
6.6 Summary
This chapter proposed a Provable Data Possession scheme POS3 using an underlying
homomorphic authentication method, which has a similar homomorphic property as
the predicate-homomorphic MAC scheme S2. POS3 is very efficient in communication
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and storage. Its computation complexity is comparable to POS2. Compared to
Ateniese et al. [ABC+07, ABC+11b], POS3 is much more efficient in computation,
and equally efficient in communication and storage. Different from both POS1 and
POS2, the verification of POS3 requires a pair of public-secret tokens, which are
generated on the fly by the verifier per each verification. Full security proof of POS3
is provided under Knowledge of Exponent Assumption, Large Integer Factorization
Assumption and the assumption of existence of secure pseudorandom function.
Part II
Verifiable Outsourced Database:





Alice has a set D of d-dimensional integer points. She chooses a private key, and
preprocesses the dataset D using her private key to generate some authentication tag
T. She sends (outsources) D and T to an untrusted service provider Bob. Then Alice
deletes the original copy of dataset D and tag T from her local storage. Later Alice
may issue a query over D to Bob, for example, an aggregate query conditional on
a multidimensional range selection, and Bob should produce the query result and a
proof based on D and T. Alice wants to authenticate the query result, using only her
private key. In Part II of this dissertation, we focus on count query conditional on
a multidimensional range selection, that is, counting the number of points within a
multidimensional rectangular range. Our solution can be extended to support other
types of aggregate queries, like finding minimum coordinate value of points within a
multidimensional range, and non-aggregate range selection query, which asks for all
points within the query range.
The problem we study fits in the framework of the outsourced database applica-
tions [DGMS01,HILM02], which emerged in early 2000s as an example of “Software-
as-a-Service” (SaaS). By outsourcing database management, backup services and
other IT needs to a professional service provider, companies can reduce expensive
cost in purchase of equipments and even more expensive cost in hiring or training
qualified IT specialists to maintain the IT services [MNT06].
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We are concerned about the communication cost and the storage overhead on Al-
ice/Bob’s side. Such requirements exclude the following straightforward approaches:
(1) Bob sends back the whole dataset D with its tag T; (2) Alice keeps a local copy
of the dataset; (3) During preprocessing, Alice generates and signs answers to all pos-
sible queries. Recently, Gennaro, Gentry and Parno [GGP10] and Chung, Kalai and
Vadhan [CKV10] showed that, in general any outsourced/delegated polynomial time
function can be verified efficiently using a private verification key in the outsourced
computation model, by using fully homomorphic encryption (e.g. Gentry [Gen09]).
Nevertheless, it is still meaningful to devise more efficient scheme for small class of
functions, without using a fully homomorphic encryption, as mentioned by Gennaro et
al. [GGP10].
There are many works on authenticating non-aggregate range selection query
(e.g. [MND+04,PJRT05,MNT06,CT09,LHKR06,ACK08,MSP09,PZM09,GTT08]).
Although there are efficient solutions for 1D and 2D range selection (e.g. Atallah et
al. [ACK08] for 2D grid dataset), solutions for higher dimension typically rely on geo-
metric partitions which suffer from the “curse of dimensionality”, leading to exponen-
tial communication overhead. Aggregate range query is arguably more challenging.
Only a few works (e.g. [PT08,TYH+09,LHKR10]) are devoted to the authentication
of aggregate query, and these works require high communication overhead for high





















Table 7.1: Worst case performance of different authentication schemes for aggregate range query or range selection query.
This table consists of two parts: the first three rows are for aggregate query; the rest four rows are for range selection query.
Note: (1) The symbol “-” indicates that the authors do not provide such information in their paper. (2) We do not include
Pang et al. [PT08] and Cheng et al. [CT09] in this table, since no concise asymptotic bound are provided. Nevertheless,
their performances are limited by their data structure, i.e. KD-tree [PT08] and R-Tree [CT09], which require exponential
(in dimension) communication overhead in the worst case. (3) Our scheme supports private key verification, while the other






















d ≥ 1 O(dN + 2d) Ω(dN) O(dN + 2d) Ω(N1− 1d ) Sum or Count or Min






This work d ≥ 1 O(d2 log2 Z) O(dN) O(d2 log2 Z)† O(dN logZ)‡ Count,Min,Max, Me-
dian
(customer designed) func-








d ≥ 1 O(logd−1N
+|S|)
- - - Range Selection Authentication Data Struc-
ture + Geometry Partition
Chen et
al. [CMH+08]
d ≥ 1 O(logd Z) O(N logd Z) O(logd Z) O(logd Z) Range Selection Authentication Tree Struc-
ture + Access Control




Range Selection (customer designed) func-
tional encryption + GKEA
based homomorphic tag
N : The number of tuples in the dataset. S: The set of tuples satisfying the query condition.
K: The number of servers in PDAS [TYH+09]. Z: The domain size of attributes/points in one dimension.
†: O(d2 log2 Z) group multiplications. ‡: O(dN logZ) bilinear map operations.
MHT: Merkle Hash Tree
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7.1 Our Results
The design of our scheme consists of a few techniques. The first technique exploits
Generalized Knowledge of Exponent Assumption (GKEA) proposed by Wu and Stin-
son [WS07], to verify that the result is computed only from data points within the
query range. This is achieved by first associating a secret number with each location
in the space. Next, a homomorphic tag is computed by Alice from the secret number
for each data point and kept in Bob’s storage. To authenticate a query, Alice gener-
ates and sends to Bob another homomorphic tag for each location within the query
range, based on the associated secret number and a random nonce. Bob aggregates
these two types of tags for all data points within the query range, and sends the
resulting aggregated values together with the query result to Alice. The aggregated
values can be verified due to homomorphism, and it is difficult to forge the aggre-
gated values using data points outside the query range, under Computational Diffie
Hellman assumption and GKEA.
However, there are two main drawbacks if the above mentioned technique is em-
ployed by itself. Firstly, the validity of the aggregated tags do not rule out “over-
counting” (where a data point is used more than once by Bob) and “under-counting”
(where a data point is omitted by Bob). To prevent over-counting and under-counting,
we further query for data points outside the original query range, and check consis-
tency between proofs and results of these queries.
The second drawback is the high communication overhead required—Alice has to
send a tag for each location within the query range. In order to lower the communi-
cation complexity, we design a functional encryption scheme by exploiting a special
property of BBG HIBE scheme [BBG05]. Using this functional encryption scheme,
Alice encrypts secret numbers associated with each data point, and sends the result-
ing ciphertexts to Bob during the setup. For each query, from the query range and
the random nonce, Alice can generate a short decryption key. From the decryption
key, Bob can decrypt those ciphertexts to obtain the tags for data points within the
query range as the decrypted values, and learn nothing for data points outside the
range, due to the property of our functional encryption scheme.
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7.1.1 Contributions
Our main contributions in Part II of this dissertation can be summarized as below:
1. We propose a functional encryption scheme in Chapter 10, by exploiting a spe-
cial property (we call it “polymorphic property”) of the BBG HIBE scheme [BBG05].
Under this functional encryption scheme, given a message Msg and an identity1
(or attribute) ~x, which is a d-dimensional point in domain [1,Z]d (Here Z is
an integer), a ciphertext can be generated using the private2 key. A decryption
key w.r.t. a d-dimensional rectangular range R and a random nonce ρ can also
be derived from the private key. With this decryption key and the ciphertext
for message Msg under identity ~x, the decryption algorithm will output Ωρ·Msg
iff ~x ∈ R, where Ω is a part of key of the functional encryption scheme. The
size3 of a private key is in O(1), the size of a ciphertext is in O(d), and the size
of a decryption key is in O(d log2Z).
2. We prove that the proposed functional encryption scheme is weak-IND-sID-CPA
secure (as defined in Section 10.3), if BBG HIBE scheme [BBG05] is IND-sID-
CPA secure (See Theorem 10.2).
3. We propose a scheme for aggregate count query in Chapter 11 by incorporat-
ing the functional encryption scheme into the preliminary scheme presented in
Chapter 8. The resulting scheme is efficient. For a dataset D with N points
in [1,Z]d and a d-dimensional rectangular query range, round complexity is
one per query, communication overhead is O(d2 log2Z) bits per query, and the
storage overheads on Alice/Bob’s side are O(1) and O(dN), respectively. If the
dataset D is normalized4 [PS85], then Z = N and O(d2 log2Z) is sublinear in
1In our functional encryption scheme, identity ~x alone is insufficient to encrypt a message.
2Unlike [BSW11,O’N10], our functional encryption scheme is a symmetric key encryption system.
3 Since the private key contains O(d) random elements from Z∗p and O(`) random elements from
G˜, its size can be reduced from O(` + d) to O(1) (precisely, O(1) number of secret seeds, and each
seed with length equal to the security parameter λ), using a pseudorandom function.
4For any dataset with size N , one can normalized [PS85] it by sorting the dataset along each
dimension, so that the normalized dataset is a subset of [1, N ]d. We remark that such normalization
will not loss generality: queries over the original dataset can be translated into queries over normal-
ized dataset online by Bob and Alice can verify this translation by checking some authentication
tags.
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N and polynomial in d. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first solution
with worst case communication overhead sublinear in the number of points in
the dataset and with polynomial (in (d,N)) storage overhead on server side,
without using fully homomorphic encryption scheme [Gen09, vDGHV10]. We
compare our result with several previous works in Table 7.1.
4. We prove that the proposed scheme is correct and sound (Theorem 11.1) under
reasonable assumptions (Computational Diffie Hellman assumption, GKEA
and `-wBDHI assumption [BBG05]). We describe our proof strategy in Sec-
tion 11.2 and illustrate it by proving that the preliminary scheme in Chapter 8
is correct and sound. The full proof is in appendix.
5. Our solution for count query leads to efficient solutions that authenticates mul-
tidimensional aggregate min/max/median query or non-aggregate range selec-
tion query, with communication overhead O(d2 log2Z). These extensions are
described in Chapter 12 and performance is listed in Table 7.1.
7.2 Related work
Researches in secure outsourced database focus on two major aspects: (1) privacy (i.e.
protect the data confidentiality against both the service provider and any third party)
for example [HILM02, HIM04, MT06, GZ07], and (2) integrity (i.e. authenticate the
soundness and completeness of query results returned by the service provider) for ex-
ample [DGMS01,MND+04,DGMS03,PJRT05,MNT06,PT08,Sio05,CT09,LHKR06,
XWYM07,ACK08,YPPK09,MSP09,PZM09,GTT08,TYH+09,LHKR10]. In the lat-
ter aspect, a lot of works are conducted for “identity query” [Sio05], i.e. the query
result is a subset of the database. Aggregate range query is arguably more challeng-
ing and only a few works (for example [PT08,TYH+09,LHKR10]) are devoted to the
authentication of aggregate query.
There are roughly four categories of approaches for outsourced database authenti-
cation in the literature [DGMS01,MND+04,DGMS03,PJRT05,MNT06,PT08,Sio05,
CT09, LHKR06, XWYM07, ACK08, YPPK09, MSP09, PZM09, GTT08]. (1) Crypto-
graphic primitives, like collision-resistant hash, (homomorphic and/or aggregatable)
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digital signature/commitment [MNT06, HHSY06, TYH+09]. (2) Geometry parti-
tion and authenticated data structure [MND+04, CT09, ACK08, MSP09, LHKR06,
LHKR10]. For example, Merkle Hash Tree (“MHT” for short; typically for 1D case)
and variants, KD-tree with chained signature [PT08], R-Tree with chained signa-
ture [CT09], and MHT-like authenticated B-Tree/R-Tree [LHKR10]. (3) Authen-
ticated precomputed partial result, for example, authenticated prefix sum [ACK08,
LHKR10] (the static case solution in [LHKR10]) and authenticated partial sum hier-
archy [PT08]. (4) Inserting and auditing fake tuples [XWYM07].
To the best of our knowledge, the existing few works (e.g. [PT08,TYH+09,LHKR10])
on authentication of aggregate query either only deal with 1D case, or have commu-
nication overhead linear (or even superlinear) w.r.t. the number of data points in the
query range, and are suffering from the “curse of dimensionality”. Even for multidi-
mensional (non-aggregate) range selection query, the communication overhead is still
in O(logd−1N + |S|) (Martel et al. [MND+04], Chen et al. [CMH+08]), where S is
the set of data points within the query range, N is the number of data points in the
dataset, and d is the dimension.
Recently, Gennaro et al. [GGP10] and Chung et al. [CKV10] proposed methods
to authenticate any outsourced (or delegated) polynomial time computable function,
based on fully homomorphic encryption [Gen09, vDGHV10, Gen10]. They [GGP10,
CKV10] also gave a good discussion on why previous techniques (e.g. interactive
proofs, probabilistic checkable proof (PCP), and interactive arguments ) are insuffi-
cient for authenticating outsourced function from the performance point of view. If a
function has input size Γ1 and output size Γ2, then both Gennaro et al. [GGP10] and
Chung et al. [CKV10] have communication overhead in Ω(Γ1 + Γ2) to authenticate
correctness of the output of this function, where the hidden constant behind the big-
Ω notation could be huge. The difference between their solutions and our work may
become more clear when authenticating non-aggregate range selection query: Both
Gennaro et al. [GGP10] and Chung et al. [CKV10] will require at least linear commu-
nication overhead Ω(|S|) where S is the set of points within the query range, while
our solution (the extension in Section 12.3) still requires O(d2 log2Z) communication
overhead which is independent on size of S.
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Shi et al. [SBC+07] proposed a predicate encryption scheme called MRQED (Multi-
dimensional Range Query over Encrypted Data). Under their scheme, given a message
and an identity, which is a d-dimensional point, a ciphertext can be generated. A
short decryption key for a d-dimensional rectangular range can be generated from the
master secret key. From this decryption key and the ciphertext, the original message
can be decrypted, iff the identity point associated with the ciphertext is within the
range. There is a subtle but crucial difference between MRQED scheme and our im-
plementation of functional encryption scheme [BSW11,O’N10,LOS+10,OT10]: After
a successful decryption, MRQED scheme reveals the original message, whereas our
functional encryption scheme reveals only a two-input one-way function value with
the original message and a nonce as inputs. As the nonce plays a crucial role in
preventing replay attack, it is not suitable to adopt MRQED for our problem. On the
other hand, MRQED has its own advantages over our functional encryption scheme,
including that MRQED is a public key encryption scheme and has a stronger security
model.
Several works in verification of integrity of data stored in remote cloud storage
server (e.g. [ABC+07,CX08,SW08a,BJO09a,DVW09,AKK09] and the three schemes
POS1, POS2 and POS3 proposed in Part I of this dissertation) also adopted some
homomorphic and/or aggregatable verification tags to achieve efficient communication
cost.
7.3 Organization
The rest of Part II of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chpater 8 gives a
more detailed overview of our main scheme. Chapter 9 presents the problem formu-
lation and security definition. The new functional encryption scheme is constructed
in Chapter 10. Our main authentication scheme for count query is described and
analyzed in Chapter 11 and its extensions for min/max/median and range selection
queries are given in Chapter 12. The full proof of security properties of the functional
encryption scheme and the authentication scheme is in Appendix A.
Chapter 8
Overview of Main Scheme
In this chapter, we illustrate our main ideas in two parts: (1) The first part presents
a preliminary scheme that authenticates count query. This preliminary scheme is
secure (Theorem 11.2) under Computational Diffie Hellman assumption and GKEA.
However, it requires high communication and computation cost. (2) The second part
describes the technique that reduces the communication and computation cost. In
particular, the reduction is achieved using a functional encryption scheme which is
constructed by exploiting a special property of BBG HIBE scheme [BBG05].
8.1 Preliminary Scheme
Let D ⊂ [1,Z]d be a set of d-dimensional points. Let G be a cyclic multiplicative
group of prime order p and {Fs : [1,Z]d → G}s∈{0,1}λ be a pseudorandom function.
During setup, Alice chooses at random β ∈ Z∗p, θ ∈ G, and s ∈ {0, 1}λ as the
private key. From the private key, Alice generates a tag value tx = (tx,1, tx,2) =
(θFs(x),Fs(x)
β) for each data point x ∈ D. Alice also computes a value ∆ =∏
x∈D tx,2. Next, Alice sends dataset D and tag values T = {tx : x ∈ D} to Bob
and deletes everything except ∆ and the private key (β, θ, s) from her storage.
Consider a count query conditional on a range R ⊂ [1,Z]d, which asks for the size
of set D ∩R. Bob is expected to send to Alice a number X as the query result, and
a proof to show that indeed X = |D ∩R| (mod p).
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To authenticate this query, Alice chooses two random nonces1 ρ and ρˆ, computes
and sends auxiliary messages (called as challenge-message) Φ = {Fs(x)ρ : x ∈ R} and
Φˆ = {Fs(x)ρˆ : x ∈ R{} to Bob, where R{ = {x ∈ [1,Z]d : x 6∈ R} is the complement
set of range R. Bob is expected to compute X = |D ∩ R| and Xˆ = |D ∩ R{|, and
generate the proof (Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3, Ψˆ1, Ψˆ2, Ψˆ3) as below:
















Step B2: Bob multiplies all values Fs(x)







Step B3: Bob repeats Step B1 and Step B2 for data points x ∈ D∩R{ using challenge-message
Φˆ to obtain Ψˆ1, Ψˆ2, Ψˆ3 correspondingly.
Bob sends back (X,Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3; Xˆ, Ψˆ1, Ψˆ2, Ψˆ3) to Alice, and Alice verifies the returned
message using the private key (β, θ, s), the secret random nonces (ρ, ρˆ), and value ∆
in this way:










1Here the secret random nonces prevent Bob from abusing this challenge-message for other
queries.
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Step A3: Repeat Step A1 and Step A2 to verify (Xˆ, Ψˆ1, Ψˆ2, Ψˆ3) using private key and
secret random nonce ρˆ.
Step A4: Is every point counted for exactly once?
Ψ2 · Ψˆ2 ?= ∆. (8.1)
If all of above verifications succeed, Alice accepts that X is the correct query result.
Remark 8
• In the computations of Ψ1, Ψ2 and Ψ3, an adversary (playing the role of Bob)
may try to multiply tags for some points within D ∩R multiple times, and/or
ignore some points within D ∩R. That is, the adversary tries to find integers
µx’s for each point x ∈ D, treat (tµxx,1, tµxx,2) as the tag of point x ∈ D in the com-
putations of Ψ1 and Ψ2, treat {Fs(x)ρ·µx : x ∈ D∩R} as the challenge-message
in the computation of Ψ3, and compute the query result X =
∑
x∈D∩R µx. Here
µx > 1 indicates that the point x is over-counted, µx < 1 indicates that the
point x is under-counted, and µx might take negative integer value. By doing
so, the adversary can pass the verifications in Step A1, A2 and A3. However,
if such adversary succeeds in passing Step A4, i.e. he can find integers µx’s, for
each x ∈ D, such that ∏x∈D tµxx,2 = ∆ = ∏x∈D tx,2 and some µx 6= 1, then he
can solve DLP (Discrete Log Problem).
• The above attack strategy is “restrictive”. A stronger adversary might perfor-
mance something else to pass the verifications. Fortunately, under GKEA, we
can show that: (informally) for any efficient adversary, under-counting and/or
over-counting are the only ways to pass verifications in Step A1, A2 and A3,
with a negligible exception.
• In the preliminary scheme, the size of challenge-message is linear w.r.t. |R|,
which can be very large, leading to large computation and communication cost.
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• The second component tx,2 = Fs(x)β in a tag tx is required to deal with adap-
tive adversary: An adversary does not gain additional knowledge from adap-
tive learning, since it can generate challenge-message by itself from {Fs(x)β :
x ∈ D}, and the forged challenge-message is identically distributed as the
challenge-message generated by Alice.
8.2 Deliver challenge-message efficiently and se-
curely
To reduce complexity, Alice needs a way to deliver the information Φ = {Fs(x)ρ : x ∈
R} (actually the subset {Fs(x)ρ : x ∈ D ∩ R} is sufficient to serve the purpose) to
Bob by sending some auxiliary data of much smaller size, and Bob must not know
the value of Fs(x)
ρ for point x 6∈ R. We design such delivery method by exploiting a
special property of existing HIBE scheme.
Polymorphic Property. We observe that some (HIBE) encryption scheme (KeyGen,
Enc, Dec), e.g. BBG HIBE scheme [BBG05], satisfies a polymorphic property : From a
pair of keys (pk, sk) ∈ KeyGen(1λ), a plaintext M , an identity id, and a random coin
r, one can efficiently find multiple tuples (pkj, skj,Mj, rj), 1 ≤ j ≤ n, such that for
each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, (pkj, skj) ∈ KeyGen(1λ) is a valid key pair and
Encpk(id,M ; r) = CT = Encpkj(id,Mj; rj).
From the opposite point of view, a ciphertext CT can be decrypted into different
values Mj’s using different decryption keys. We can view these decrypted values Mj’s
as a function of the original plaintext M which is used to produce the ciphertext CT.
Hence, such polymorphic property may lead to a new way to construct functional
encryption schemes [BSW11,O’N10,LOS+10,OT10].
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Overview of the Delivery Method. Alice can deliver the challenge-message
{Fs(x)ρ : x ∈ D∩R} in this way: For simplicity, assume the dataset D ⊂ [1,Z] con-
sists of N 1D data points. Each point x in the domain is associated with an identity
ID(x), which corresponds to a leaf node in the identity hierarchy tree of BBG HIBE
scheme. In the setup phase, for each data point xi ∈ D, Alice computes a ciphertext
~ci, which can be considered as encryption of Mi,j under key (pkj, skj), j = 1, 2, 3, . . .
Alice sends these N ciphertexts {~ci : 1 ≤ i ≤ N} to Bob at the end of setup phase.
Later, for a query range R, Alice chooses a random nonce ρ and derives the delegation
key ~δ w.r.t. the set S = {ID(x) : x ∈ R} of identities from the key pair (pkρ, skρ),
and sends ~δ as challenge-message to Bob. With this delegation key, Bob is able to
decrypt ciphertext ~ci to obtain Mi,ρ if xi ∈ D∩R. By carefully choosing parameters,
we may have Mi,ρ = Fs(xi)
ρ as desired.
The tree structure of the identity hierarchy of HIBE scheme facilitates short de-
scription of the delegation key, and thus the challenge-message, which originally con-
tains Z subkeys in the worst case, can now be expressed with only O(logZ) subkeys.
For high dimensional cases, we perform the above procedure for each dimension,
and combines the challenge-messages for all dimensions. The security of this method
can be reduced to the IND-sID-CPA security of the underlying HIBE scheme.
Chapter 9
Formulation
In this chapter, we formalize the problem and security model, and describe the security
assumptions formally.
9.1 Dataset and Query
The dataset D is a set of N d-dimensional points ~x1, ~x2, . . . , ~xN from the domain
[1,Z]d where Z can be a large integer (e.g. 64 bits integer). Let R = [a1, b1] ×
[a2, b2] × . . . × [ad, bd] ⊆ [1,Z]d be a d-dimensional rectangular range. In Part II of
this dissertation, we focus on queries that count the number of points in D ∩R. Let
us define function F :
F (D,R)
def
= |D ∩R| = |D ∩R| mod p,
where p is a large prime. Note that p is exponential in the security parameter λ and
N is polynomial in λ.
We write an integer interval [1, n] = {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} as [n] for abbreviation, where
n is some positive integer.
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9.2 Security Model
We formulize our problem, as a variant of Verifiable Computation proposed by Gen-
naro et al. [GGP10]. Let us view a query on a dataset as the function F : D× R→
{0, 1}∗, where D is the domain of datasets, R is the set of all possible queries, and the
output of F is represented by a binary string. We define a remote computing protocol
as follows:
Definition 10 (RC) A Remote Computing (RC) protocol for a function F : D ×
R → {0, 1}∗, between Alice and Bob, consists of a setup phase and a query phase.
The setup phase consists of a key generating algorithm KGen and data encoding algo-
rithm DEnc; the query phase consists of a pair of interactive algorithms, namely the
evaluator Eval and the extractor Ext. These four algorithms (KGen,DEnc, 〈Eval,Ext〉)
run in the following way:
Setup Phase
1. Given security parameter λ, Alice generates a key K: K ← KGen(1λ).
2. Alice encodes dataset D ∈ D: (DB,DA) ← DEnc(D, K), then sends DB to
Bob and keeps DA.
Query Phase The query phase consists of multiple query sessions. In each query
session, Alice and Bob interact as below.
1. Alice selects a query R ∈ R.
2. Algorithm Ext(DA,R, K) on Alice’s side, interacts with algorithm Eval(DB)
on Bob’s side to compute (ζ,X, ~Ψ) ← 〈Eval(DB),Ext(DA,R, K)〉, where
ζ ∈ {accept, reject} and ~Ψ is the proof of result X.
If ζ = accept, then Alice accepts that X is equal to F (D,R). Otherwise,
Alice rejects.
We are interested in efficient RC protocol where the sizes of K,DA,DB, and the
communication overhead are all small.
One of the main differences betweenRC model and Verifiable Computation [GGP10]
model is that: RC allows multiple rounds of communication between Alice and Bob
CHAPTER 9. FORMULATION 129
to compute a function value in a query session; in contrast, Verifiable Computation
model [GGP10] allows only one round of communication. Although in Part II of this
dissertation, both the scheme for count query in Section 11.1 and the extension for
range selection query in Section 12.3 requires only one round of communication due
to parallelism, our extensions for min/max/median query in Section 12.1 and Sec-
tion 12.2 require at least two rounds of communication, since dependencies between
different rounds prevent parallelism.
We say a RC protocol is verifiable, if the following conditions hold: (1) Alice
always accepts, when Bob follows the protocol honestly; (2) Alice rejects with o.h.p.
(overwhelming high probability), when Bob returns a wrong result. Here we consider
adversaries, i.e. malicious Bob, who are allowed to interact with Alice and learn
for polynomial number of query sessions, before launching the attack. During the
learning, the adversary may store whatever it has seen or learnt in a state variable.
Definition 11 (VRC) Let λ be the security parameter. We call a RC protocol E =
(KGen,DEnc, 〈Eval,Ext〉) w.r.t. function F : D × R → {0, 1}∗ a Verifiable Remote
Computing (VRC) protocol, if the following two conditions hold:
• correctness: for any D ∈ D, any K ← KGen(1λ) and any R ∈ R, it holds
that 〈Eval(DB),Ext(DA,R, K)〉 = (accept, F (D,R), ~Ψ) for some ~Ψ, where
(DB,DA)← DEnc(D, K).
• soundness: for any adaptive PPT adversary A, the advantage AdvE,A(1λ) ≤
negl(λ),
where AdvE,A(1λ) is defined as below






loop until A(viewEA) decides to stop
Ri ← A(DB, viewEA);
(ζi, Xi, ~Ψi)← 〈A(DB, viewEA),Ext(DA,Ri, K)〉;
R← A(DB, viewEA);
(ζ,X, ~Ψ)← 〈A(DB, viewEA),Ext(DA,R, K)〉;





(ζ,X, ~Ψ, viewEA,D,R)← ExpEA(1λ) :
ζ = accept ∧ X 6= F (D,R)
]
.
The probability is taken over all random coins used by related algorithms, negl(·) is
some negligible function, and viewEA is a state variable
1 describing all random coins
chosen by A and all messages A can access during previous interactions with E.
9.3 Assumptions
Throughout Part II of this dissertation, let p be a λ bits safe prime, and e : G×G→ G˜
be a bilinear map, where G and G˜ are two cyclic multiplicative groups of order p.
Assumption 4 (Computational Diffie Hellman Assumption [DH76]) For any
PPT algorithm A, it holds that
Pr
[A(g, ga, gb) = gab] ≤ ν1(λ),
where g is chosen at random from G˜, a and b are chosen at random from Z∗p, and
ν1(·) is some negligible function.
1The adaptive adversary A may keep updating this state variable.
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The assumption GKEA is an extension of KEA1 [Dam92,HT98,BP04b,Kra05,
Den06] and KEA3 [BP04a], and proposed by Wu and Stinson [WS07]. Roughly,
GKEA assumption can be described as below:
For any adversary A that takes input {(ui, uβi ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ m} and returns (U1, U2)
with Uβ1 = U2, there exists an “extractor” A¯, which given the same inputs as A





Assumption 5 (Generalized KEA [Dam92,BP04a,WS07,Gro10]) Let A and





Wm = {(ui, uβi ) : i ∈ [m], ui $←− G˜, β $←− Z∗p}
(U1, U2)← A(Wm; r);
(µ1, µ2, . . . , µm)← A¯(Wm; r, r¯) :






where the probability is taken over all random coins used and with m fixed (Here the
notation
$←− denotes uniformly randomly sampling from a set. E.g. the expression
x
$←− S means that x is uniformly randomly chosen from the set S). For any PPT
algorithm A (called as adversary), there exists PPT algorithm A¯ (called as extractor),
such that the GKEA-advantage of A against A¯ is upper bounded by some negligible
function ν2(λ), i.e. Adv
GKEA
A,A¯ (λ) ≤ ν2(λ), where m is polynomial in λ.
Remark 9
• GKEA is a natural extension of KEA1 and KEA3, in the sense that GKEA⇒
KEA3⇒ KEA1. Abe and Fehr [AF07] proved KEA1 and KEA3 in generic
group model. Following their techniques, GKEA can be proved in generic group
model.
• If ui = gxi for each i with some random g and x, then Assumption 5 will become
the q-PKE assumption proposed by Groth [Gro10].
Furthermore, the (Decision) `-wBDHI Assumption [BBG05] is required for the
IND-sID-CPA security of the underlying BBG HIBE scheme.
Chapter 10
Functional Encryption Scheme
Recall that the preliminary scheme in Chapter 8 requires large communication and
computation cost. In order to reduce such cost, we construct a functional encryp-
tion [BSW11, O’N10] scheme by exploiting the polymorphic property of BBG HIBE
scheme [BBG05], following the overview given in Chapter 8.
10.1 Polymorphic Property of BBG HIBE Scheme
We observe that the BBG HIBE scheme [BBG05] satisfies the polymorphic property:
An encryption of a message M can be viewed as the encryption of another message M̂
under different key. Precisely, let CT and ĈT be defined as follows, we have CT = ĈT:




hI11 · · ·hIkk · g3
)s)
under key: params = (g, g1, g2, g3, h1, . . . , h`,Ω = e(g1, g2)), master-key = g
α
2
ĈT = Encrypt(p̂arams, id, M̂ ; sz) =
(
Ωsz · M̂, ĝsz,
(
ĥI11 · · · ĥIkk · ĝ3
)sz)
,
under key: p̂arams = (ĝ, g1, g2, ĝ3, ĥ1, . . . , ĥ`,Ω = e(g1, g2)), ̂master-key = gαz2
(10.1)
where ` is the maximum depth of the HIBE scheme, k ≤ ` is the length of identity
id, M̂ = MΩs(1−z), ĝ = gz
−1 mod p, ĝ3 = g
z−1 mod p
3 , ĥi = h
z−1 mod p
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ `




. To be self-contained, the description of this
132
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BBG HIBE scheme is given in Appendix A.1 (on page 174). One can verify the above
equality easily.
10.2 Define Identities based on Binary Interval Tree
An identity is a sequence of elements from Z∗p. To apply HIBE scheme, we intend
to construct two mappings to associate identities to integers or integer intervals: (1)
ID(·) maps an integer x ∈ [Z] into an identity ID(x) ∈ (Z∗p)`, where ` = dlogZe
is the height of identity hierarchy tree of the BBG HIBE scheme. (2) IdSet(·) maps
an integer interval [a, b] ⊆ [Z] into a set of O(`) identities, where each identity is a
sequence of at most ` elements from Z∗p. The two mappings ID and IdSet are required
to satisfy the property: For any x ∈ [a, b] ⊆ [Z], there is a unique identity id in the set
IdSet([a, b]), such that identity id is a prefix of identity ID(x). If x 6∈ [a, b], then there
is no such identity id in IdSet([a, b]). For each dimension ι ∈ [d], we will construct
such mappings IDι and IdSetι using a binary interval tree [SBC
+07]. The resulting
mappings are made public.
Binary Interval Tree. The binary interval tree is constructed as below: First,
we build a complete ordered binary tree with 2` leaf nodes. Next, we associate an
integer interval to each tree node in a bottom-up manner: (1) Counting from the
leftmost leaf, the j-th leaf is associated with interval [j, j]; (2) For any internal node,
the associated interval is the union of the two intervals associated to its left and right
children respectively. As a result, the interval associated to the root node is [1, 2`].
An example of binary interval tree with size 8 is showed in Figure 10.1.
Constructions of Mappings IDι and IdSetι for dimension ι. Let H : Z2`+1 ×
Z2`+1 × [d] → Z∗p be a collision resistant hash function. Let (v1, v2, . . . , vm) be the
path from the root node v1 to the node vm in the binary interval tree. We associate




, where [aj, bj] is the
interval associated to node vj, 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
For any x ∈ [Z], we define IDι(x) as the identity associated to the x-th leaf node
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(counting from the left). For any interval [a, b] ⊆ [Z], we find the minimum set {vj :
vj is a tree node, 1 ≤ j ≤ n} such that the intervals associated to vj’s form a partition
of [a, b], and define IdSetι([a, b]) as the set {idj : idj is the identity associated to node vj,
1 ≤ j ≤ n}. One can verify that the newly constructed mappings IDι and IdSetι sat-
isfy the property mentioned in the beginning of Section 10.2. Furthermore, the set








Figure 10.1: Binary Interval Tree with 8 leaf nodes.
10.3 Construction of Functional Encryption Scheme
Let (Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt) be the BBG Hierarchical Identity Based Encryp-
tion (HIBE) scheme proposed by Boneh, Boyen and Goh [BBG05] (the description
of this scheme is in Appendix A.1 on page 174). Based on this HIBE scheme, we
construct a functional encryption scheme FE = (f Setup, f Enc, f KeyGen, f Dec, f Mult)
as below.
f Setup(1λ, d,Z) : security parameter λ, dimension d, maximum integer Z; the
domain of points is [Z]d
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1. Let ` = dlogZe. Run algorithm Setup(`, λ) to obtain bilinear groups (p,G, G˜, e),
public parameter params = (g, g1, g2, g3, h1, . . . , h`,Ω = e(g1, g2)) and master
private key master-key = gα2 , such that p is a λ bits prime, G, G˜ are cyclic
multiplicative groups of order p, e : G × G → G˜ is a bilinear map, g is a
generator of G, α ∈ Zp, g1 = gα ∈ G, and g2, g3, h1, . . . , h` ∈ G.
2. Let IDι and IdSetι, ι ∈ [d], be the mappings as in Section 10.2.
3. Choose d random elements τ1, . . . , τd from Z∗p and let ~τ = (τ1, . . . , τd).
4. Let pk = (p,G, G˜, e,Ω) and sk = (pk, params, master-key, ~τ ). Make IDι’s and
IdSetι’s public and output (pk, sk).
f Enc(Msg, ~x, sk) : message Msg ∈ Z∗p, d-dimensional point ~x
1. Treat the d-dimensional point ~x as (x1, . . . , xd) ∈ [Z]d; recall that the private
key sk is (pk, params,master-key, ~τ ), where ~τ = (τ1, . . . , τd).




3. Choose d random elements σ1, . . . , σd from G˜ with constraint
∏d
j=1 σj = Ω
−∑dj=1 sj .
4. For each j ∈ [d], encrypt σj under identity IDj(xj) with random coin sj to
obtain ciphertext ~cj as follows
~cj ← Encrypt(params, IDj(xj), σj; sj). (10.2)
5. Output ciphertext CT = (~c1, . . . ,~cd).
f KeyGen(R, ρ, sk) : d-dimensional rectangular range R, function key ρ ∈ Z∗p
1. Treat the d-dimensional rectangular range R ⊆ [Z]d as Cartesian product A1×
A2 . . . ×Ad, where Aj ⊆ [Z] for each j ∈ [d]; recall that the private key sk is
(pk, params,master-key, ~τ ), where ~τ = (τ1, . . . , τd).
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2. For each dimension j ∈ [d], generate a set δj in this way:
(a) For each identity id ∈ IdSetj(Aj), generate the private key did, using algo-
rithm KeyGen and taking the value master-keyρτj as the master key.
(b) Set δj ← {did : id ∈ IdSetj(Aj)}.
3. Output delegation key ~δ = (δ1, δ2, . . . , δd).
f Dec(CT, ~x,R, ~δ, pk) : ciphertext CT, d-dimensional point ~x, d-dimensional
rectangular range R, delegation key ~δ
1. Treat the d-dimensional rectangular range R ⊆ [Z]d as Cartesian product A1×
A2 . . . ×Ad, where Aj ⊆ [Z] for each j ∈ [d]. Let us write the ciphertext CT
as (~c1, . . . ,~cd), and the d-dimensional point ~x as (x1, . . . , xd).
2. For each dimension j ∈ [d], generate t˜j in this way: If xj 6∈ Aj, then output ⊥
and abort. Otherwise, do the followings:
(a) Find the unique identity id∗ ∈ IdSetj(Aj) such that id∗ is a prefix of identity
IDj(xj).
(b) Parse ~δ as (δ1, . . . , δd) and find the private key did∗ ∈ δj = {did : id ∈
IdSetj(Aj)} for identity id∗.
(c) Generate the private key dj for the identity IDj(xj) from private key did∗ ,
using algorithm KeyGen.
(d) Decrypt ~cj using algorithm Decrypt with decryption key dj, and denote
the decrypted message as t˜j.
3. Output t˜ =
∏
1≤j≤d t˜j ∈ G˜.
f Mult(CT′, y, pk) : ciphertext CT′, y ∈ G˜
1. Let us write the ciphertext CT′ as (~c′1, . . . ,~c
′
d).
2. Choose d random elements η1, . . . , ηd from G˜ with constraint
∏d
j=1 ηj = y ∈ G˜.
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3. For each dimension j ∈ [d]: parse ~c′j as (A,B,C) and set ~cj = (A · ηj, B, C).
4. Output ciphertext CT = (~c1, . . . ,~cd).
Note: Both ~c′j and ~cj are valid BBG ciphertexts for different plaintexts under
the same identity.
10.4 The Constructed Functional Encryption Scheme
is Correct and Secure
In this section, we analyze the correctness and security of the newly constructed
functional encryption scheme.
10.4.1 Correctness
Let us define a key-ed function family {fρ : Z∗p → G˜}ρ∈Z∗p as below: Let Ω ∈ G˜ be as
in f Setup of Section 10.3.
f1(Msg) = Ω
Msg; ∀ρ ∈ Z∗p, fρ(Msg) = f1(Msg)ρ ∈ G˜. (10.3)
Lemma 10.1 (FE is correct) The functional encryption scheme FE described in
Section 10.3 satisfies these properties:
(a) For any public-private key pair (pk, sk) ← f Setup(1λ, d,Z), for any message
Msg ∈ Z∗p, for any point ~x ∈ [Z]d, for any rectangular range R ⊆ [Z]d, for any
ρ ∈ Z∗p, if CT← f Enc(Msg, ~x, sk) and ~δ ← f KeyGen(R, ρ, sk), then
f Dec(CT, ~x, R, ~δ, pk) =
{
fρ(Msg) (if ~x ∈ R)
⊥ (otherwise) (10.4)
(b) For any public-private key pair (pk, sk) ← f Setup(1λ, d,Z), for any message
Msg ∈ Z∗p, for any point ~x ∈ [Z]d, for any rectangular range R ⊆ [Z]d, for any
ρ ∈ Z∗p, for any y ∈ G˜, if CT ← f Enc(Msg, ~x, sk) and ~δ ← f KeyGen(R, ρ, sk),
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then
f Dec(f Mult(CT, y, pk), ~x, R, ~δ, pk) =
{
y · fρ(Msg) (if ~x ∈ R)
⊥ (otherwise)
(10.5)
(The proof is in Appendix A.3.)
10.4.2 Security
We formulize the security requirement of our functional encryption scheme by mod-
ifying the IND-sID-CPA security game [BBG05]. The resulting weak-IND-sID-CPA
security game between an adversary A and a challenger C is defined as below:
Commit: The adversary A chooses the target point ~x∗ from the space [Z]d and
sends it to the challenger C.
Setup: The challenger C runs the setup algorithm f Setup and gives A the resulting
system parameters pk, keeping the secret key sk to itself.
Challenge: The challenger C chooses two plaintexts Msg0,Msg1 at random from the
message space Z∗p, and chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. C sets the challenge ciphertext
to CT = f Enc(Msgb, ~x
∗, sk), and sends (CT, f1(Msg0), f1(Msg1)) to the adversary A.
Learning Phase: The adversary A adaptively issues queries to the challenger C,
where each query is one of the following:
• Delegation key query (R, ρ), where ~x∗ 6∈ R: In response to this query, C runs
algorithm f KeyGen(R, ρ, sk) to generate the delegation key ~δ, and sends ~δ to
A.
• Anonymous delegation key query (R): In response to this query, C chooses ρ
at random from the space Z∗p and runs algorithm f KeyGen(R, ρ, sk) to generate
the delegation key ~δ, and sends ~δ to A.
• Encryption query (Msg, ~x): In response to this query, C runs f Enc(Msg, ~x, sk)
to obtain a ciphertext, and sends the ciphertext to A.
Guess: Finally, the adversary A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins if b = b′.
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We refer to the above adversary A as a weak-IND-sID-CPA adversary. We define
the advantage of the adversary A in attacking the scheme FE as
Advweak-IND-sID-CPAFE,A =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Theorem 10.2 If the BBG HIBE scheme is IND-sID-CPA secure (as defined in [BBG05]),
then the functional encryption scheme FE constructed in Section 10.3 is weak-IND-
sID-CPA secure. That is, there is no PPT adversary A that can win the weak-IND-
sID-CPA game against the scheme FE with non-negligible advantage Advweak-IND-sID-CPAFE,A .
(The more detailed statement of this theorem and its proof appear in Appendix A.4
on page 179).
Most of previous functional encryption schemes (e.g. attribute-based encryp-
tion [SW05], and predicate encryption [KSW08]), if not all, allow the decryptor to
obtain the original plaintext Msg in “good” case (e.g. if the attribute of plaintext
and/or the decryption key satisfy the designated predicate) from a ciphertext of Msg,
and nothing otherwise. In contrast, our functional encryption scheme FE only allows
the decryptor to obtain f1(Msg)
ρ in “good” case, from a ciphertext of Msg, where
f1 is a one-way function. Unlike [BSW11, O’N10], our functional encryption scheme
is a symmetric key system. Our security formulation is weaker than previous works





In this chapter, we propose an authentication scheme for aggregate count query in
Section 11.1. We analyze the proposed scheme in security aspect in Section 11.2 and
in performance aspect in Section 11.3.
11.1 The Main Construction
By incorporating the newly constructed functional encryption scheme FE into the
preliminary scheme presented in Chapter 8, we construct a RC protocol E = (KGen,
DEnc, 〈Eval,Ext〉) as below, to authenticate aggregate count query over multidimen-
sional dataset.
(Alice) KGen(1λ):
Step 1: Run f Setup(1λ) to obtain public/private key pair (pk′, sk), where pk′ =
(p,G, G˜, e,Ω). Set pk = (p,G, G˜, e).
Note: e is a bilinear map e : G × G → G˜, Ω ∈ G˜, and both G and G˜ are
multiplicative groups of prime order p.
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Step 2: Choose β, γ at random from Z∗p, and θ at random from G˜. Let K =
(pk′, sk, β, γ, θ).
Step 3: Output (K, pk).
(Alice) DEnc(D;K):
Step 1: Dataset D ⊂ [Z]d consists of N points ~x1, ~x2, . . . , ~xN . Choose N random
elements W1, . . . ,WN from Z∗p independently and N random elements v1, . . . , vN
from G˜ independently.





i , wi = f1(Wi)
)
. (11.1)
Note: Alice can evaluate functions {fρ(·)}ρ∈Z∗p, since Alice has Ω ∈ G˜.
Step 3: For each i ∈ [N ]:
(a) Encrypt message Wi under point ~xi: CT
′
i ← f Enc(Wi, ~xi, sk);
(b) Apply the homomorphic property of FE to attach vγi to ciphertext:
CTi ← f Mult(CT′i, vγi , pk′).
Step 4: Send DB =
(
D, T = {~ti : i ∈ [N ]}, C = {CTi : i ∈ [N ]}, pk
)
to Bob, and









(Alice, Bob) ProVer = 〈Eval (DB) , Ext (DA, R, K)〉: DA = (N, d,∆), DB = (D,T,C, pk)
Precondition: The query range R ⊂ [Z]d is a rectangular range.
Step 1: Alice partitions the complement range R{ into 2d rectangular ranges {R` ⊂
[Z]d : ` ∈ [1, 2d]}, and sets R0 = R.
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Step 2: For 0 ≤ ` ≤ 2d, Alice and Bob invokes CollRes on range R`. Denote the
output as (ζ`, X`,Ψ
(`)
2 ).
Step 3: Alice sets ζ = accept, if the following equalities hold







otherwise sets ζ = reject. Alice outputs (ζ,X0,∆).
(Alice, Bob) CollRes =
〈
E˜val (DB) , E˜xt (DA, R, K)
〉
: DA = (N, d,∆), DB = (D,T,C, pk)
Precondition. The query range R ⊂ [Z]d is a rectangular range.
Step A1: (Alice’s first step) Alice chooses a random nonce ρ from Z∗p and runs al-
gorithm f KeyGen to generate a delegation key ~δ w.r.t. (R, ρ): ~δ ← f KeyGen(R,
ρ, sk). Alice sends (R, ~δ) to Bob, where ~δ will be treated as the challenge-message.
Step B1: (Bob’s first step) Bob computes the query resultX and proof (Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3,Ψ4)
as follows






f Dec(CTi, ~xi,R, ~δ, pk).
(11.3)
Bob sends (X,Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3,Ψ4) to Alice.
Note: For ~xi ∈ D∩R, f Dec(CTi, ~xi,R, ~δ, pk) is supposed to output vγi f1(Wi)ρ =
vγi w
ρ
i ; the operator
⊗
denotes component-wise multiplication of vectors of the
same dimension.
Step A2: (Alice’s second step) Let Λ← Ψ1
θX








Otherwise sets ζ = reject. Alice outputs (ζ,X,Ψ2).
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Remark 10
1. To understand the verifications in the interactive algorithm CollRes, one may
consider a homomorphic tag function Tag defined as below: Let y be the input,
K = (β, γ, θ) be the key, and v, w be random coins.
TagK(y; v, w) = (θ
yv, vβ, w, vγwρ);∏
i












Note that the first three component of TagK(1; vi, wi) are just the three com-
ponents of vector ~ti generated in Equation (11.1), and the fourth component
vγwρ is the output of f Dec(CTi, ~xi,R, ~δ, pk) w.r.t. the random nonce ρ (i.e.
~δ ← f KeyGen(R, ρ, sk) ). In the algorithm CollRes, Bob computes the product
of Tag values of data points within the query range as the proof of the query
result X. Next, Alice verifies whether the proof (Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3,Ψ4) is a valid Tag
value for X, with key K and without knowing the values of random coins vj’s
and wj’s.
2. A simple alternative construction of Tag is as follows, as in the preliminary
scheme in Chapter 8:
Tag′K(y; v) = (θ
yv, vβ, vρ),
where vρ is the output of f Dec. However, we encounter difficulty in proving
the security of the constructed scheme if we adopt Tag′. Thus we introduce a
new random coin w and change Tag′ to Tag. It is not clear whether such ad-
ditional component plays a crucial role in achieving security or simply helps
in simplifying the proof. The role of the additional random coin wi is as fol-
lows: In our proof, given the first two components {(θyivi, vβi ) : i ∈ [N ]} of all
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tag values, a simulator can simulate Alice in our scheme. Next, the simula-
tor invokes a malicious Bob to interact with Alice to produce a forgery. For
the alternative construction with Tag′, to simulate DEnc, the simulator has to
find a ciphertext for some message Wi ∈ Z∗p, such that f1(Wi) = ΩWi = vβi ,
which could be infeasible due to DLP (Discrete Log Problem). In our con-
struction with Tag, since the additional term wi is independent on the first two
components of tag ~ti, the simulator can choose Wi freely, and generate wi ←
f1(Wi) and the ciphertext CTi ← f Mult
(





γ′ ∈ Z∗p is randomly chosen. Consequently, if ~xi ∈ R, then by Lemma 10.1,
f Dec (CTi, ~xi,R, f KeyGen(R, ρ, sk), pk) = v
βγ′




i as desired (taking
γ as βγ′). Thus the simulation of DEnc can be done.
3. To ensure completeness and prevent over-counting or under-counting, we need
to run CollRes on the complement query range R{. Since our functional encryp-
tion scheme FE only supports high dimensional rectangular ranges, we have to
divide range R{ into multiple high dimensional rectangular ranges, and then run
CollRes on each of them.
4. The (2d+ 1) invocations of CollRes can be executed in parallel. As a result, the
round complexity of our scheme is exactly 1.
5. In Step 2 of ProVer, in the extreme case that R` = ∅, Alice can save the
execution of CollRes on range R`, since Alice can predict the genuine result
(ζ` = accept, X` = 0,Ψ1 = Ψ2 = Ψ3 = Ψ4 = 1 ∈ G˜).
6. The complement set of rectangular range [a1, b1]× [a2, b2]× . . .× [ad, bd] ⊂ [Z]d
can be partitioned into 2d number of rectangular ranges: [a1, b1]× [a2, b2]× . . .×
[1, a` − 1] and [a1, b1]× [a2, b2]× . . .× [b` + 1,Z], ` ∈ [d].
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11.2 Security Analysis
11.2.1 Our main theorem
Theorem 11.1 (Main Theorem of Part II) Suppose Computational Diffie-Hellman
Assumption 4 and GKEA Assumption 5 hold, and BBG [BBG05] HIBE scheme is
IND-sID-CPA secure. Then the RC protocol E = (KGen,DEnc,ProVer) constructed in
Section 11.1 is VRC w.r.t. aggregate count function F (·, ·), where F (·, ·) is defined
in Section 9.1 (on page 127) and VRC (Verifiable Remote Computing protocol) is
defined in Definition 11 (on page 129). Namely, E is correct and sound w.r.t.
multidimensional aggregate count query.
The full proof is in appendix. In this section, we will brief the proof strategy
for the main theorem, and prove the security of the preliminary scheme given in
Chapter 8 as an illustration of our proof strategy.
11.2.2 Overview of Proof of Main Theorem
To process a query, our scheme (particularly the algorithm ProVer) invokes (2d +
1) instances of interactive algorithm CollRes. In each instance of CollRes, Bob is
supposed to return a 5-tuple (X,Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3,Ψ4) where X is the query result and
(Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3,Ψ4) is the proof, and Alice will verify whether the proof is valid w.r.t.
the query result. Furthermore, after all of (2d+1) invocations, Alice will perform one
additional verification (equation (11.2)) to ensure completeness and prevent over-
counting or under-counting. In order to fool Alice with a wrong query result, an
adversary has to provide a valid 5-tuple for each invocation of CollRes and pass the
equation (11.2). Therefore, an adversary against E = (KGen,DEnc,ProVer) is also an
adversary against E˜ = (KGen,DEnc,CollRes).
We consider various types of PPT adversaries against E or E˜ , which interacts with
Alice by playing the role of Bob and intends to output a wrong query result and a
forged but valid proof:
• Type I adversary: This adversary is not confined in any way in its attack
strategy and produces a 5-tuple (X,Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3,Ψ4) on a query range R.
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• Type II adversary: A restricted adversary which can produce the same forgery1
from the same input as Type I adversary, and can find N integers2 µi’s, 1 ≤






, where β and vi’s are as in Section 11.1.
• Type III adversary: The same as Type II adversary, with additional constraint:
µi = 0 for each ~xi ∈ D ∩R{.
• Type IV adversary: The same as Type III adversary, with additional constraint:
µi = 1 for each ~xi ∈ D ∩R.
Note that the Type II (or Type III, Type IV) adversary explicitly outputs {µ1, . . . , µN},
and implicitly outputs (X,Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3,Ψ4) which is exactly the output of the corre-
sponding Type I adversary. This is similar to the relationship between KEA extractor
and KEA adversary.
Basically, our proof framework is like this:
• Lemma A.2 (on page 188): The existence of Type I adversary implies the ex-
istence of Type II adversary, under GKEA Assumption 5, where Type I ad-
versary is a counterpart of adversary A in GKEA and Type II adversary is a
counterpart of the extractor A¯ in GKEA.
• Theorem A.3 (on page 192): If there exists a Type II adversary which is not
in Type III, then there exists a PPT algorithm to break the weak-IND-sID-CPA
security of the functional encryption scheme FE.
• Theorem A.4 (on page 200): If there exists a Type III adversary which is not
in Type IV, then there exists a PPT algorithm to break Discrete Log Problem.
• (Part of )Theorem 11.1 (on page 204): If there exists a Type IV adversary which
breaks our scheme, then there exists a PPT algorithm to break Assumption 4.
1This is possible, if the Type II adversary just invokes Type I adversary as a subroutine using
the same random coin.
2Note that µi can take negative integer value, and µi > 1 (µi < 1, respectively) corresponds to
the case of over-counting (under-counting, respectively) point ~xi.
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Informally, by combining all together, Theorem 11.1 states that if there exists a Type
I adversary which outputs result X and a valid proof, then X has to be equal to the
correct query result with o.h.p, under related computational assumptions. Note that
Lemma A.2 and Theorem A.3 focus on the partial scheme E˜ and Theorem A.4 and
Theorem 11.1 focus on the whole scheme E .
The structure of our proof or the relationships among all assumptions, lemmas
and theorems are shown as below. Note that the proof of correctness (Lemma 10.1)
does not rely on any computational assumption.
Assumption 4
BBG is IND-sID-CPA secure [BBG05]⇒ Theorem 10.2
Assumption 5⇒ Lemma A.1⇒ Lemma A.2
⇒ Theorem A.3






11.2.3 The Preliminary Scheme is Secure
In this subsection, we prove that the preliminary scheme described in Chapter 8 is
secure, following the proof framework in Section 11.2.2. This proof sketch serves as
an illustration of our proof strategy and as a warm up of our full proof for the main
scheme in appendix.
Theorem 11.2 Suppose Assumption 4 and Assumption 5 hold for the cyclic multi-
plicative group G of order p and Fs(·) is a random oracle. The preliminary scheme
described in Chapter 8 is a VRC w.r.t. function F (·, ·) as defined in Section 9.1,
under Definition 11. Namely, the preliminary scheme is correct and sound w.r.t. the
aggregate count function F .
Proof sketch of Theorem 11.2: The correctness part is straightforward. We just
focus on soundness.
Part I: The existence of Type I adversary implies the existence of Type II adversary,
under GKEA Assumption 5. Suppose there exists Type I adversary B against the
preliminary scheme. We try to construct a Type II adversary B¯ based on GKEA
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Assumption. We follow the proof framework for the statement that KEA3 implies
KEA1 by Bellare et al. [BP04a]. First, we construct a GKEA adversary A1 based
on the Type I adversary B:
Construction of GKEA adversary A1 based on the Type I adversary B
1. The input is {(ui, uβi ) : ui ∈ G, 1 ≤ i ≤ m}, where β ∈ Zp is unknown.
2. Choose two independent random elements R1, R2 ∈ G. There exist some unknown
θ, v0 ∈ G, such that R1 = θv0, R2 = vβ0 .
3. Let D = {x1, x2, . . . , xm+1} ⊂ [Z]d be the dataset. Let um+1 = 1. Define function
Fs: For any xi ∈ D, Fs(xi) = uiv0; for any x ∈ [Z]d \D, choose zx ∈ Z∗p at random
and set Fs(x) = u
zx
1 . Note that Fs(x)
β still can be computed, although β is unknown.
4. Invoke the preliminary scheme (Alice’s part) with parameters β, θ and function Fs.
Note that tag ti = (θFs(xi),Fs(xi)
β) = (uiR1, u
β
i R2) still can be computed without
knowing the values of θ, β,Fs(xi).
5. Invoke the adversary B (Bob’s part) to interact with Alice. For any query R made by
B, generate challenge-message from {Fs(x)β} in this way: choose ρ′ ∈ Z∗p at random,
and send {Fs(x)βρ′ : x ∈ R}. Note the actual random nonce ρ = βρ′ is unknown.


























By GKEA Assumption, there exists an extractor A¯1, which outputs {µi : 1 ≤ i ≤ m}






i . Then we can construct
an adversary B2 based on A¯1 which just outputs {µi : 1 ≤ i ≤ m + 1}, where
3Including the random coin.
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µm+1 = X−
∑m






















Part II: If there exists a Type II adversary which is not in Type III, then there exists
a PPT algorithm to break Computational Diffie Hellman Assumption 4.
Construction of adversary A2 against Computational Diffie Hellman Problem
1. The input is (v, va, u) ∈ G3 where a ∈ Zp. The goal is to find ua.
2. Define function Fs: For each xi ∈ D, choose zi at random from Zp and set Fs(xi) =
vzi ∈ G. For each xi ∈ [Z]d\D, choose zi at random from Zp and set Fs(xi) = vzi ∈ G.
3. Choose i∗ from [N ] at random and redefine Fs(xi∗): Fs(xi∗) = u.
4. Invoke the preliminary scheme (Alice’s part) with function Fs and invoke the Type II
adversary (Bob’s part) to interact with Alice. The adversary’s adaptive queries can
be answered in the same way as in Step 5 of algorithm A1.
5. Let R be the adversary’s challenging query range. If xi∗ ∈ R, abort and fail. Other-
wise, generate challenge-message with random nonce ρ = a: the value Fs(xi)
a = (va)zi
for xi ∈ R can be computed, although a is unknown.
6. Let (X,Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3, µ1, . . . , µN ) be the output of adversary. If µi∗ 6= 0, then compute
ϕ as below and output ϕµ
−1
i∗ (This is the success case).
ϕ← Ψ3∏i 6=i∗
1≤i≤N Fs(xi)aµi
Otherwise, abort and fail.
Let S# = {i : µi 6= 0, xi ∈ D ∩ R{}. Since the adversary is not in Type III,
S# 6= ∅. It is easy to verify that, in the success case, i.e. when the adversary’s output
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pass Alice’s verifications and Ψ2 =
∏N
i=1 Fs(xi)




a = ua. Since the index i∗ is uniformly random in [N ] and tags for
all N points are identically distributed, there is non-negligible probability that the
success case will be reached, and thus the value of ua can be found.
Part III: If there exists a Type III adversary which is not in Type IV, then there
exists a PPT algorithm to break Discrete Log Assumption.
Construction of adversary A3 against Discrete Log Problem
1. The input is (v, va) ∈ G2. The goal is to find a ∈ Zp.
2. Define function Fs: For each xi ∈ D, choose yi, zi at random from Zp and set Fs(xi) =
(va)yi · vzi ∈ G; otherwise, set Fs(x) to a random number in G.
3. Invoke the preliminary scheme (Alice’s part) with function Fs and invoke the Type
III adversary (Bob’s part) to interact with Alice. The adversary’s adaptive queries
can be answered in the same way as in the preliminary scheme. Note the simulator
has all of private key.
4. Let R be the challenging query range. Let (X,Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3, {µi : xi ∈ D ∩R}) be the
output of adversary for range R and let (Xˆ, Ψˆ1, Ψˆ2, Ψˆ3, {µi : xi ∈ D ∩R{}) be the
output of adversary for the complement range R{.

















6. Since the adversary is not Type IV, there exists some i, such that µi 6= 1. Conse-
quently, a univariable equation in unknown a of order 1 can be formed from the above
equation. Solve this equation to get root a′ and output a′.
Note that Computational Diffie Hellman Assumption 4 implies Discrete Log Assump-
tion.
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Part IV: If there exists a Type IV adversary which breaks our scheme, then there
exists a PPT algorithm to break Assumption 4. Given input (u, uβ, vβ), we can con-
struct an algorithm to find v. Choose a random number R. There exists some θ,
such that R = θv. Similar as the construction of GKEA adversary A1 in Part I,
from input (u, uβ, θv, vβ), we can simulate the preliminary scheme (Alice’s part). Let




3, {µi : xi ∈ D ∩ R}) be an
output of a Type IV adversary on query R and let (X,Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3, {µi : xi ∈ D∩R})














= Ψ2 and Ψ2 =
∏
xi∈D∩R Fs(xi)






= θ. As a result, we find the value of v: v = R
θ
.
Combining the results in Part I, II, III and IV, we conclude that no efficient
adversary against the preliminary scheme can output a wrong result and forged a
valid proof. In other words, the preliminary scheme is sound. uunionsq
11.3 Performance
In the setup phase, the computation complexity on Alice’s side is O(dN logZ) and
the dominant step is Step 3 of DEnc in Section 11.1. In the query phase, the com-
munication overhead (in term of bits) per query is O(d2 log2Z): (1) In CollRes, the
communication overhead is dominated by the size of challenge-message ~δ, which is
in O(d log2Z), i.e. O(logZ) decryption keys for each dimension, and each decryp-
tion key of size O(logZ); (2) There are O(d) invocations of CollRes to process one
query. Computation complexity on Bob’s side is O(dN logZ) (bilinear map opera-
tions): (1) In CollRes, O(d|D ∩R| logZ) computation is required for query range R
and the dominant computation step is Step B1 of CollRes in Section 11.1; (2) In total,∑2d
`=0O(d|D∩R`| logZ) = O(dN logZ), where {R` : ` ∈ [0, 2d]} is a partition of the
domain [Z]d. The computation complexity per query on Alice’s side is O(d2 log2Z)
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(group multiplications). The dominant computation step is Step A1 of CollRes in Sec-
tion 11.1. The storage overhead on Bob’s side, is O(dN). The storage cost on Alice’s
side, i.e. the size of key and DA, is O(d+ `), which can be reduced to O(1) (precisely
O(1) number of seeds and each seed with length equal to the security parameter λ)
using a pseudorandom function.
Chapter 12
Authenticating Other Types of
Queries—Min,Max,Median and
Range-Selection Queries
In this chapter, we apply the authentication scheme for count query proposed in the
previous Chapter 11 as a blackbox, in order to authenticate other types of queries,
including aggregate min/max/median and non-aggregate range-selection queries. The
extended schemes require only O(d2 log2Z) communication overhead for each type of
queries which are supported.
To distinguish different queries, in this chapter, we denote an aggregate count
query with multidimensional rectangular range R with notation Count(R).
12.1 Min and Max
Min and Max queries can be authenticated in a similar way. We only elaborate the
authentication method for Min query as below.
A min query Min(R, ι) with query range R and dimension ι ∈ [d], asks for the
minimum coordinate value along the ι-th dimension among all data points within
D ∩ R, i.e. min{~x[ι] : ~x ∈ D ∩ R}. We find that Min query can be converted to
Count query. The conversion is based on the below Proposition 1:
153
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Proposition 1 For any finite set S of numbers,
c = minS ⇔ c ∈ S ∧ |S| = |{x : x ∈ S ∧ x ≥ c}|. (12.1)
Suppose Alice asks Bob for the minimum coordinate value along the ι-th dimension
of points within range R. Bob returns a data point ~x, such that ~x[ι] is the minimum
in the set S of coordinate values along the ι-th dimension of all points within range
R (i.e. S = {~x[ι] : ~x ∈ R ∩D}). Meanwhile, Bob also sends a proof to show that
~x ∈ D. Then Alice issues two Count queries to Bob: (1) Count(R), i.e. the size




[Z]ι−1 × [c,Z]× [Z]d−ι)) where c = ~x[ι], i.e. the size of
set {x : x ∈ S∧x ≥ c}. Bob is expected to return the two count numbers with proofs
following the scheme in previous Chapter 11. Alice believes c is the minimum value if
all proofs are valid and the two count nubmers are equal. The interactive algorithm
between Alice and Bob is showed as below.
Authenticating Query Min(R, ι)
1. Alice sends (R, ι) to Bob.
2. Bob finds ~x∗ = arg min~x∈D∩R ~x[ι] and sends ~x∗ to Alice.
3. Alice issues a count query Count({~x∗}) with range {~x∗} to Bob and gets authenti-
cated query result N0.
4. Alice sets c = ~x∗[ι] and finds the range Rc = R ∩
(
[Z]ι−1 × [c,Z]× [Z]d−ι).
5. Alice issues two count queries Count(R) and Count(Rc) to Bob and gets authen-
ticated results N1 and N2.
6. Alice accepts c as the minimum, if all verifications succeed and N0 ≥ 1 and N1 = N2.
Proposition 1 and our main Theorem 11.1 in Part II of this dissertation, imply
the following Corollary 12.1:
Corollary 12.1 The above extended scheme is a VRC (Verifiable Remote Computing
protocol) w.r.t. Min query, i.e. it is correct and sound to authenticate Min query.
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12.2 Median
Median can also be converted into Count. Quartile or percentile queries can be
handled in a similar way.
Proposition 2 Let S be a finite set of numbers.
c is the median in set S ⇔
c ∈ S ∧ |{x : x ∈ S ∧ x ≤ c}| ≥ d |S|
2
e ∧ |{x : x ∈ S ∧ x ≥ c}| ≥ d |S|
2
e (12.2)
Suppose Alice asks Bob for the median coordinate value along the ι-th dimension of
points within range R. Bob returns a data point ~x, such that ~x[ι] is the median in
the set S of coordinate values along the ι-th dimension of all points within range R
(i.e. S = {~x[ι] : ~x ∈ D ∩ R}). Meanwhile, Bob also sends a proof to show that
~x ∈ D. Then Alice issues three Count queries to Bob: (1) Count(R), i.e. the size




[Z]ι−1 × [c,Z]× [Z]d−ι)) where c = ~x[ι], i.e. the size of
set {x : x ∈ S ∧ x ≥ c}; (3) Count (R ⋂ ([Z]ι−1 × [1, c]× [Z]d−ι)) i.e. the size of
set {x : x ∈ S ∧ x ≤ c}. Bob is expected to return the three count numbers N1, N2
and N3 with proofs following the scheme in previous Chapter 11. Alice believes c is
the median value if all proofs are valid and N2 ≥ dN12 e and N3 ≥ dN12 e.
The interactive algorithm between Alice and Bob is showned as below. Note that
when the size of S is even, there are two medians. For simplicity of presentation of
the algorithm, we request Bob to return either one of the two medians, instead of
both.
Authenticating Query Median(R, ι)
1. Alice sends (R, ι) to Bob.
2. Bob finds ~x∗ such that ~x∗[ι] is a median among {~x[ι] : ~x ∈ D} and sends ~x∗ to Alice.
3. Alice issues a count query Count({~x∗}) with range {~x∗} to Bob and gets authenti-
cated query result N0.
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4. Alice sets c = ~x∗[ι] and finds the range R+c = R∩
(
[Z]ι−1 × [c,Z]× [Z]d−ι) and range
R−c = R ∩
(
[Z]ι−1 × [1, c]× [Z]d−ι).
5. Alice issues three count queries Count(R), Count(R+c ) and Count(R
−
c ) to Bob
and gets authenticated results N1, N2 and N3.
6. Alice accepts c as the median, if all verifications succeed and N0 ≥ 1 and N2 ≥ dN12 e
and N3 ≥ dN12 e.
Proposition 2 and Theorem 11.1 for count query, imply the following Corol-
lary 12.2:
Corollary 12.2 The above extended scheme is a VRC (Verifiable Remote Computing
protocol) w.r.t. Median query, i.e. it is correct and sound to authenticate Median
query.
12.3 Range Selection
With the help of an aggregate signature scheme (e.g. BLS signature [BLS04,BGLS03]),
it is straightforward to extend our scheme for count query to authenticate range
selection query with multidimensional rectangular range R, which is denoted with
RangeSelect(R) and asks for the set {~x : ~x ∈ D ∩ R}. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first solution that authenticates multidimensional range selec-
tion query with sublinear communication overhead in the worst case and polynomial
storage on Bob’s side.
We assume the dataset D is a set of distinct points. The authentication scheme
for range selection query is as follows:
Authenticating Query RangeSelect(R)
1. In the setup, Alice generates a signature Sig(~x) for each data point ~x ∈ D using an
aggregate signature scheme, and sends all signatures to Bob.
2. To answer a range selection query with range R, Bob finds the set S = {~x : ~x ∈ D∩R}
and computes an aggregated signature Sig(S) for set S from signatures Sig(~x)’s for
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point ~x ∈ D ∩ R, using the aggregate signature scheme. Bob sends (S, Sig(S)) to
Alice.
3. Alice verifies: (1) Is S a set of distinct points? (2) Is S a subset of query range R?
(3) Is Sig(S) a valid signature for S?
4. Alice issues a count query with range R to Bob using our scheme presented in Sec-
tion 11.1 and gets authenticated result N0.
5. Alice verifies whether |S| = N0.
6. Alice accepts S as the query result, if all verifications succeed.
We remark that the extra aggregate signature for each data point is actually
unnecessary, since our authentication tag can take the role of aggregate signature in
this particular application.
Corollary 12.3 The above extended scheme is a VRC (Verifiable Remote Computing




In this dissertation, we studied two problems in verifiable cloud computing: proofs of
storage and verifiable outsourced database. We have constructed efficient solutions
to these problems, by devising new homomorphic cryptographic methods.
Proofs of Storage.
In this first part of this dissertation, we designed three efficient solutions POS1,
POS2 and POS3 to proofs of storage problem, based on some underlying linearly
homomorphic authentication methods. Each of these three solutions enables a user
Alice to remotely and reliably verify the integrity of her data files stored in a cloud
storage server Bob, without trusting in Bob and without retrieving the files. All
of these three solutions require only O(λ) communication, storage and computation
cost on Alice’s side, independent on the size of the file stored in the cloud storage.
Furthermore, in both POS2 and POS3, the storage overhead (due to error erasure
encoding and authentication information) is only a fraction (e.g. 2% or 3%) of the
original file size, and the latency for one verification is within one second independent
on the file size, confirmed by empirical study and analysis. We provided full security
proofs for all of three solutions. The proposed predicate-homomorphic MAC scheme
may have independent interests.
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Verifiable Outsourced Database.
In the second part, we proposed a new functional encryption scheme. This functional
encryption scheme allows a third party, with a delegation key which is generated
on the fly, to compute a pre-determined two-input one-way function value from a
ciphertext, where the first input is the corresponding plaintext and the second input is
secretly embedded in the delegation key, without knowing the value of of the plaintext.
We applied the proposed functional encryption scheme to construct a scheme to
authenticate aggregate range query over static multidimensional outsourced dataset,
and the communication complexity (in term of bits) is O(d2 log2Z) (d is the dimension
and each data point is in domain [Z]d). Our solution for aggregate count query leads
to solutions for aggregate min/max/median and non-aggregate range selection queries
with similar complexities.
The proposed functional encryption scheme and the idea of implementing func-
tional encryption by exploiting polymorphic property of existing encryption schemes
may have independent interests.
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We restate the BBG HIBE scheme proposed by Boneh et al. [BBG05], to make this
paper self-contained. Let p be a λ bits safe prime, and e : G×G → G˜ be a bilinear
map, where the orders of G and G˜ are both p. The HIBE scheme contains four
algorithms (Setup,KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt), which are described as follows.
Setup(`)
To generate system parameters for an HIBE of maximum depth `, select a
random generator g ∈ G, a random α ∈ Zp, and set g1 = gα. Next, pick
random elements g2, g3, h1, . . . , h` ∈ G. The public parameters and the master
key are
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The private key for id can be generated incrementally, given a private key for





















= (K0, K1,Wk, . . . ,W`)
be the private key for id|k−1. To generate did, pick a random t ∈ Zp and output
did =
(
K0 ·W Ikk ·
(




, K1 · gt, Wk+1 · htk+1, . . . ,W` · ht`
)
.
This private key is a properly distributed private key for id = (I1, . . . , Ik) for
r = r′ + t ∈ Zp.
Encrypt(params, id,M ; s)
















Consider an identity id = (I1, . . . , Ik). To decrypt a given ciphertext CT =
(A,B,C) using the private key did = (K0, K1,Wk+1, . . . ,W`), output
A · e(K1, C)
e(B,K0)
.
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A.2 Two Propositions
Some analysis in our proof is based on the following propositions (We do not claim
the discovery of Proposition 3 or Proposition 4.)
Proposition 3 If event A implies event B, then Pr[A] ≤ Pr[B].
Proof : Since A⇒ B, we have Pr[¬A ∨B] = 1 and Pr[A ∧ ¬B] = 0. Therefore,
Pr[A] = Pr[A ∧ ¬B] + Pr[A ∧B] = 0 + Pr[A ∧B] = Pr[A|B]Pr[B] ≤ Pr[B].
uunionsq
















A.3 Proof of Lemma 10.1
Lemma 10.1 The functional encryption scheme FE described in Section 10.3 satisfies
these properties:
(a) For any (pk, sk) ← f Setup(1λ, d,Z), for any message Msg ∈ Z∗p, for any point
~x ∈ [Z]d, for any rectangular range R ⊆ [Z]d, if CT ← f Enc(Msg, ~x, sk) and
~δ ← f KeyGen(R, ρ, sk), then
f Dec(CT, ~x, R, ~δ, pk) =
{
fρ(Msg) (if ~x ∈ R)
⊥ (otherwise) (A.3)
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(b) For any (pk, sk) ← f Setup(1λ, d,Z), for any message Msg ∈ Z∗p, for any point
~x ∈ [Z]d, for any rectangular range R ⊆ [Z]d, for any y ∈ G˜, if CT ←
f Enc(Msg, ~x, sk) and ~δ ← f KeyGen(R, ρ, sk), then
f Dec(f Mult(CT, y, pk), ~x, R, ~δ, pk) =
{
y · fρ(Msg) (if ~x ∈ R)
⊥ (otherwise)
(A.4)
Proof of Lemma 10.1: We observe that the BBG HIBE scheme [BBG05] satisfies
the polymorphic property: An encryption of a message M can be viewed as the
encryption of another message M̂ under different key. Precisely, let CT and ĈT be
defined as follows, we have CT = ĈT:




hI11 · · ·hIkk · g3
)s )
under key: params = (g, g1, g2, g3, h1, . . . , h`,Ω = e(g1, g2)), master-key = g
α
2
ĈT = Encrypt(p̂arams, id, M̂ ; sz) =
(
Ωsz · M̂, ĝsz,
(
ĥI11 · · · ĥIkk · ĝ3
)sz )
,
under key: p̂arams = (ĝ, g1, g2, ĝ3, ĥ1, . . . , ĥ`,Ω = e(g1, g2)), ̂master-key = gαz2
(A.5)




, M̂ = MΩs(1−z), ĝ = gz
−1 mod p, ĝ3 =
gz
−1 mod p
3 and ĥi = h
z−1 mod p
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ `. To be self-contained, the description of
this BBG HIBE scheme [BBG05] is given in Appendix A.1. One can verify the above
equality easily.
Proof of Lemma 1(a):
Let (pk, sk) ← f Setup(1λ), message Msg ∈ Z∗p, point ~x ∈ [Z]d, R be a d-
dimensional rectangular range, and ρ ∈ Z∗p. Let CT ← f Enc(Msg, ~x, sk), ~δ ←
f KeyGen(R, ρ, sk), and y ∈ G˜.
We consider dimension j ∈ [d] and apply the polymorphic property of BBG scheme
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In case ~x ∈ R. If ~x ∈ R, then the HIBE decryption will succeed in the
process of f Dec (Section 10.3). Note that during decryption for dimension j, we
use decryption key derived from master-keyρτj . Let t˜j be as in Step 2(d) of f Dec for
decrypting ciphertext CT. We have
t˜j = M̂ = σjΩ
sj(1−τjρ), j ∈ [d]. (A.6)
Combining all d dimensions, and applying the two equalities (see algorithm f Enc
in Section 10.3) Msg = −∑dj=1 sjτj mod p and ∏dj=1 σj = Ω−∑dj=1 sj we have,





























In case ~x 6∈ R. Let R = A1 ×A2 . . . ×Ad as in Step 1 of f Dec. If ~x 6∈ R,
then for some dimension j ∈ [d], ~x[j] 6∈ Aj, and f Dec will output ⊥ (Step 2 of f Dec
in Section 10.3).
Proof of Lemma 1(b):
In case ~x ∈ R. Check the decryption algorithm Decrypt of BBG HIBE (See
Appendix A.1), it is easy to verify that: For any η ∈ G˜, if Decrypt(did, (A,B,C))
outputs M , then Decrypt(did, (A · η,B,C)) will output η ·M .
Let η1, . . . , ηd be as in Step 2 of f Mult in Section 10.3. Similar as the argument
for Lemma 10.1(a), for dimension j ∈ [d], we have ( t˜j is as in equation (A.6) and t˜′j
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is the counterpart of t˜j for decrypting ciphertext f Mult(CT, y, pk) )
t˜′j = ηjM̂ = ηj t˜j.
Combining all d dimensions and applying the equation
∏d
j=1 ηj = y (See Step 2 of
f Mult) and the result in Lemma 10.1(a), we have















· f Dec(CT, ~x, R, ~δ, pk)
= y · fρ(Msg).
In case ~x 6∈ R. The same argument for the case ~x 6∈ R of Lemma 10.1(a)
applies. uunionsq
A.4 Proof of Theorem 10.2
Theorem 10.2 Suppose there exists a weak-IND-sID-CPA adversary AFE, which
runs in time tFE and has non-negligible advantage  against the functional encryption
scheme FE with one chosen delegation key query and Naq chosen anonymous delega-
tion key queries and Nenc chosen encryption queries. Then there exists an IND-sID-
CPA adversary ABBG, which has advantage 2d against the BBG HIBE scheme [BBG05]
with O(d`) chosen private key queries and zero chosen decryption query, and runs in
time tFE +O(d` · tmax · (Naq +Nenc)), where tmax is the maximum time for a random
sampling (within a space of size at most p), a BBG encryption Encrypt, or a BBG key
generation KeyGen.
Proof :
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The proof idea.
Let AFE be the weak-IND-sID-CPA adversary against the functional encryption scheme
FE as in Theorem 10.2. We try to construct an IND-sID-CPA adversary ABBG against
BBG based on AFE: Choose two random messages m0 and m1, and send them to the
BBG challenger. After receiving the challenge ciphertext CT for message mb where
b ∈ {0, 1}, guess b = 0 and construct a FE challenge (f1(Msg0), f1(Msg1),CTFE) based
on the BBG challenge CT. If the adversary AFE wins the weak-IND-sID-CPA game,
then output a guess b′ = 0; otherwise output a guess b′ = 1.
We argue that if indeed b = 0, then the forged FE challenge is valid, and the
hypothesis is applicable: AFE wins with probability 1/2 + . If b = 1, the forged FE
challenge is invalid, we cannot apply the hypothesis. However, in this case the forged
FE challenge is independent on the value of b. Hence, in case of b = 1, AFE wins with
probability exactly 1/2.
Recall that the BBG HIBE scheme is (Setup,KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) and the
functional encryption scheme FE is (f Setup, f Enc, f KeyGen, f Dec, f Mult). Now let
us construct the IND-sID-CPA adversary ABBG against BBG. ABBG will simulate the
weak-IND-sID-CPA game where ABBG takes the role of challenger and invokes AFE in
the hypothesis as the adversary.
Construction of IND-sID-CPA adversary ABBG against BBG HIBE scheme
based on AFE
BBG Commit :
FE Commit : Adversary AFE chooses a random point ~x∗ = (x1, . . . , xd) ∈ [Z]d.
AFE sends ~x∗ to FE challenger ABBG as the target identity.





to BBG challenger CBBG.
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BBG Setup : BBG challenger CBBG runs setup algorithm Setup, and give ABBG the re-
sulting system parameter params, keeping the master-key private.
BBG Phase 1 : Adversary ABBG does nothing.
BBG Challenge : Adversary ABBG chooses m0,m1 at random from the plaintext space
G˜, and sends (m0,m1) to the challenger CBBG. CBBG picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}
and sends the challenge ciphertext CT = Encrypt(params, id∗,mb; s) to ABBG.
BBG Phase 2 :
FE Setup : ABBG chooses d random elements τ1, . . . , τd from Z∗p and let ~τ =
(τ1, . . . , τd). Let (p,G, G˜, e,Ω) be a part of params, where p is a prime, both
G and G˜ are cyclic multiplicative group of order p, e : G×G→ G˜ is a bilinear
map, and Ω ∈ G˜. Let pk = (p,G, G˜, e,Ω) and sk = (pk, params,master-key, ~τ ).
ABBG sends pk to AFE.
Note: ABBG does not know master-key.
FE Challenge : The FE challenger ABBG chooses a random bit a ∈ {0, 1} and a
random message Msg1−a from the message space Z∗p. ABBG will decide Msga
and generate the challenge ciphertext CTFE in this way:
1. Parse the BBG challenge ciphertext as CT = (A,B,C), where A = Ωsmb.
2. Choose (d − 1) random elements s1, . . . , sξ−1, sξ+1, . . . , sd (i.e. excluding
sξ) from Z∗p.









4. For each j ∈ [d] and j 6= ξ, encrypt σj under identity IDj(xj) with random
coin sj to obtain ciphertext ~cj as follows
~cj ← Encrypt(params, IDj(xj), σj ; sj). (A.7)
5. Define ~cξ based on the BBG challenge ciphertext CT = (Ω
smb, B,C):
~cξ = (Ω
smb ·m−10 · σξ, B, C).
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6. Define Msga = −
∑
j∈[d] sj · τj (mod p), where unknown sξ ∈ Zp is defined
by Ωsξ = Ωsmb · m−10 . Although the value Msga is unknown since sξ is






)τξ · Ω−∑1≤j≤dj 6=ξ sj ·τj
ABBG computes f1(Msg1−a) = ΩMsg1−a .
7. Set the challenge ciphertext to CTFE = (~c1, . . . ,~cd), and send (CTFE, f1(Msg0),
f1(Msg1)) to AFE.
FE Learning Phase :
1. AFE issues a delegation key query (R, ρ), where ~x∗ 6∈ R and R = A1 ×
A2 . . . ×Ad ⊆ [Z]d: If xξ ∈ Aξ, then ABBG aborts and outputs a random
bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} (Denote this event as E1). Otherwise, simulate the procedure
of f KeyGen:
(a) The private key is sk = (pk, params,master-key, ~τ = (τ1, . . . , τd)), where
ABBG has only pk, params and ~τ , and does not know master-key (which
is kept securely by the BBG challenger CBBG).
(b) For each j ∈ [d], generate a set δj in this way:
• For each identity id ∈ IdSetj(Aj), issue a private key query with
identity id to BBG challenger CBBG and get reply did.
Note: The BBG private key query (id) is valid, i.e. id 6= id∗ and id
is not a prefix of id∗. This is implied by the following two properties
satisfied by our constructions of IDι and IdSetι in Section 10.2: (1)
For any i, j ∈ [d], x, y ∈ [Z], if IDi(x) and IDj(y) share a non-empty
prefix, then i = j; (2) For any ∈ [a, b] ⊆ [Z], iff x ∈ [a, b], there
exits an identity id in the set IdSetj([a, b]), such that id is a prefix of
identity IDj(x).
• For each identity id ∈ IdSetj(Aj), parse the key did as (K0,K1,Υk, . . . ,Υ`)






k , . . . ,Υ
ρτj
` ).
• Set δj ← {d′id : id ∈ IdSetj(Aj)}.
(c) Send ~δ = (δ1, δ2, . . . , δd) to AFE as the delegation key w.r.t. (R, ρ).
Note: AFE can make at most one delegation key query.
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2. AFE issues an anonymous delegation key query (R): Choose a random
element Z ∈ G˜. For each anonymous delegation key query (R), choose
ρ ∈ Z∗p at random, run the algorithm f KeyGen(R, ρ, sk′), where sk′ =
(pk, params, Z, ~τ ) (i.e. taking Z as the master key), and get output ~δ. Send
~δ to AFE as the delegation key w.r.t. R.
Note: (1) ABBG can answer anonymous delegation key query without the
help of BBG challenger CBBG. (2) There exists an unknown ω, such that
Z = master-keyω. The generated delegation key ~δ corresponds to range R
and (unknown) function key ρω, where ρω is uniformly distributed in Z∗p as
desired.
3. AFE issues an encryption key query (Msg, ~x): Run the encryption algorithm:
C ← f Enc(Msg, ~x, sk) and send the resulting ciphertext C to AFE as the
reply.
Note: ABBG can run algorithm f Enc, since it requires only pk, params, ~τ .
FE Guess : Adversary AFE outputs a bit a′ ∈ {0, 1}.
BBG Guess : If a = a′, adversary ABBG outputs b′ = 0. Otherwise, ABBG outputs b′ = 1.
The constructed BBG adversary ABBG made O(d`) private key query and zero
decryption query to the BBG challenger CBBG. Let id∗ = IDξ(xξ) = (I1, . . . , I`) ∈(
Z∗p
)`
. Recall that the two BBG ciphertexts CT and ~cξ are










sξ · σξ, B, C) =
(
Ωsξ · σξ, gs,
(





where Ωsξ = Ωsmb ·m−10 . If b = 0, then sξ = s and ~cξ is a valid BBG encryption of σξ
under identity IDξ(xξ) with random coin sξ. Consequently, the FE scheme simulated
by ABBG is identical to a real one from the view of AFE (even if AFE is computationally
unbounded). If b = 1, then sξ is independent on s. As a result, in the FE scheme
simulated by ABBG, the challenging ciphertext CTFE is independent on the value of
Msga. Note that adversary AFE does not know m0,m1, params.
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Let the d-dimensional range R = A1 × . . .×Ad. Define set S#:
S# = {j ∈ [d] : ~x∗[j] 6∈ Aj}
Since ~x∗ 6∈ R, S# is not empty and |S#| ≥ 1. We have





Note that adversary ABBG has two terminal cases: (1) If event E1 occurs, ABBG
outputs a random bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}. (2) If event E1 does not occur, ABBG outputs b′ = 0
iff AFE outputs a′ = a.
In case of E1: Conditional on event E1, Pr[b = b
′] = 1/2.
In case of ¬E1: Suppose event E1 does not occur. Then b′ = 0⇔ a = a′ and b′ =
1 ⇔ a 6= a′. Applying the Proposition 3, we have Pr[b′ = 0|b = 0] = Pr[a = a′|b = 0]
and Pr[b′ = 1|b = 1] = Pr[a 6= a′|b = 1].
As a result, conditional on event ¬E1,
Pr[b = b′] = Pr[b = b′ = 0] + Pr[b = b′ = 1]
= Pr[b = 0]Pr[b′ = 0|b = 0] + Pr[b = 1]Pr[b′ = 1|b = 1]






















Combining the two cases (E1 and ¬E1), we obtain the advantage of ABBG against


























The adversary ABBG wins the game with probability at least 1/2+ /(2d) using O(d`)
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private key queries and running in time tFE + O(d` · tmax · (Naq +Nenc)), where tmax
is the maximum time for random sampling (within a space of size at most p), BBG
encryption Encrypt, or BBG key generation KeyGen, and Naq (Nenc, respectively) is the
number of anonymous delegation key queries (encryption key queries, respectively)
made by AFE. uunionsq
A.5 A valid proof should be generated from points
within dataset D
The notion that a valid proof is essentially generated from points (and their tags)
within the dataset D, is formulized by Lemma A.2. We prove Lemma A.2 in two
steps: first we show that the GKEA Assumption 5 implies Lemma A.1 (which states
that an alternative form of GKEA problem is hard); then we derive Lemma A.2
from Lemma A.1.
We remark that both the proof of Lemma A.1 in Appendix A.5.1 and proof of
Lemma A.2 in Appendix A.5.2 follow the proof framework for statement that KEA3
implies KEA in [BP04a]. Their proof can be outlined as follows: Given any ad-
versary algorithm AKEA, construct an adversary algorithm AKEA3. Then applying
KEA3 Assumption, there exists an extractor algorithm A¯KEA3. Based on A¯KEA3,
construct extractor algorithm A¯KEA for AKEA. The key point is how to convert
the input/output between A¯KEA (AKEA, respectively) and A¯KEA3 (AKEA3, respec-
tively).
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A.5.1 Lemma A.1 and Proof
Lemma A.1 Suppose Assumption 5 holds. For any PPT algorithm A, there exists





Sm+1 ← {(θvi, vβi ) : i ∈ [m+ 1], vi $←− G˜, θ $←− G˜, β $←− Z∗p}
(Ψ1,Ψ2, X)← A(Sm+1; r);





)β ∧ Ψ2 6= ∏m+1j=1 (vβj )µj

≤ ν2(λ), (A.8)
where the probability is taken over all random coins used, m is polynomial in λ and
function ν2(·) is as in Assumption 5.
Proof of Lemma A.1: Let adversary A be as in Lemma A.1. We construct a
GKEA adversary A1 based on an adversary A.
Construction of GKEA adversary A1: Based on an adversary A
1. The input is Wm = {(ui, uβi ) ∈ G˜2 : 1 ≤ i ≤ m} and the random coin is r1.
2. Choose two independent random elements R1, R2 ∈ G˜2 based on the random coin r1.
There exists some unknown θ, vm+1 ∈ G˜, such that R1 = θvm+1 and R2 = vβm+1.
3. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, define vi = uivm+1 and compute θvi = ui(θvm+1) = uiR1 and
vβi = (uivm+1)
β = uβi R2. Let Sm+1 = {(θvi, vβi ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ m+ 1}.
4. Invoke the adversaryA with random coin r derived from r1: (Ψ1,Ψ2, X)← A(Sm+1; r).
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According to Assumption 5, there exists an extractor A¯1 for the adversary A1,
such that AdvGKEAA1,A¯1 is negligible. Now we construct an extractor A¯ for A based on
A¯1.
Construction of extractor A¯ for A: Based on GKEA extractor A¯1
1. The input is Sm+1 = {(θvi, vβi ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ m+ 1}. The random coin is (r, r¯).





. Let Wm = {(ui, uβi ) :
1 ≤ i ≤ m}.





Note: We can represent the random coin r1 used by A1 as (R1, R2, r).
4. Invoke extractor A¯1 with random coin (r1, r¯1 = r¯): (µ1, . . . , µm)← A¯1(Wm; r1, r¯1).
5. Define µm+1 = X −
∑m

































vβµii = Ψ2. (A.10)




i , combining with equation (A.9) and equa-





= Ψ2 ⇒ Uβ1 = U2 ⇒ U2 =
m∏
i=1
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As a result,(















Note that the implications in equation (A.9) and equation (A.10) are always true,




i is true only with certain
probability.
Applying the Proposition 3 in Appendix A.2, we have
Pr
[
















= 1− AdvLem A.1A,A¯ .
Hence,
AdvLem A.1A,A¯ ≤ AdvGKEAA1,A¯1 ≤ ν2.
uunionsq
A.5.2 Lemma A.2 and Proof
Lemma A.2 Suppose Assumption 5 holds. For any PPT algorithm A, there exists a
PPT algorithm A¯, such that AdvLem A.2A,A¯ (1λ) ≤ ν2(λ), where the advantage AdvLem A.2A,A¯









{µi : i ∈ [N ]} ← A¯(viewE˜A) :







where vβi is the second component of tag ~ti for data point ~xi ∈ D (See Step 2 of DEnc
in Section 11.1).
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Proof of Lemma A.2: Let A be any PPT adversary against scheme E˜ = (KGen,
DEnc, CollRes). We construct a PPT adversary B against Lemma A.1 based on A.
Adversary B against Lemma A.1: Based on A
1. The input is Sm = {(θvj , vβj ) ∈ G˜2 : j ∈ [m]}. The random coin used in this algorithm
is r.
2. Simulate Alice in the experiment ExpE˜A.
(a) Invoke adversary A with a random coin derived from r. A chooses a set D =
{~xi ∈ [Z]d : i ∈ [N ]} of N = m d-dimensional data points. Note: If N > m, B
can generate more tuples (θvj , v
β
j ) for j = m+1, . . . , N from Sm. For simplicity,
we just assume N = m.
(b) Simulate KGen:
i. Invoke f Setup(1λ) to obtain public/private key pair (pk, sk).
ii. Choose γ′ at random from Z∗p. B does not know the values of θ, β.
(c) Simulate DEnc:
i. Choose N random elements W1, . . . ,WN from Z∗p.







iii. For each i ∈ [N ], encrypt messageWi under point ~xi: CT′i ← f Enc(Wi, ~xi, sk);
attach vβγ
′
i to ciphertext by applying the homomorphic property of the
functional encryption scheme: CTi ← f Mult(CT′i, vβγ
′
i , pk).
iv. Send DB = {D,T = {~ti : i ∈ [N ]},C = {CTi : i ∈ [N ]}, pk} to adversary
A.
(d) Simulate CollRes: For each query range Rj chosen by A during A’s learning
phase and challenging phase
i. (Step A1) Choose random nonce ρ ∈ Z∗p, generate delegation key ~δ ←
f KeyGen(Rj , ρ, sk), and send (Rj , ~δ) to adversary A.
ii. (Step A2) Do not perform verifications, after receiving reply from A.
3. Receive output (X,Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3,Ψ4) for the challenging query range R from A. Output
(X,Ψ1,Ψ2).
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Remarks on Algorithm B.
1. Adversary B has the private key sk, and can generate the challenge-message in
the same way as in CollRes in Section 11.1.
2. Adversary B has no knowledge of β or θ, and consequently cannot perform
verification as in CollRes.
3. The view of adversary A after interacting with the simulated scheme is iden-
tically distributed with the the view viewE˜A of A after interacting with the real
scheme in the experiment ExpE˜A.
(a) KGen: The simulator B generates key (pk, sk) in the same way as the real
scheme. The unknown secret key β ∈ Z∗p, θ ∈ G˜ and γ = (βγ′)−1 ∈ Z∗p
are independently and uniformly randomly distributed over corresponding
domains.
(b) DEnc: The dataset D is generated in the same way as in real experi-
ment. The tags T are identically distributed as in real experiment. The
ciphertexts C are generated in the same way as in real experiment. As a
result, DB = {D,T,C} that A received is identically distributed as in real
experiment.
(c) CollRes
i. Step A1: The simulator just follows the procedure in Section 11.1 with
key sk and random nonce ρ to execute this step.
ii. Step A2: Since the simulator does not know the values of secret key
(β, γ, θ), it cannot perform the verifications. However, according to
our scheme, the accept/reject decisions are always kept secret from
Bob (or adversary).
4. If A is a successful adversary, then its output will indeed pass all verifications
with non-negligible probability, although the simulator cannot perform the ac-
tual verifications and yet cannot know whether A succeeds or not in each single
attack instance.
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From the random coin r, B can simulate the experiment ExpE˜A and produce a view
viewr which is identically distributed as the view view
E˜
A produced by a real experiment.
In the other direction, information theoretically, the random coin r can be recovered
from the adversary’s view viewr, considering r as the collection of all (true) random
bits flipped in the simulation. Consequently, we can view viewr as an alternative
representation of random coin r.
By Lemma A.1, there exists a PPT algorithm B¯ such that AdvLem A.1B,B¯ ≤ ν2. We
construct an extractor A¯ for adversary A based on B¯.
Extractor A¯: Based on B¯
1. The input is viewE˜A, a state variable describing all random coins chosen and all message
accessed by A during interactions with E˜ in the experiment ExpE˜A.
2. Recover D,T,C from viewE˜A and construct a set SN ← {(θvi, vβi ) : i ∈ [N ]}, where
θvi and v
β
i are the first two components of tag
~ti ∈ T.
3. Invoke B on input SN with random coin viewE˜A. B extracts information from viewE˜A
and replays1 the interaction between Alice and Bob (i.e. the adversary A) in the
experiment ExpE˜A. Denote the output of experiment as (ζ,X, ~Ψ, view
E˜
A,D,R). Re-
cover the reply of A on the challenging query R from viewE˜A, and denote it with
(X,Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3,Ψ4). B outputs (X,Ψ1,Ψ2).
4. Let B¯ be the extractor such that AdvLem A.1B,B¯ ≤ ν2. Invoke B¯ on input SN using ran-
dom coin viewE˜A, and obtain output (µ1, . . . , µN ) from B¯. Output (Ψ1,Ψ2, X, µ1, . . . , µN ).
Note that according to the algorithm CollRes, ζ = accept implies that the ver-





(the first equality test in equation (11.4)). We
have














1Since A is invoked with the same random coin recovered from viewE˜A, its behaviors become
deterministic.
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Hence, by applying Proposition 3, we have
AdvLem A.2A,A¯ = Pr
















A.6 A valid proof should be generated from points
within intersection D ∩R
Theorem A.3 Suppose Assumption 4 and Assumption 5 hold, and FE scheme con-
structed in Section 10.3 is weak-IND-sID-CPA secure. For any PPT algorithm A, there
exists PPT algorithm A¯, such that both AdvLem A.2A,A¯ and AdvThm A.3A,A¯ are negligible,










({µi : i ∈ [N ]})← A¯(viewE˜A) :






∀~xi ∈ D ∩R{, µi = 0
 ,
where vβi is the second component of tag ~ti for data point ~xi ∈ D (See Step 2 of DEnc
in Section 11.1).
Proof of Theorem A.3:
The idea of proof. For any PPT algorithm A, applying Lemma A.2, let A¯ be
the PPT algorithm such that AdvLem A.2A,A¯ is negligible. Using proof of contradiction,
assume that AdvThm A.3A,A¯ is non-negligible (Hypothesis!). Based on A and A¯, we
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construct a PPT algorithm B, such that B breaks weak-IND-sID-CPA security of FE








where ν1 is as in Assumption 4 and Adv
weak-IND-sID-CPA
FE,B is defined in Section 10.4.2 The
contradiction implies that our hypothesis is wrong, and thus Theorem A.3 is proved.
weak-IND-sID-CPA adversary B against FE scheme
Let E˜ = (KGen,DEnc,CollRes). We construct the adversary B, which simulates the
experiment ExpE˜A by invoking the adversary A, where B takes the role of Alice and A
takes the role of Bob. Note that B makes only one delegation key query.
weak-IND-sID-CPA adversary B against FE scheme
Commit : Initialize A’s status viewA. Invoke adversary A(viewA), and A chooses a set
D = {~x1, . . . , ~xN} of N d-dimensional points in [Z]d. B chooses i∗ ∈ [N ] at random,
and sends ~xi∗ to the challenger C as the target identity.
Setup : The challenger C runs the setup algorithm f Setup and gives A the resulting system
parameters pk = (p,G, G˜, e,Ω), keeping the secret key sk = (pk, params,master-key, ~τ )
to itself.
Challenge : C chooses two plaintexts Msg0,Msg1 at random from the message space Z∗p,
and a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. C sets the challenge ciphertext to CT = f Enc(Msgb, ~xi∗ , sk),
and sends (CT, f1(Msg0), f1(Msg1)) to B.
Learning Phase : B (playing the role of Alice) interacts with A (playing the role of Bob)
to simulate the experiment ExpE˜A. B proceeds as below.
KGen : Choose β, γ at random from Z∗p , and θ at random from G˜. Let (pk, sk) be
the key pair generated by the challenger C. Generate pk by removing Ω from
pk, i.e. pk = (p,G, G˜, e). Output (pk, sk) Note: B knows pk, but not sk.
DEnc :
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1. Choose N random elements W1, . . . ,WN from Z∗p and N random elements
v1, . . . , vN from G˜.
2. For each i ∈ [N ] except i = i∗, generate a tag ~ti = (θvi, vβi , f1(Wi)) ∈ G˜.
Note: With Ω, B can evaluate function fρ(·).
3. For each i ∈ [N ] except i = i∗, generate ciphertext CTi:
• Issue an encryption query (Wi, ~xi) to the challenger C and get reply
CT′i.
• Apply the homomorphic property of the functional encryption scheme
to attach vγi to the ciphertext: CTi ← f Mult(CT′i, vγi , pk).
4. Define the tag ~ti∗ and ciphertext CTi∗ based on the challenge message
(CT, f1(Msg0), f1(Msg1)): Set ~ti∗ = (θvi∗ , v
β
i∗ , f1(Msg0)) and
CTi∗ ← f Mult(CT, vγi∗ , pk).
5. Send (D,T = {~ti : i ∈ [N ]},C = {CTi : i ∈ [N ]}, pk) to A (Bob).
A in Learning Phase : A issues queries R1,R2, . . .. For each of such queries, B
simulates Alice in CollRes as below.
Step A1: B makes a corresponding anonymous delegation key query (Ri) to
the challenger C, and sends the reply message ~δi to A (Bob).
Step A2: Do nothing. Note: (1) According to our scheme and formulation, the
accept/reject decision is always hidden from A. So there is no need to do
verification here. (2) B does not know the function key ρi for the delegation
key ~δi, so is not able to perform all verifications in step A2 of CollRes.
A in Challenge Phase : A issues a query with range R: If ~xi∗ 6∈ R, B simulates
Alice in CollRes as below.
Step A1: B chooses a random element ρ ∈ Z∗p and makes a corresponding
delegation key query (R, ρ) to the challenger C, and sends the reply message
~δ to A (Bob).
Step A2: Receive response (ζ,X,Ψ2) for count query R associated with chal-
lenge message ~δ) from A. Perform all verifications as in Step A2 of CollRes.
Note: In this case B does know the function key ρ for the delegation key ~δ
and secret values β, γ, so is able to perform all verifications in step A2 of
CollRes.
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Otherwise, if ~xi∗ ∈ R then B abort and outputs a random bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} (Denote
this event as E1).
Guess : B outputs a guess bit b′ as below.
1. Invoke the extractor A¯(viewA) for A and get output {µi : i ∈ [N ]}.






and µi∗ 6= 0, then output b′ = 0 (Denote
this event as E2).
3. Otherwise, output a random bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} (Denote this event as E3).
Note that all three events E1, E2 and E3 are mutually exclusive, and only E2 is
the success case, and both of E1 and E3 correspond to failure.
Pr[b = b′] = Pr [E1 ∨ E3]Pr [b = b′|E1 ∨ E3] + Pr [b = b′,E2]
= (1− Pr [E2])× 1
2













∣∣∣∣12Pr [b = b′,E2 | b = 0]− 14Pr [E2 | b = 0]
∣∣∣∣ − (A.13)∣∣∣∣12Pr [b = b′,E2 | b = 1]− 14Pr [E2 | b = 1]
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ (A.14)
Advweak-IND-sID-CPAFE,B conditional on b = 0.
In case of b = 0, the forged tag ~ti∗ and ciphertext CTi∗ are valid and consistent,
and identical to those generated by DEnc. The simulated experiment ExpB˜A by B is
identical to a real one, to the view of A (even if A is computationally unbounded).
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Recall that by the hypothesis, A is a Type II adversary but not a Type III ad-






with o.h.p, and there exists
~xi ∈ D ∩R{, such that µi 6= 0 with non-negligible probability. We denote with E4






, and there exists ~xi ∈ D ∩ R{,
such that µi 6= 0.
Pr[E4 | b = 0] = Pr




)µi ∧ ∃~xi ∈ D ∩R{, µi 6= 0 | b = 0

= AdvThm A.3A,A¯ (A.15)
Denote with E5 the event that i
∗ ∈ S# = {i ∈ [N ] : ~xi ∈ D ∩R{, µi 6= 0}. In the
case of b = 0, the event E2 is equivalent to conjunctions of three events: ¬E1, E4,
and E5, i.e. E2 ≡ ¬E1 ∧ E4 ∧ E5. Since the conjunctions of E4 and E5 implies that
~xi∗ 6∈ R and ξ ∈ [d] is independently and randomly chosen, we have




Pr [E2 | b = 0] = Pr [¬E1 ∧ E4 ∧ E5 | b = 0]
= Pr [¬E1 | E4 ∧ E5 ∧ b = 0]Pr [E4 ∧ E5 | b = 0]
≥ 1
d









AdvThm A.3A,A¯ ( Event E4 implies that S# 6= ∅)
According to the construction of B, if b = 0 and event E2 occurs, the algorithm
B will output b′ = 0. That is, Pr [b = b′|E2, b = 0] = 1.
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Hence, conditional on b = 0, the advantage of B is
Advweak-IND-sID-CPAFE,B |b=0 =
∣∣∣∣Pr [E2 | b = 0] (Pr [b = b′ | E2, b = 0]− 12)
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 12dN AdvThm A.3A,A¯ .
(A.16)
Advweak-IND-sID-CPAFE,B conditional on b = 1.
Next we show that Pr[E2 | b = 1] is negligible under Computational Diffie Hellman
(CDH) assumption.
Claim A.6.1 There exists a PPT algorithm which solves Computational Diffie Hell-
man problem with probability equal to Pr[E2 | b = 1].
Proof of Claim A.6.1: The proof idea is: Given input (v, vγ, u), we choose a
random number R, and simulate the scheme E˜ = (KGen, DEnc, CollRes) by embedding
(u,R) into the tag/ciphertext for the target index i∗ and embedding (v, vγ) into
tag/ciphertext for the other index, . If b = 1 and event E2 occurs, we try to compute
uγ with the help of adversary A.
Algorithm D: Break Computational Diffie Hellman problem
1. Input is (v, va, u) ∈ G˜3, where the unknown exponent a is uniformly randomly dis-
tributed over Z∗p. The goal is to output ua.
2. Simulate the scheme E˜ = (KGen,DEnc,CollRes):
KGen: The same as in Section 11.1, except that let γ be the unknown value a:
γ ← a.
DEnc: (a) Choose N random elements W1, . . . ,WN from Z∗p. Choose i∗ ∈ [N ] at
random.
(b) For each i ∈ [N ] except i∗:
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i. choose zi ∈ Z∗p at random and compute vi = vzi and vγi = (vγ)zi =
(va)zi ;
ii. generate a tag ~ti = (vi, v
β
i , f1(Wi)) ∈ G˜3;
iii. generate a ciphertext CTi as in Section 11.1.
(c) For i∗:
i. generate a tag ~ti∗ = (vi∗ , v
β
i∗ , f1(Wi∗)) where vi∗ = u;
ii. generate a ciphertext CTi∗ = f Mult(CT
′, R, pk), where CT′ ← f Enc(Wi∗ ,
~xi∗ , sk) and R is a random element in G˜.
(d) Send all tags and ciphertexts and pk to Bob as in Section 11.1.
CollRes: The same as in Section 11.1, except that the simulator does not perform
the verifications in step A2 of CollRes.
Note: Since γ is unknown, some verifications can not be done.
3. Invoke the adversary A and simulate the experiment ExpE˜A using the above simulated
scheme E˜ .
Let (X,Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3,Ψ4) denote the reply returned by adversary A on the challenging
query range R and ρ be the corresponding random nonce. Note: When the adversary
A is in challenging phase, the verification cannot be done, since γ = a is unknown.
4. Let viewA be the view of A after the experiment. Invoke the extractor A¯ w.r.t. A,
and obtain output: {µi : i ∈ [N ]} ← A¯(viewA).










Denote the experiment ExpE˜A simulated by D as ExpD; denote the experiment
ExpE˜A simulated by B in the case of b = 1 as ExpB. Both simulated experiments ExpD
and ExpB are identical, to the view of adversary A (even if A is computationally
unbounded):
• In both simulated experiments, for each i ∈ [N ] except i∗, the tag ~ti and
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ciphertext CTi are consistent and identical as those generated by the algorithm
DEnc in Section 11.1.
• In both simulated experiments, the ciphertext CTi∗ is independent on the tag
~ti∗ :
– In ExpD,~ti∗ = (vi∗ , v
β
i∗ , f1(Wi∗)) and ciphertext CTi∗ = f Mult(CT
′, R, pk),
where CT′ ← f Enc(Wi∗ , ~xi∗ , sk) and R is a random element in G˜. That
is, the ciphertext CTi∗ is randomized due to the independent randomness
R in the execution of f Mult.
– In ExpB, ~ti∗ = (vi∗ , v
β
i∗ , f1(Msg0)) and CTi∗ ← f Mult(CT, vγi∗ , pk), where
CT← f Enc(Msg1, ~xi∗ , sk) is the ciphertext of Msg1, and Msg0, Msg1 are
two independent random elements in Z∗p. That is, the ciphertext CTi∗ is
randomized2 due to the independent randomness Msg1 in the execution of
f Enc.
• In both simulated experiments, for any range query R, A receives the same
(identically distributed) reply as in CollRes in Section 11.1.
We remark that the differences in the capabilities of verifications in the two simulated
experiments, are invisible to A, since all accept/reject decisions are completely hidden
from A.
Suppose b = 1 and event E2 occurs






and µi∗ 6= 0. It is easy to show that
φ = vγµi∗i∗ ; φ
µ−1
i∗ = vγi∗ = u
γ = ua.
2One can verify that randomization in f Mult is equivalent to randomization in f Enc, by checking
the constructions of f Mult and f Enc and the underlying BBG HIBE scheme. Note that public key
params of the underlying BBG HIBE scheme and Wi’s (Random numbers as in Step 1 of DEnc in
Section 11.1) are unknown to the adversary A.
3Note that the algorithm D cannot tell whether E2 occurs or not, since D does not know γ thus
cannot perform some verifications. D simply guesses that event E2 does occur, and this guess will
be correct with probability Pr[E2|b = 1]
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Hence, the above algorithm D solve the CDH problem with probability
Pr[E2 | b = 1] Pr[φµ−1i∗ = ua | E2, b = 1] = Pr[E2 | b = 1].
uunionsq
Therefore, under CDH assumption, Pr[E2 | b = 1] ≤ ν1, where ν1(·) is some negligible
function. As a result, conditional on b = 1, the advantage of B in breaking the FE
scheme is
Advweak-IND-sID-CPAFE,B |b=1 =
∣∣∣∣Pr [E2 | b = 1] (Pr [b = b′ | E2, b = 1]− 12)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12ν1. (A.17)
Advweak-IND-sID-CPAFE,B ≥









A.7 A valid proof should be generated by process-
ing each point within intersection D ∩ R for
exactly once
Theorem A.4 Suppose Assumption 4 and Assumption 5 hold, and BBG [BBG05]
HIBE scheme is IND-sID-CPA secure. For any PPT algorithm A, there exists a
PPT adversary A¯, such that all of AdvLem A.2A,A¯ , AdvThm A.3A,A¯ , and AdvThm A.4A,A¯ are
negligible, where the advantage AdvThm A.4A,A¯ of A against A¯ w.r.t. scheme E =
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({µi : i ∈ [N ]})← A¯(viewEA) :






)µi ∧ ∀i ∈ [N ], µi = 1)
 ,
where vβi is the second component of tag ~ti for data point ~xi ∈ D (See Step 2 of DEnc
in Section 11.1).
Proof of Theorem A.4:
Idea of proof. For any PPT algorithm A, applying Theorem A.3, let A¯ be the
PPT algorithm, such that AdvLem A.2A,A¯ ≤ 5 and AdvThm A.3A,A¯ ≤ 6 for some negligible
functions 5(·) and 6(·). Using proof of contradiction, assume that AdvThm A.4A,A¯ ≥ 7
for some non-negligible function 7(·). We construct a PPT algorithm B based on
A and A¯, such that B breaks Discrete Log Problem with non-negligible advantage
7 − (2d+ 1)(5 + 6).
Denote with E1 the event that ζ = accept
∧
∆ 6= ∏i∈[N ] (vβi )µi , and with E2







)µi ∧ ∃j ∈ [N ], µj 6= 1. We can split
the probability AdvThm A.4A,A¯ into two parts,
AdvThm A.4A,A¯ = Pr

(ζ,X, ~Ψ, viewEA,D,R)← ExpEA(1λ);
({µi : i ∈ [N ]})← A¯(viewEA) :
ζ = accept
∧




(ζ,X, ~Ψ, viewEA,D,R)← ExpEA(1λ);









∧ ∃j ∈ [N ], µj 6= 1

= Pr[E1] + Pr[E2].
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Part I: Pr[E1] ≤ (2d+ 1)
(





Suppose that: (1) The challenging query range is R. (2) Alice partitions R{ into 2d
rectangular ranges R1, . . . ,R2d and sets R0 = R. (3) For 0 ≤ ` ≤ 2d, denote with
(ζ`, X`,Ψ
(`)
2 ) the reply returned by adversary A in the execution of CollRes on range
R`. (4) Denote with (ζ,X,∆) the output of Alice in the execution of ProVer. (5)





According to the construction in Section 11.1 (i.e. Step 3 of ProVer), we have ∧
`∈[0,2d]
ζ` = accept




2 ⇔ ζ = accept (Denoted as statement A)
(A.18)
In additional to statement A, let us define statement A` and B` as below:




i , 0 ≤ ` ≤ 2d.




i ⇒ ∀~xi ∈ D ∩R{` , µ`,i = 0, 0 ≤ ` ≤ 2d.
Let us define integers µi, i ∈ [N ], based on integers µ`,i’s, ` ∈ [0, 2d], i ∈ [N ], as
below: For each i ∈ [N ], find the unique rectangular range R`, ` ∈ [0, 2d], such that
data point ~xi ∈ D ∩R`, then set µi = µ`,i.
The conjunctions of statements A, A`’s (0 ≤ ` ≤ 2d), and B`’s (0 ≤ ` ≤ 2d),
directly imply the following statement
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Applying Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 in Appendix A.2, we have
Pr
[





























≤ (2d+1) (AdvLem A.2A,A¯ + AdvThm A.3A,A¯ ) .
Part II: Break Discrete Log Problem.
Applying the result in Part I, we have Pr[E2] = Adv
Thm A.4
A,A¯ −Pr[E1] ≥ AdvThm A.4A,A¯ −
(2d + 1)
(




. We construct the following algorithm to break
the Discrete Log Problem.
DLP Adversary B
1. The input is (v, va) ∈ G˜2. The goal is to find a ∈ Zp.
2. Invoke scheme E = (KGen,DEnc,ProVer) with f2 defined as above, with the following
modification:
• In DEnc, for each i ∈ [N ], choose yi, zi ∈ Zp at random and set vi = (va)yi ·vzi ∈
G˜.
Note: B has full information of private key.
3. Simulate the experiment ExpEA, by invoking the adversary A (playing the role Bob)
to interact with Alice in E . Then invoke A¯(viewEA) to obtain {µi : i ∈ [N ]}.
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)µi ∧ ∃j ∈
[N ], µj 6= 1.




i . So a
univariable equation in the unknown variable a of order 1 in group Zp can be formed
by substituting vj = v
ayj+zj . Solve this equation and get a root a∗. Output a∗.
The PPT algorithm B constructed as above breaks DLP with probability Pr[E2].
Therefore, under Computational Diffie Hellman Assumption 4, DLP is infeasible
and thus Pr[E2] has to be negligible.
Combining results in Part I and II, we have
AdvThm A.4A,A¯ ≤ (2d+ 1)
(






A.8 Proof of Main Theorem 11.1
Theorem 11.1 (Main Theorem) Suppose Assumption 4 and Assumption 5 hold,
and BBG [BBG05] HIBE scheme is IND-sID-CPA secure. Then the RC protocol E =
(KGen,DEnc,ProVer) constructed in Section 11.1 is VRC w.r.t. function F (·, ·) as
defined in Section 9.1, under Definition 11. Namely, E is correct and sound w.r.t.
function F .
Proof of Theorem 11.1: The correctness is straightforward once we have Lemma 10.1.
Here we save the details and focus on the soundness part.
Suppose E is not sound, i.e. there exists a PPT algorithm A, with non-negligible
advantage 6 against E :
AdvEA = Pr
[
(ζ,X, ~Ψ, viewEA,D,R)← ExpEA(1λ);
ζ = accept
∧
X 6= F (D,R) (mod p)
]
≥ 6.
Applying Theorem A.4, let A¯ be the extractor for A such that all of AdvLem A.2A,A¯ ,
AdvThm A.3A,A¯ , and Adv
Thm A.4
A,A¯ are negligible.
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We intend to construct a PPT algorithm B based on A to break Assumption 4
(Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem), and argue that B succeeds with probability
about 6, with the help of A¯, under Assumption 4, Assumption 5, and the assumption
that BBG [BBG05] HIBE is IND-sID-CPA secure. The contradiction will imply that
such adversary A does not exist and the constructed scheme E is sound.
Adversary B against Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
1. The input is (u, uβ, vβ) ∈ G˜. The goal is to find v.
2. Choose a random number R1 from G˜. Then R1 = vθ for some unknown θ ∈ G˜.




)zj . Let Wm = ({uj , uβj : j ∈ [m]}).
4. Convert (Wm, R1, R2 = v
β) to Sm+1 = {(θvi, vβi )}mi=0 in the same way as in construc-
tion of algorithm A1 in the proof of Lemma A.1 in Appendix A.5.1.
5. From Sm+1, simulate the scheme E just as adversary B in the proof of Lemma A.2 in
Appendix A.5.2.
6. Invoke the adversary A and simulate the experiment ExpEA. Let (X, Ψ¯1, Ψ¯2, Ψ¯3, Ψ¯4)
be the reply returned by adversary A on challenging query range R in the execution
of CollRes.
7. Simulate the experiment ExpEA honestly (just using the algorithm Eval instead of
adversary A) and get query result Y = |D ∩R| and proof (Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3,Ψ4).






Note: (1) Y = F (D,R). (2) If A succeeds, then X 6= F (D,R) (mod p). Recall the
definition of function F : D× R→ Zp in Section 9.1.
9. Output R1θ′ .
Note that as in proof of Lemma A.2, the simulated scheme E is identical to a real one
from the view of adversary A.
For the constructed adversary B, we make the following claim:
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Claim A.8.1 Suppose Assumption 4 and Assumption 5 hold, and BBG [BBG05]
HIBE scheme is IND-sID-CPA secure. If A succeeds, it holds with o.h.p. (i.e. with











Proof of Claim A.8.1: If A succeeds, then its output (X, Ψ¯1, Ψ¯2, Ψ¯3, Ψ¯4) will
pass all verifications in the scheme E (Step A2 of CollRes and Step 3 in ProVer in





= Ψ¯2, ζ = accept. (A.20)
where ζ ∈ {accept, reject} denotes the corresponding decision (a part of output of
ProVer) regarding A’s reply on the challenging query.
Let (µ1, . . . , µN) be the output of extractor A¯. Under Assumption 4, Assumption 5
and the assumption that BBG [BBG05] HIBE scheme is IND-sID-CPA secure, by
applying Lemma A.2, Theorem A.3 and Theorem A.4, the following implications
hold with o.h.p.,





)µi ∧ ∀i ∈ [N ], µi = 1
 ;


















The output (X,Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3,Ψ4) returned by an honest Bob also passes all verifica-





= Ψ2, where Ψ2 =
∏
~xi∈D∩R
vβi is computed following the scheme. (A.22)
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= Pr [θ′ = θ] ≥ Pr [A succeeds] (1− negl) ≥ 6(1− negl),
where negl(·) is some negligible function. Therefore, the constructed algorithm B
breaks Assumption 4 with non-negligible probability 6(1− negl). The contradiction
implies that our hypothesis is wrong: such adversary A does not exist. Thus, the
constructed scheme E is sound and Theorem 11.1 is proved. uunionsq
